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This study offers a cultural history of Antiguan politics between 1967 and 1976. It demonstrates the 
emergence of Antiguan party politics and explores its early impact on society and culture. The 
dissertation does this by focussing on four key events in Antigua’s recent past: the 1967 schism in the 
labour movement, civil unrest and political convulsion in 1968, and the General Elections of 1971 and 
1976. Each of these events testifies to the development of a culture of ‘partyism’ - a political ideology 
that prioritises the survival and empowerment of one’s political party over any other principle or 
objective. In line with partyism, party membership became a defining feature of one’s identity within 
the Antiguan community, eclipsing other sources of identity such as class. This precipitated a process 
of societal polarisation whereby Antiguan society became sharply divided along party lines. This 
division was characterised by distrust between members of the opposing parties, hostility, and 
extreme political rhetoric. This in turn contributed to a process of pernicious polarisation whereby 
partyism reached such extremes that it resulted in a breakdown in good governance and long-term 
dislocation in Antiguan society. Many of the features and consequences of pernicious polarisation are 
apparent in Antigua today, making this study of importance to any with an interest in Antiguan 
politics and society. This project draws upon and contributes to scholarship on political polarisation 
and the social cost of politics. In particular, this case study of Antigua provides insight into how 
theories of politics and society apply, or do not apply, to very small states and postcolonial societies. 
Both smallness and postcolonialism loom large in this dissertation, and the project touches on 
substantial historical debates such as the appropriateness of the Westminster System in postcolonial 
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I first visited Antigua and Barbuda six years ago, one month after the 2014 General Election. Even 
after a month, the signs and symbols of polling day were everywhere: bunting and banners in bright 
blue and lurish red were strung the entire length of even the most rural streets; vast posters of 
candidates’ faces adorned every other tree trunk and lamp-post; and fliers and emblems were 
emblazoned across front porches, shop windows, car windshields, and children’s rucksacks. Even as 
someone deeply interested in politics and elections, I had never seen such an expression of political 
identity and party-political pride. In the intervening six years what began as surprised amusement has 
developed into a deep fascination with Antiguan politics. In particular, I have been struck by the 
extent to which politics permeates daily life in Antigua, and the degree to which political party 
membership constitutes a powerful source of Antiguan identity. Party loyalty is tantamount to a 
religion for many Antiguans; it is one of the most important ways in which people define themselves 
and each other, it constitutes a powerful community which is instilled from birth and rarely changed, 
and it is characterised by enthusiastic deployment of symbols and a largely unquestioning obedience 
of charismatic leaders. Party support in Antigua is divided between two parties - the Progressives and 
Labour. This dissection of the Antiguan population has resulted in polarisation of Antiguan political 
culture and wider society. Through the process of societal polarisation, party politics has come to 
invade non-political areas of daily life from youth groups to employment opportunities. Over time, 
political polarisation has become pernicious to the extent that society is deeply divided along party 
lines with significant negative impact on civil society and democratic government.  
 
The Question  
 
The objective of this project is to chart the rise of partyism and political polarisation in Antigua 
between the 1967 schism in the labour movement and the return of the Antigua Labour Party in the 
1976 General Election. In this dissertation, partyism is defined as an ideology which prioritises the 
survival and empowerment of one’s political party over all other principles, often creating a highly 
emotional and sometimes toxic political climate. This is my own definition which brings together a 
range of scholarship on politics, social identity, and political polarisation. With regard to partyism as 
an overriding ideology, I have drawn on current work by Jennifer McCoy who, with others, has 
shown that party membership has the potential to become the main driving force behind group 
activity, eclipsing other motivations such as ideology, and replacing them with a policy of party 
success at any cost.  Where partyism is apt to create emotive and hostile political culture, I have 1
drawn on the work of Cass Sunstein who has described partyism as a category of social differentiation 
that often leads to hostility and negative judgement between members of opposing parties.   2
1 Jennifer McCoy, Tahmina Rahman, and Murat Somer, "Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: 
Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities," ​American Behavioral 
Scientist​ 62, no. 1 (2018): 22. 





The Anglophone Caribbean is particularly susceptible to the influence of partyism. This is due 
to a lack of ideological diversity in Caribbean politics and a high degree of personalisation of political 
culture. Paul Sutton has shown that lack of ideological disagreement between parties is common in the 
Anglophone Caribbean, concluding that voters’ choice is less about ideology or policy and more 
about ‘personality, political leader, and political elite.’  This is particularly noticeable in small states 
3
such as those of the Eastern Caribbean where parties are ‘basically personalistic’ and often decline 
after the removal or death of the leader.  Small states are also vulnerable to what Seibert has called a 
4
‘small-town mentality’, whereby ties between individuals encourage personalised discussion and 
close association between rulers and ruled facilitates personalistic political discourse (as well as the 
extreme personalisation of political power.)   
5
Personalistic politics and small town mentality mean that small Anglophone Caribbean 
countries are more vulnerable to extreme cases of partyism than larger more diverse democracies. In 
such settings, partyism can result in political and social polarisation because it generates an 
exceptionally strong ‘us versus them’ attitude whereby competing parties are seen not just as political 
rivals but as threats to group survival.  This type of opposition encourages hostile and alarmist 
6
rhetoric, deepening the divide between members of competing parties. At its most extreme, the 
polarisation wrought by partyism inhibits cooperation, impedes good governance, and creates social 
discord. This dissertation asks therefore the following questions: How did partyism emerge in 
Antigua? And when and how did it become pernicious polarisation?  
 
Literature Review  
 
While the primary motivation for this project emanates from my own enthusiasm for Antigua, a 
secondary incentive is to address a problematic neglect of Antigua in existing historical literature. 
Antigua, along with its Eastern Caribbean neighbours, has been widely ignored by Caribbean 
historians and other researchers in the humanities, probably because of its small size and relative 
political stability. This is troubling because Antigua and nations like it have valuable contributions to 
make to multiple areas of study.  
Firstly, focussing on Antigua can contribute to work on Caribbean decolonisation by 
providing a case study to complement or contradict theories and narratives developed in relation to 
larger more well-studied countries like Jamaica or Trinidad. This is important because it helps avoid 
generalisations whereby broad theories are applied to unique and peculiar societies. For example, it is 
commonly asserted that the Anglophone Caribbean witnessed ‘two waves’ of political party formation 
- during decolonisation and after independence - and that Anglophone Caribbean politics is 
characterised by ‘the same two parties contesting and winning elections over and over again.’  Neither 
7
of these tropes apply to Antigua where a second party only emerged two decades after the first and 
3 Paul Sutton, “Politics in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Post-Colonial Experience,” ​European Review of 
Latin American and Caribbean Studies​ 51 (1991): 56. 
4 Wouter Pieter Veenendaal, “Politics and democracy in microstates: a comparative analysis of the effects of 
size on contestation and inclusiveness,” (PhD Thesis, 2013), 53. 
5 Gerhard Seibert, ​Comrades​, ​Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in Sao Tome 
and Principe​, (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 541. 
6 ​McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, "Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy,” 22. 
7 ​Matthew Bishop, Jack Corbett, and Wouter Veenendaal, "Labor Movements and Party System Development: 





where only one party has ever been re-elected following time in opposition. The history of Antigua 
thus has a role in combating generalisations that tend to lump ‘the Caribbean’ or even ‘the 
Anglophone Caribbean’ together as a single social and political entity.  
Relatedly, Antigua's example contributes to postcolonial studies. In particular, recent 
scholarship has reassessed the suitability of the Westminster System in postcolonial states. In 2015, 
Kate Quinn summarised potential negative features of the Westminster System in the Caribbean as 
including: 'unchecked executive power and the emasculation of the legislature, a lack of separation 
between the executive and legislative branches of government, an adversarial ‘winner takes all’ 
political culture, corruption, clientelism, and political tribalism.'  Each of these possible challenges 8
appear in this dissertation, with adversarial 'winner takes all' politics being a significant recurring 
theme in the development of Antiguan polarisation. Antigua contributes to this scholarship by 
demonstrating the universality of these challenges, even in a polity differentiated from many of its 
Caribbean neighbours. For example, even though multi-party politics emerged very late in Antigua 
(1968) it still led very rapidly to the development of a strong 'winner takes all', hostile form of 
oppositional politics. A reappraisal of Antigua's postcolonial political settlement could be a beneficial 
consequence of this project.   9
Thirdly, with a population of 60,000 in the 1960s and 1970s, Antigua provides a case study 
for politics in small places.  This is a topic which has only recently received the special attention it 
10
deserves, with scholars like Jack Corbett and Wouter Veenendaal emphasising the profound influence 
smallness can have on the colonial experience, decolonisation, and political practice.  Antigua's small 11
size has had a direct impact on its political culture, determining the relationship between voters, 
politicians, and other state actors such as business leaders. In Antigua, smallness has accentuated 
various problems inherent in the Westminster System, particularly the lack of separation of powers 
resulting from such a small government with significant overlap of personnel between legislative and 
executive branches. This absence of scrutiny enables the passage of legislation which in other 
circumstances would be regarded as extreme. Moreover, the narrowness of MPs’ majorities, close 
relationships across all sectors of the economy, and high accessibility of ministers contribute to 
corruption, further impeding good and fair governance and fuelling hostile politics and polarisation. 
Finally, this work engages with a growing awareness of and interest in countries most at risk 
from the main challenges of the modern era: globalisation and climate change. The severity of these 
issues is heightened in developing, tropical, and small countries such as Antigua. Economically, 
Antigua is overwhelmingly dependent on tourism and thus is vulnerable to shocks to the global 
market beyond its control. For instance, the 2008-09 financial crash caused a 8.9 percent contraction 
of Antigua’s economy and the recovering island now suffers from the collapse of tourism during the 
Covid-19 pandemic.  Environmentally, as a low-lying tropical island dependent on tourism for 
12
8 ​Kate Quinn, "Introduction: Revisiting Westminster in the Caribbean," ​Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics​ 53, no.1 (2015): 3. 
9 In the course of this dissertation I shall use a definition of ‘Westminster System’ as outlined by Matthew 
Bishop in Matthew Bishop, “Slaying the ‘Westmonster’ in the Caribbean? Constitutional reform in St Vincent 
and the Grenadines.” ​British Journal of Politics and International Relations​ 13, no.3 (2010): 422. 
10 “Population, total - Antigua and Barbuda”, The World Bank, accessed Jan 14, 2020, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2018&locations=AG&start=1960&view=chart. 
11 Jack Corbett and Wouter Veenendaal, “Westminster in small states: Comparing the Caribbean and Pascific 
experience,” ​Contemporary​ ​Politics ​22, no. 4 (2016):​ ​434. 
12 Auguste Kouame and Maria Reyes, “The Caribbean Region Beyond the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis. 
Options for the Caribbean After the Global Financial Crisis: Conference on economic growth, development, and 





income and groundwater for water, Antigua is acutely susceptible to the effects of global warming and 
rising sea levels. For example, in 2017 Hurricane Irma destroyed or damaged 96 percent of Barbudan 
housing and caused US$220 million in damage.  Partyism and polarisation severely hinder Antigua’s 
13
ability to deal with these challenges of globalisation and climate change. Greater appreciation for the 
causes of partyism and a discussion about ameliorating the effects of polarisation will better equip 




This study adopts a cultural approach to political history. Traditionally, political history has focussed 
on the role of political leaders, social elites, election cycles, and administrative structures.  Such 
14
emphasis overlooks the agency of ordinary people, accentuates the role of individuals, and postulates 
politics as a top-down event. The Caribbean region has especially been blighted by a reductive ‘great 
man theory’ of political history which focuses too much attention on the agency and unique 
capabilities of individual leaders. Many historians, such as Antigua’s Paget Henry, conflate political 
history with biography and produce narratives of national development focussed entirely on the 
actions of politicians, in Henry’s case V C Bird. In contrast, the cultural approach presents politics as 
a continually renegotiated social process rather than a defined and static system or structure. One of 
the most notable movements in recent decades has been the reintroduction of the concept of ‘the 
political’ as opposed to ‘politics’. Pierre Rosanavallon defined ‘the political’ as ‘everything that 
constitutes political life beyond the immediate field of partisan competition for political power, 
everyday governmental action, and the ordinary function of institutions.’  This represents a 
15
multidisciplinary approach to political history which has been widely adopted in recent years. When 
the term politics is used in this dissertation, it refers to a ‘synthetic and integrative’ process in line 
with Rosanavallon’s definition.   
16
A cultural approach to Antiguan political history requires an attention to sources which best 
demonstrate how party politics was discussed in the public sphere and how political polarisation 
developed over time. My starting point has been interviews with Antiguans from a range of 
backgrounds, conducted in November and December 2019.  I have been well placed to carry out this 17
research as my long-standing familiarity with Antigua puts me in contact with many enthusiastic 
participants. I purposefully interviewed a range of Antiguans, taking into account class, gender, 
locality, and party affiliation, in order to fully appreciate how the full spectrum of Antiguan society 
experienced the events discussed in this dissertation. As the long-term effects of polarisation are still 
13 “Antigua and Barbuda”, Union of Concerned Scientists, accessed Jan 15, 2020, 
https://www.climatehotmap.org/global-warming-locations/antigua-and-barbuda.html 
14 Steven Pincus and William Novak, “Political History after the Cultural Turn” ​Perspectives on History​ 49, no. 
5 (2011) accessed Jan 27, 2020, 
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/may-2011/political-history-after
-the-cultural-turn​, np. 
15 Pierre Rosanavallon and Samuel Moyn​e,​ ​Democracy: Past and Future.​ (New York: Columbia University 
Press 2006): 36. 
16 Pincus and Novak, “Political History after the Cultural Turn,” np. 
17 ​I gained permission from the Arts and Humanities Ethics Committee to conduct these interviews and have 
consent forms asserting each interviewee’s understanding of their rights as study participants and granting their 




being felt, I have also spoken to several young people, both boys and girls, to capture their perspective 
on the consequences of past events.  
This oral research was not without its challenges. As Antigua is a very small community and 
politics is a highly emotional topic I had to follow strict rules on confidentiality to obtain ethics 
approval, granting anonymity to all interviewees. Collecting oral histories is of particular importance 
because Antigua’s oral tradition means many people only pass on their life experiences through 
stories told to friends and children, rather than writing or recording them. This is especially the case 
among older working-class people, who lack the literacy skills and the resources necessary to make a 
permanent record. 
Using Antiguans’ testimony as my starting point I turned to other primary sources which 
demonstrate how partyism entered public debate. The most valuable sources in this regard were 
newspapers published by political parties and workers’ unions. The daily ​Workers’ Voice ​was strongly 
supportive of the Antigua Trades and Labour Union (ATLU) and the Antigua Labour Party (ALP). 
The ​Antigua Star ​meanwhile was the paper of the opposition groups - the Antigua Workers Union 
(AWU) and the Progressive Labour Movement (PLM). These sources demonstrate how political 
rhetoric changed over time and help to emphasise the notion of ‘the political’ as an ever changing 
social activity rather than a top-down event. Appreciating the role of daily papers in disseminating and 
reflecting on political opinion allows us to acknowledge how political debate was processed and 
interpreted by working people. Importantly, these highly-partisan periodicals served to reaffirm the 
political rhetoric of party leaders and acted to entrench party membership as an identity. By doing so 
these papers contributed to the emotionally-charged hostility between the two parties, exacerbating 
polarisation. I accessed most of these papers in the Antigua National Archive (ANA) while some have 
been shared with me from private collections. 
As well as newspapers, other material published for public consumption include pamphlets 
written by the fringe groups such as the Antigua and Barbuda Democratic Movement (ABDM) and 
the Antigua Freedom Fighters (AFF.) Much of this material only exists in private collections to which 
I have had access through friends and acquaintances in Antigua.  
The National Archives (TNA) and other depositories in the UK also held materials which 
shed light on the events in question. Most useful were reports and letters by the British Government 
Representative (BGR) to the West Indies Associated States. Headquartered in Castries, St Lucia, the 
BGR had no political power but provided advice to the six associated West Indian states and kept the 
UK government updated on internal political developments. Charles Roberts was BGR from 1967 to 
1970 and his deputy Desmond Kerr had an important role in mediating an Antiguan political crisis. 
The BGR had an interest in reporting the facts as objectively as possible so that the British 
government could respond appropriately. They also provide a perspective somewhat removed from 
the internal political intrigue of Antigua and its party-politics. As such, the BGR reports give valuable 
insight into how the Antiguan situation developed over time. Other official documents have helped to 
place the political environment into its regional and economic context. For example, industrial and 
economic reports contextualise political developments and deepen understanding of people’s 
behaviour and reactions.  
Overall, I have tried to draw on as diverse a range of primary material as possible. On the one 
hand I have drawn inferences from the lyrics of soca and calypso music which shed light on popular 
cultural opinion. On the other hand I have analysed electoral data and statistics which I have collated 
into a database from 1946 to the present. This latter type of quantitative analysis gives solid grounding 





Collecting these varied published and unpublished sources was not without its challenges. 
Firstly, the Covid-19 pandemic has severely restricted my access to primary sources held by public 
institutions. Even as lockdowns are being eased, most repositories in the UK and Antigua are 
operating a reduced service. Nonetheless, lack of access to these documents has not excessively 
impeded the satisfactory completion of this project. A more significant challenge has been the less 
than ideal preservation of physical material. Many Antiguan sources created in the 1960s and 70s 
were of poor quality - for instance, pamphlets printed on thin, low-quality paper. A lot of this has not 
survived, not least because of damage done by the tropical climate. Material that has survived has 
been further damaged by poor preservation and handling techniques. Relatedly, the cataloguing of 
most relevant primary resources is confusing as Antigua’s piecemeal decolonisation process meant 
different materials were sent to different institutions in the UK and Antigua. Moreover, 
source-identification procedures in all institutions are poor, likely due to erstwhile lack of academic 
interest in these documents. For example, until recently many items in the ANA had no catalogue 
numbers while in TNA many items lack accurate names or descriptions. Identifying and locating these 
scattered and poorly organised sources had been a time consuming task and I am grateful for the help 
in this matter provided by the ANA’s archivist, Joseph Prosper.  
A further challenge was the restricted pool of primary resources of relevance to the lives of 
working Antiguans. For example, low rates of literacy in the period under study means that primary 
resources generated by ordinary people are scarce. Working people’s memoirs such as Samuel 
Smith’s ​To Shoot Hard Labour​ are as notable for their rarity as their insight. This means that in some 
cases we simply do not have the data (such as extensive diaries, opinion polls, or contemporary 
ethnographic research) necessary to make explicit conclusions about people’s opinions and thoughts 
at the time. We are however able to combine all existing sources and conclude that all the available 
evidence implies people felt and thought a specific way. Moreover, I have been able to focus on 
specific, evidence-rich areas of everyday life, such as the workplace, and make inferences about the 
effects of politics on wider society.  
These diverse sources will be analysed using methods typical of cultural history. For instance, 
linguistic analysis of political rhetoric across a range of documents and over time gives insight into 
how political culture changed over time and how the same events were processed and presented 
differently according to party political affiliation. For example, rhetoric concerning treachery and 
nationalistic tropes increased as common themes in the language of political actors and commentators 
between 1967 and 1976. 
This rich source base will be complemented by the latest scholarship on a range of 
interrelated topics. In particular, recent work on political polarisation lends this dissertation its broad 
thematic structure. The study of political polarisation has well-established roots in the work of 
Hampton Davey (1972) and Giovanni Sartori (1976). These theories conceived of polarisation in the 
traditional sense as a measure of ideological or policy separation between two or more political 
groups.  However recent events such as Brexit in the UK and the Trump Presidency in the US have 18
revived interest in a more complex approach to polarisation. In 2016 James Campbell defined 
polarisation as ‘the condition of substantial and intense conflict over political perspectives arrayed 
along a single dimension.’  This is a useful definition because it acknowledges a wide scope of 
19
political perspective beyond traditional areas of political policy, such as the economy, and takes into 
account less clear-cut perspectives that have been pushed to the fore by Brexit and Trump such as 
18 ​McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, "Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy,” 20 





nationalism, populism, modernism, and so on. More recently Javier Garcia-Arenas (MIT, LSE) 
defined polarisation as ‘a key variable that quantifies the extent to which public opinion is split into 
two opposing extremes.’  This is an even better definition for it appreciates that all public opinion, 
20
not just political perspectives, have the capacity to fall into the trap of polarisation and contribute in 
some way to a division of society into opposing partisan groups. 
In most democracies Campbell’s ‘single dimension’ or Garcia-Arenas’s ‘opposing extremes’ 
take the form of a left-right or liberal-conservative socio-economic spectrum, as epitomised by the 
UK Conservative and Labour parties or the US Republican and Democratic parties.  However, the 
21
idea of polarisation along a left-right socio-economic spectrum does not apply to many developing 
postcolonial states. In 2019 Tahmina Rahman applied the theory of pernicious polarisation to 
Bangladesh, showing polarisation there to be based on two competing definitions of national identity 
rather than a left-right socio-economic divide.  With relation to Latin America, Levitsky et al (2016) 22
have shown that the most successful young parties there remain ‘programmatically ambiguous’ and 
have emerged from conflicts not predicated on the left-right spectrum but are borne of ‘socio-cultural 
and even personalistic appeals’.  This is where partyism comes into play in the Anglophone 
23
Caribbean; rather than being along a left-right spectrum, polarisation in Antigua is based on a 
party-political axis with two parties, with a similar ideology, competing for power.  
Jennifer McCoy has expanded the definition of polarisation still further. Recent political 
trends like the Morsi Government and coup in Egypt, the continuing populism of Orban in Hungary, 
and Brexit in the UK, have guided McCoy to forego traditional definitions of polarisation and their 
focus on a left-right spectrum all together.  McCoy et al’s expanded approach to polarisation has 24
advanced theories of societal and pernicious polarisation. These terms have been adopted and further 
developed by the likes of Murat Somer and Tahmina Rahman.   25
Societal polarisation is when political polarisation ‘spills over’ from the political sphere into 
wider society, affecting everyday non-political experiences such as work, education, social activity, 
and relationships.  This largely results from ‘political identities becoming social identities’ as a result 
26
of the establishment of party-based institutions such as clubs, youth organisations, newspapers, and 
symbols.  Through creating social identities, societal polarisation becomes self-sustaining and the 
27
polarising effect can even outlast the initial polarising agent.  In a 2001 study on ethnic polarisation 
28
in Yugoslavia, Murat Somer expounded the notion of polarisation as a 'cascade' or a snow-balling 
20 Javier Garcia-Arenas, “Political polarisation: the phenomenon that should be on everyone’s lips,” ​Caixa Bank 
research, ​May 14, 2019, accessed July 22, 2020, 
https://www.caixabankresearch.com/en/economics-markets/public-sector/political-polarisation-phenomenon-sh
ould-be-everyones-lips. np. 
21 “Political Polarisation,” ​Pew Research Center, ​accessed July 22, 2020, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/topics/political-polarization/. 
22 Tahmina Rahman, “Party System Institutionalisation and Pernicious Polarisation in Bangladesh,” ​The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science​ 681, no.1, (2019): 173. 
23 Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, and Brandon Van Dyke, ​Challenges of Party Building in Latin America​, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 11. 
24 ​McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, "Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy,” 20 
25 ​Rahman, “Party System Institutionalisation and Pernicious Polarisation in Bangladesh,” ​173. 
26 ​McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, "Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy,” 20. 
27 McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, "Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy,” 22. 
28 Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue, ​Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political 




phenomenon whereby it self-replicates and strengthens as more members of a group come to share 
similar and stronger perceptions of the ‘other’ group.  29
Self-sustaining societal polarisation has the capacity to generate pernicious polarisation. This 
is when polarisation has a detrimental impact on the social fabric of society and impedes good 
governance.  Tajfel and Turner established as early as 1986 that social identity categories, such as 30
party membership, are ‘essentially competitive’ and generate social rivalry, even when there is no 
significant disagreement on group objectives.  Recently Cass Sunstein has gone further in stating that 31
mere identification with a political party can create hostility towards members of an opposing party.  
32
Both these assertions are of relevance to Antigua where party rivalry emerged despite little to no 
ideological disagreement between the two parties. Antiguan political competition was about partyism 
and the dogged pursuit of power at any cost and almost exclusively took the form of negative 
campaigning. At its extremes this hostile competition generates an ‘us versus them’ attitude which 
‘exacerbates intolerance and discrimination, diminishes societal trust, and increases violence’.  
33
Polities exposed to such conditions find it impossible to ‘achieve the ideological, political, and social 
consensus needed for democratic governability.’  The negative impact of such polarisation of society 
34
and politics is what gives it the name pernicious.  
It is important to stress at this point that political, societal, and pernicious polarisation are all 
independent processes, rather than exclusive categories or events.  However, at least as I conceive of 35
them, they do have a semi-dependent relationship whereby political polarisation is a necessary 
prerequisite of societal polarisation which in turn is required to lay the groundwork for pernicious 
polarisation. Moreover, theories of polarisation are purposefully dynamic so as to accommodate the 
constantly developing nature of public opinion and political activity. Therefore, it is inaccurate to 
think of McCoy's three types of polarisation as progresive stages through which a society moves in 
sequence. Rather, it is more helpful to think of a society as being politically polarised whilst having 
certain features of societal polarisation. Similarly, a society may be societally polarised and 
experience certain flash-points of pernicious polarisation without being fully perniciously polarised. 
We should therefore think in terms of ‘markers’ of polarisation. When a significant number of 
particular markers are present we may speak of a society being politically, societally, or perniciously 
polarised. It should be emphasised also that polarisation is a dynamic process and a society may 
experience intense periods with many markers of pernicious polarisation before these decline; 
depolarisation is indeed possible, though it is difficult.  36
Other theoretical grounding for this dissertation has come from a variety of sources and 
reflects the multidisciplinary approach necessary for a cultural history of politics. In understanding 
how polarisation contributed to the concentration of political power, I have drawn on Paget Henry’s 
theory of political accumulation and authoritarianism in the Caribbean which itself draws on 
29 Murat Somer, “Cascades of Ethnic Polarization: Lessons from Yugoslavia,” ​The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science​ 573, no.1 (2001): ​129. 
30 McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, "Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy,” 19. 
31 Henri Tajfel and John C Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Behaviour,” ​Political psychology: Key 
readings​, ed. John T Jost and Jim Sidanius, 276-293, (Hove: Psychology Press, 2004): 283. 
32 Sunstein, “Partyism,” lecture. 
33 ​Murat Somer and Jennifer McCoy, "Transformations through Polarizations and Global Threats to 
Democracy," ​The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science​ 681​,​ no. 1, (2019):​ 2. 
34 Maria Pilar ​García-Guadilla and Ana Mallen, "Polarization, Participatory Democracy, and Democratic 
Erosion in Venezuela's Twenty-First Century Socialism," ​The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
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well-established work by Robert Michels.  Henry states that Caribbean political leaders pursued four 
37
strategies of expanding and entrenching their political power: conversion of political to social capital, 
self entrenchment, withdrawal from base control, and factional competition.  The latter two of these 38
strategies were of particular importance in the 1967-76 period. Meanwhile, the work of George Danns 
has provided the main theoretical guidance in relation to charismatic leadership in the context of 
Antigua’s political culture. Discussing authoritarianism in Guyana, Danns proposes a new form of 
Weberian charismatic leadership which he calls ‘new charismatic’ or ‘mesmeric’ leadership.  The 
39
mesmeric leader gains support within an existing political system through a combination of rational 
achievements and personal magnetism. He creates a highly personalised politics in which he himself 
is regarded as necessary for political stability and advancement. In return, the Antiguan case study is 
of benefit to these theories as it demonstrates how they do and do not apply to the particular context 




The dissertation adopts a chronological structure as this enables explicit demonstration of the rise of 
partyism and Antigua’s progression through McCoy’s three types of polarisation. The study is divided 
into four chapters, each focussing on a key milestone on the road to pernicious polarisation: the 1967 
schism in the labour movement, the formation of a new union and party in 1968, and the General 
Elections in 1971 and 1976. I shall analyse the evolution of rhetoric used by politicians and 
commentators in campaign literature, speeches, and newsprint. I shall then evaluate how the public 
responded to this rhetoric, paying attention to quantitative data such as voting patterns and levels of 
participation in public demonstrations.  
Chapter One analyses the 1967 split of the Antigua Trades and Labour Union (ATLU) and the 
expulsion of its leaders George Walter and Donald Halstead. These men had amassed huge popular 
support among the Union’s membership, particularly with younger Antiguans and the dock workers 
vital to the export of sugar.  Fearing their popularity posed a threat to his leadership, Union President 
40
V.C. Bird expelled them from the Union. Unlike previous purges, Walter’s dismissal precipitated a 
full-scale schism of the labour movement, with workers split between support for Walter and loyalty 
to Bird. This division was the foundation from which partyism developed in subsequent months and 
years. To understand how this dismissal led to a polarised political climate, I will explore in detail the 
evolving context in which the dismissal took place - especially focussing on the role played by 
Associated Statehood in 1967 and the so-called ‘Two Hats Problem’ which will be explained in 
Chapter One. To understand why this division was so powerful and long-lasting I will analyse the 
language used by political leaders, newspapers, and working people when discussing Walter’s 
dismissal and subsequent events. The dominant theme in this respect is a rhetoric of betrayal and 
treachery which drew on religious and moral language as well as ideas of politics and economics. 
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Through the use of such emotionally-charged and oppositional language, 1967 heralds the arrival of 
an ‘us versus them’ approach to politics.  
Chapter Two analyses the 1968 fallout of Walter’s dismissal. Drawing on his popular support, 
Walter established a rival union in 1968 able to challenge the previously unquestioned hegemony of 
Bird’s ATLU. The new Antigua Workers Union (AWU) was immediately successful with around 70 
percent of ATLU members defecting to it.  Walter then helped establish a new political party - the 
41
Progressive Labour Movement (PLM.) This brought together members of what I call a ‘coalition of 
discontent’ - a diverse group of politically active but previously disjointed Antiguans united through 
their opposition to Bird and building on the momentum of Walter’s new union. These new groups 
were opposed by Bird’s government and by big business, both of whom had an interest in maintaining 
the status quo. The tension between these forces culminated in a period of civil unrest in the spring of 
1968. Resultant negotiations led to a new political settlement which entrenched oppositional politics 
as a permanent feature of Antiguan political culture - symbolised by four by-elections in 1968.  The 
42
experience of civil unrest and the government’s efforts to curtail the rise of a new union 
institutionalised the polarisation of Antigua’s working class. The rise and success of the PLM ensured 
that this rupture would not remain an industrial matter but would be expressed in party political terms. 
By the end of 1968, party politics was established in Antigua and party membership had become a 
powerful marker of Antiguan identity, serving to maintain and perpetuate polarisation.  
Chapter Three shows that between 1968 and 1971, Antigua began to experience societal 
polarisation. As Jennifer McCoy and Tahmina Rahman, among others, have theorised this is the 
condition when political polarisation spills over into other areas of everyday life. Though McCoy et al 
have mainly focussed on larger democracies in South America and Europe, their theories on 
polarisation are of great relevance to Antigua. Chapter Three shows that by 1971 party politics had a 
pervasive influence on all areas of Antiguan life, from community activity to workplace 
discrimination. Societal polarisation escalated a tense political environment and heightened the 
emotional nature of party politics. It did this by entrenching oppositional hostility and minimising 
space for political cooperation. This will be demonstrated by an analysis of the 1971 General Election. 
This election shows that by 1971 party politics was the axis around which Antiguan socio-political 
life revolved. The election and the campaigns leading up to it also reveal that there was little to no 
ideological difference between the two parties and that their conflict was predicated not on policy but 
on personality.  
Chapter Four engages with the concept of pernicious polarisation and explores it in relation to 
the 1976 general election. Pernicious polarisation, also pioneered by McCoy, is when extreme societal 
polarisation begins to have a damaging effect on society and government.  The most explicit example 43
of this is the high degree of hostility between supporters of the opposing parties, often leading to 
violence, intimidation, and even terrorism. This in turn hinders good government by impeding 
cooperation and compromise.  Moreover, the culture of distrust undermines confidence in the 44
legitimacy of the governing party, encouraging civil disobedience and anti-government action. At the 
same time, the emotionally-charged atmosphere and an 'all or nothing' attitude to politics drives the 
governing party to pursue actions and legislation which would otherwise be deemed extreme and 
unconstitutional. This breakdown in democratic norms is the most dangerous consequence of 
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pernicious polarisation. In many ways, Antigua's 1976 election represented a moment of ‘peak 
polarisation’ in Antigua, evidenced by an almost full voter turnout and a near-perfect split of the 
electorate between two parties.  
The dissertation closes with a consideration of so-called ‘missed opportunities’ in Antigua’s 
political development between 1967 and 1976. This dissertation argues that there were and still are 
multiple flaws built-in to Antigua’s political system, such as the vulnerability to corruption of the 
Westminster System in such a small country. However, it was not inevitable that aggressive party 
politics became the dominant feature of Antiguan political culture or that Antigua underwent an 
experience of pernicious polarisation. Rather, these things came about due to consecutive decisions 
made by individual politicians and the wide-scale responses to those decisions by ordinary working 
people. There are, therefore, a number of missed opportunities whereby polarisation could have been 
avoided. Alongside these opportunities, the conclusion also points to the long-term effects of 




This introduction will close with a brief overview of Antiguan history up to 1967. Antigua is a small 
island in the Eastern Caribbean [see figures one and two.] Europeans first came across Antigua in 
1497 when Christopher Columbus named it after the chapel of Santa Maria la Antigua in Seville 
Cathedral, Spain.  In 1632 the island was colonised by English settlers who grew tobacco and then 
45
sugar. This work was done by enslaved Africans of whom there were 25,000 working on 300 
plantations in 1764.  Following the abolition of slavery in 1834, ex-slaves were forced to continue 
46
working on plantations by a Contract Act, the scarcity of land for agriculture or construction, and the 
absence of any other form of employment.  This perpetuated a binary racial polarisation whereby the 
47
island’s black population made up the workforce while the land and the means of production were 
owned entirely by white Europeans.  
From the 1930s onwards, constitutional reform brought greater levels of democracy to 
Antigua, though property qualifications barred most black Antiguans from participating in politics.  
48
However, through pooling resources some middle-class Antiguans were elected to the Legislative 
Assembly - beginning with Luther George in 1943. In 1939, Sir Walter Citrine, in Antigua as a 
member of the Moyne Commission, recommended that Antiguans organise themselves into a 
workers’ union in order to negotiate with employers for better conditions and wages. On 16 January 
1939 the Antigua Trades and Labour Union (ATLU) was officially formed, with jewellry store owner 
Reginald Stevens as its leader.  Other founding members included Norris Allen, Berkley Richards, 
49
and Vere Cornwall (VC) Bird. In September 1943 Bird replaced Stevens as Union President. The 
ATLU was a general union with membership open to “all manual and clerical workers above the age 
of 16...regardless of race and sex.”  Its constitution provided for a democratic structure with power 
50
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vested in an Executive Committee elected annually at the ATLU Conference.  In practice many 
51
executive-level elections were uncontested and figures like Bird as Union President were returned 
yearly without challenge.  
As the first general union, the ATLU gained a default hegemony over organised labour. This 
was mirrored in Antigua’s emerging democracy, with the ATLU Executive Committee fielding 
candidates in elections as Antigua Labour Party (ALP) representatives. The introduction of Universal 
Suffrage in 1951 ensured the ALP a monopoly on all elected positions in Antiguan politics - a 
dominance it retained until 1968.  Also in 1951 the number of elected seats in the Legislative 
52
Assembly increased from five to eight, heightening the role and responsibility of the democratically 
elected members. In 1956, further reform implemented Ministerial Government and Bird was made 
minister for trade and production [see appendix ii.]  
During this time the elected representatives introduced and campaigned for social reforms to 
improve the lives of working Antiguans. Such measures included land redistribution, economic 
diversification, and nationalisation of some key utilities such as the water supply.  The predominance 
53
of Labour as an organisation cannot be overemphasised. Between 1939 and 1967 the ATLU, though 
first and foremost a trades union, functioned as an all-inclusive civil society organisation playing a 
role in matters as diverse as education and family relations. In at least one instance, Bird himself 
mediated in an argument between a married couple and provided counselling.  The ATLU thus 
54
consumed areas of social life which in a larger, more complex country would give rise to a range of 
civil society organisations. Notably independent of ATLU were the established churches, though on a 
parish level even these eventually became aligned with opposing union and political groups.  The 
55
other exception to the ATLU’s umbrella-nature was big business which maintained its own 
independent pressure group in the form of the Antigua Employers Federation.  56
In 1967, Antigua, along with five other Eastern Caribbean colonies, became a self-governing 
state ‘in free association’ with Great Britain. This represented a halfway-house between colony status 
and independence whereby a new constitution granted Antigua internal self-governance whilst Britain 
retained control over defence and foreign policy. Under the 1967 Constitution, Antigua became a 
constitutional monarchy in accordance with the Westminster System. Adults over the age of 21 
elected a House of Representatives every 5 years which, along with an appointed Senate, formed a 
bicameral legislature. The Representative commanding the confidence of the House was made Chief 
Minister and tasked with forming a Cabinet from members of the Senate and House. This constituted 
the Government which acted on behalf of the Governor, who in turn represented the Queen of Antigua 
(Elizabeth II) as Head of State [see appendix iii]. As the only popular party, Labour had complete 
control of the House, Senate, and Government until 1968. As ATLU President, leader of the ALP, and 
Chief Minister, Bird had supreme political power in Antigua at the time of Associated Statehood in 
February 1967.  
Labour was not the only political movement in Antiguan politics however. In almost all 
elections a handful of candidates represented a range of small, transitory parties. Most of these were 
middle-class groups established to represent professional and business interests, such as the Antigua 
National Party (ANP). Many only campaigned for a single election before collapsing - the ANP only 
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campaigned in 1956 and stood candidates in only four of the eight constituencies.  The most 
57
important and longest lasting minority party in the pre-1967 era was Robert Hall’s Antigua and 
Barbuda Democratic Movement (ABDM). The ABDM is often overlooked and Paget Henry has 
called it a party led by ‘landed interests.’  While technically true, this does disservice to Robert Hall 
58
whose primary objective in establishing the ABDM was to scrutinise the government and challenge 
the notion of an elected one-party dictatorship.  To do this, Hall published a series of ABDM 
59
pamphlets, colloquially referred to as the White Papers which scrutinised the work of the Bird 
Government. The ABDM also had some electoral successes, managing to achieve a peak of 1,859 
votes across all constituencies in 1965.  While far outmatched by Labour’s 7,275 votes, the ABDM’s 
60
performance does show that there was a latent non-Labour aligned and even anti-Labour sentiment 
among some in the Antiguan electorate. The ABDM was never able to capitalise on this and never 
won a seat, largely because of widespread distrust of a Hall as a white Antiguan and a belief that the 
ABDM only represented landed or middle-class interests. However, Hall’s expertise, the ABDM’s 
infrastructure, and the proven existence of at least some anti-Bird support would be crucial factors in 
the formation of a political Opposition in 1967. When a successful Opposition did emerge it was 
through combining the political resources of the ABDM with the popular appeal of a new and rival 
labour movement.  
The political background to 1967 was thus one of complexity and change. The economic 
context of 1967 was no less chaotic. The dominant theme of Antigua’s twentieth-century economy 
was a transition from sugar-based agriculture to tourism. This is demonstrated through employment 
statistics which show a shift away from agricultural dominance in 1960 (30 percent of workers) and 
towards tourism and hotel construction in 1968 (60 percent or workers.)  This transition was largely 
61
welcomed by Antiguan workers, most of whom preferred work in hospitality to sugar production as it 
was less backbreaking, better paid, and offered more opportunity for rapid advancement.  However, 
62
the tourism industry was owned primarily by non-Antiguans - usually white British or American 
investors with the capital to build and maintain the infrastructure and supply chains necessary for a 
successful tourism industry. In 1968, only 200 of the 1,780 hotel bedrooms in Antigua were owned by 
Antiguans, and most of these were lower-quality guest-houses.  The Caribbean was and is a highly 
63
competitive tourism market. To attract foreign investors, the Antiguan government offered tax breaks 
and rebates which minimised government revenue drawn from tourism whilst maximising profits for 
the foreign investors.  The predominance of white ownership and the profit-stripping it facilitated 
64
have been ongoing problems for Antigua and is of importance to this dissertation.  
As well as the economic and political, one must appreciate the social context. Throughout the 
period under study, Antigua’s population can be described as black, working class, rural, and 
Christian. 92 percent of Antiguans were recorded as black during the period under consideration, with 
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1.3 percent white and the remainder of mixed-heritage.  This made Antigua among the most 
65
ethnically non-diverse societies in the Caribbean. Most Antiguan households operated a small profit, 
with income outmatching expenditure by an average of EC$1,700 per annum.  60 percent of 
66
Antiguans lived in rural communities, with the remainder living in the only city, St John’s.  
67
Religiously Antigua was Christian though no denomination held dominance; the largest religious 
groupings were the ‘established’ churches of Anglican, Moravian, and Methodist, established in 
Antigua in 1634, 1756, and 1760 respectively.  By 1967 a range of evangelical churches were also 
68
active and began attracting large congregations, particularly the Pentecostal, Pilgrim Holiness, and 
Seventh Day Adventists.  The religious context was therefore also characterised by change and 
69
diversity.  
The background to 1967 is therefore one of change in all areas of Antiguan life. In many 
ways, Antigua at the beginning of 1967 was at a crossroads: newly endowed with the rights of 
self-government, gripped by a rapidly changing economy at home and across the world, and watching 
the march of civil rights and political extremism throughout the Americas. The actions and reactions 
of Antiguans at this crossroads decided the future of this island nation and take the focus of this 
dissertation.   
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Chapter One: the Schism of 1967  
 
 
No history of Antigua during this period could ignore the influence the trade 
union movement has had on the shaping of events. I might go so far as to say 
that the history of Antigua from 1939 to 1964 has been the history of the 
trade union.  
70
 
Nouvelle Richards, scribe of the Antiguan labour movement, 1965. 
 
 
This chapter explores the 1967 schism within the Antiguan labour movement. It proposes that this 
event laid the foundations for oppositional party politics in Antigua and the political polarisation this 
would later create. This chapter shows that the nature of the schism and the rhetoric surrounding it 
generated a highly emotional and hostile political environment. Political arguments were couched in 
personalised terms, invoking language of treachery and stoking animosity between the two sides. This 
emotionally-charged atmosphere fed into an ‘us versus them’ and an ‘all or nothing’ approach to 
politics which encouraged the emergence of partyism in Antigua. Partyism - the pursuit of political 
power for one’s group at any cost - entrenched this emotional and hostile opposition in Antiguan 
political culture and established the preconditions for societal and later pernicious polarisation of 
Antigua.  
As shown in the Introduction, at the time of Associated Statehood in February 1967 Bird and 
Labour had internal political domination of Antigua. As President of the hegemonic ATLU, leader of 
the dominant ALP, and Chief Minister, Bird had a level of power that constituted an elected 
dictatorship. While dissenting voices existed outside of Labour, these were never popular enough to 
win election or challenge Bird’s authority. This sets Antigua apart from other Anglophone Caribbean 
nations which exhibited competitive multi-party democracies - a hallmark of the Westminster System 
- while Antigua maintained an elected one party dictatorship.  This situation radically and 71
permanently changed from May 1967 onwards.  
At an executive meeting of the ATLU on 5 May 1967, Bird introduced a resolution 
dismissing the union’s General Secretary, George Walter. Bird claimed that ‘I have come to the 
conclusion that we cannot work together and that some parting must take place.’  When pressed for 
72
an explanation, Bird accused Walter of advising Barclays Bank against lending money to the 
Antiguan Government to complete the nationalisation of the sugar industry and its land. Allegedly, 
Walter had done this to gain leverage in negotiations with the Government on behalf of workers at the 
Antigua Sugar Factory (ASF). However, this accusation had previously been investigated by a union 
sub-committee and found to be false. Accordingly, Walter initiated legal proceedings against the 
ATLU and was awarded $5,694 in damages, a verdict that was upheld by the West Indies Court of 
Appeal.  
73
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George Walter was a long-term leading light of the ATLU, having edited its newspaper ​The 
Workers Voice​ and been its General Secretary since 1960. Born in 1928, Walter attended the Antiguan 
Grammar School and established a small fishing business in St John’s. Walter encouraged other 
fishermen to join the ATLU and in the mid 1950s helped establish the Fishermen’s Section as the 50th 
section of the ATLU before being elected its chairman.  Walter therefore had a long history with the 74
ATLU at the crossroads between leadership and rank-and-file members. From the Fisherman’s section 
Walter cultivated relationships with members and skills as a coordinator and orator, eventually being 
elected General Secretary in 1960. Throughout the 1960s Walter amassed huge popular support 
through engagement with the membership and his proactive stance on labour issues. As well as being 
popular, Walter also came to criticise certain aspects of Bird’s leadership, particularly the overlap of 
personnel in the ATLU and the government. Threatened by his popularity and criticism, Bird used the 
Barclays Bank sabotage accusation to dismiss Walter on 5 May 1967.  
This chapter will explore the motives behind Walter’s dismissal before turning to the public 
reaction to understand why this purge led to a popular schism. The role of the media is then explored, 
with focus given to the language used by each side. In particular, the rhetoric of treachery set the tone 
for all subsequent political debate in Antigua. 
This discussion supports scholarship on the role of charisma in the Anglophone Caribbean. In 
particular, I draw on George Danns’s theory of the new charismatic or mesmeric leader to analyse 
how Bird maintained authority in the 1960s and also how he began to lose it before, during, and after 
the 1967 schism.  This chapter also affirms the perception that parties in the Anglophone Caribbean 75
emerged out of trade union movements, though in this case that fact was a cause of political disaster 
as well as strength.  Overall, this chapter shows that the 1967 dismissal and schism set the scene for 
76
the growth of oppositional politics underpinned by partyism and set Antigua on a course towards 
polarisation.  
 
Motives for Walter’s dismissal 
 
The accusation of sabotage was used by Bird to conceal two political motivations for dismissing 
Walter. First, a direct popularity contest between Bird and Walter - Bird hoped to remove a potential 
political rival in a single dismissal. But the more important motivation concerns what I call the Two 
Hats Problem. I use this term to refer to an overlap in leadership between a trade union and a political 
party, such as Bird being both President of the ATLU and leader of the Labour Party. The 
terminology comes from Keithlyn Smith who, in his reflections on Antiguan trade unionism in ​No 
Easy Push Over​, identified the ‘objectionable doctrine of one head wearing two hats’ as a major 
obstacle for Antigua’s trade union movement.  This overlap results from the fact that in the 
77
Anglophone Caribbean political parties have usually emerged from trade union movements, whose 
organisational structure and social networks provided an institutional framework on which political 
parties could be constructed.  In the most extreme cases where little to no differentiation between 
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union and party happens - of which Antigua’s Labour is an example - the executive members of the 
union automatically assumed the leadership of the party. When these ‘union-parties’ adopted 
responsibilities in colonial administrations - and later in independent governments - this overlap 
became problematic because the interests of a government and a trade union often conflicted.  
The Two Hats Problem became more pronounced as a result of Associated Statehood in 
February 1967. Firstly, Associated Statehood constituted a political realignment whereby the 
Antiguan Government, now headed by Bird and Labour, became the target of public political 
dissatisfaction. Previously, Labour had been able to blame the colonial administration for economic 
hardship. This produced a political paradox whereby the same men were the target of popular 
dissatisfaction (the Government) whilst also being working people’s most effective spokespeople (the 
Union.) Secondly, now responsible for Antigua’s finances, Labour needed to balance the demands of 
organised labour with the requirements of the national economy. Often, the former were sacrificed in 
favour of the latter. Similar situations were found throughout the Anglophone Caribbean, notably in St 
Kitts and Nevis where Bradshaw and subsequent Premiers' conflicted positions contributed to 
Labour’s 1980 electoral defeat.   
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An example of the Two Hats Problem in effect in Antigua is the 1966 West Indian Airlines 
dispute. Union-purist Keithlyn Smith demanded industrial action to support workers employed by the 
airline while Bird opposed any activity that could discourage investment in the tourism industry.  
80
Here Bird sacrificed workers’ interests in favour of the national economy, prioritising his job as Chief 
Minister over his role as union President. This incident also demonstrates the central role of foreign 
investment in Antiguan political decision making.  
Bird wished to retain his Two Hats for two reasons. First, while he did not go so far as 
Jamaica's Bustamante in the explicit practice of what Richard Hart has called 'Proprietary Unionism’, 
Bird viewed the ATLU as an organisation which he had a right to lead.  Furthermore, Bird drew 
81
much of his authority and legitimacy from his dual role as leader of Antigua’s workers’ union and its 
popular political party. For Bird, these positions were fundamentally entwined, with one supporting 
and strengthening the power bestowed by the other. Separating these positions, as Walter wanted to 
do, would decrease Bird’s power in Antigua and threaten his hold on whichever of the two positions 
he retained. Bird’s desire to remain both Chief Minister and Union President was the first and 
foremost motivation behind Walter’s dismissal.  
Bird’s second motivation was the threat posed by Walter’s popularity. During the 1960s, 
while Bird was distracted from Union business by his work as an MP, minister, and Chief Minister, 
Walter amassed support among the ATLU rank-and-file. Throughout the 1960s, Walter, as General 
Secretary, travelled throughout Antigua speaking to working people, which made him the 
approachable face of the Labour movement. In contrast, Vere Bird, Lionel Hurst, Bradley Carrott, and 
other ‘union-ministers’ became less relatable and less appealing. This was commented upon explicitly 
by multiple interviewees who remarked that prior to becoming Chief Minister, Bird would tour the 
villages and mediate in matters as seemingly trivial as family arguments.  One villager said that after 
82
his involvement in politics this stopped and Bird ‘lost his way’ by falling out of touch with working 
people.  The fact that this was said by a long-term Labour supporter shows that even some of his own 
83
loyalists recognised a divergence in Bird's priorities. In contrast, Walter was, in his own words, 
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“providing the bread and butter…[he] became very popular.”  Bird’s withdrawal mirrored that of 
84
other Caribbean leaders. For example, Pedro Noguera has explored how Eric Gairy, after gaining 
power in Grenada in the 1970s, replaced popular appeal with targeted use of patronage and favours to 
maintain necessary strategic support. As a result, as Gairy’s ‘control over government became more 
secure and his confidence grew, he became increasingly aloof and isolated from his followers.’  In 
85
Antigua, in the wake of Bird’s own aloofness Walter mobilised support among working people, 
especially the young and urbanised in new and growing sectors like tourism.   
86
As well as physically distanced, Bird’s Cabinet became less ideologically aligned with the 
working class. This happened because of simultaneous deviations from the status quo consensus. On 
the one hand, the Two Hats Problem meant that Bird’s actions in government became more geared 
towards the needs of a stable and reliable capitalist economy, at the expense of his earlier more radical 
reformist socialism. On the other hand, a new generation of political activists was emerging. This new 
generation was better educated, had some experience of living and working standards abroad, and was 
familiar with the political thought emanating from the US Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. This 
generation combined socialist ideology and civil rights discourse to advocate for further social and 
economic reform in Antigua. A leading example of this new generation was Tim Hector, a student of 
C.L.R. James, who abandoned academic study in Canada in 1967 to advance the radical anti-colonial 
movement in his native Antigua.   87
The ideological divergence between the early labour movement and the younger generation 
was emphasised by a different attitude to the state of decolonisation in 1967. For Bird and his allies, 
ministerial governance and universal suffrage were achievements to be celebrated and perfected. 
However the younger generation, which grew up with these rights as accepted norms, saw such 
freedoms not as successes but as starting points in the long fight for true independence. This created a 
generation of Anriguans who felt less duty-bound to support Bird and more willing to champion 
radical activists such as Walter. Growing up in a semi-democratic country with self-governance on the 
horizon also increased the expectation of fuller democratic practices among this generation. This 
meant they were more sceptical of the conventions which, for instance, saw Bird’s position as Chief 
Minister and ATLU President uncontested. Bird himself was aware of this shift in popular opinion 
and attempted to instil a sense of obligation towards himself and Labour among younger Antiguans. 
One way he did this was to begin public speeches with long lists of ALP achievements in an attempt 
to link Antiguan development with his and his party’s actions.  Nonetheless, better education, 
88
exposure to radical literature and movements, and heightened expectation of democracy throughout 
society meant that this younger generation provided Walter with a pool of support when he was 
dismissed from the union.  
This generational dynamic can be seen at play in debates around tourism and how this 
growing sector should be managed. On one side, Bird recognised that tourism would only flourish in 
Antigua through extensive foreign investment. To attract investment, Bird wanted to foster a stable 
domestic economy, part of which involved limiting industrial action. This has already been shown in 
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the 1966 West Indian Airlines example [see page 19] wherein Bird refused to sanction union strikes 
that threatened to deter investment in tourism. In contrast, Walter argued that Antigua’s transition to a 
tourism economy provided an opportunity to proactively assert local financial control, enshrine 
workers’ rights in the emergent hospitality sector, and put an end to centuries of white financial 
domination. The contrast between Bird’s ‘kid-gloves’ approach and Walter’s proactivity demonstrates 
the divergence between the old and the new generation of labour activists. This generational dynamic 
was recognised by contemporaries and commented upon frequently in the Administrator’s intelligence 
reports. One of these reports, for instance, spoke of long-running arguments between “the older hands 
of the Labour Party” and “the younger.”  A similar observation was made by deputy-BGR Desmond 
89
Kerr who recognised the 1967/68 divisions as largely between “the younger field officers of the union 
and its Executive.”  Recognising this dynamic and Walter’s rising popularity with the younger 
90
generation of workers provided Bird with a further incentive to dismiss Walter from the ATLU. If 
Bird thought that purging the ATLU of Walter would eradicate the threats to his own political 
supremacy, he was wrong. In fact, by dismissing Walter, Bird helped bring about the period of 
multi-party politics in Antigua and heralded the dawn of polarisation.  
 
Walter's dismissal in a wider context  
 
Walter’s dismissal exemplified Bird’s leadership style which was despotic from the moment he 
became ATLU President in 1943. Within the first year of his Presidency, Bird oversaw a number of 
dismissals and resignations, all of which stemmed from disagreements with his leadership. Ashley 
Kirwan quit as chairman of the ATLU Factory Branch in protest at Bird’s autocratic control of the 
ATLU.  Also in 1943, the editor of the ​Workers' Voice, ​Musgrave Edwards, was forced from the 91
ATLU after criticising Bird and the Executive Committee.  A year later, Emmanuel De Souza left the 92
ATLU and formed the Antigua United Port Seamen and General Workers Union and a political arm, 
the Antigua Democratic Labour Party, to (unsuccessfully) challenge Labour’s hegemony.  The first 
93
factional purge happened in 1948 when ATLU General Secretary Samuel James was ousted by Bird 
because he had criticised the President’s leadership.  A group that Novelle Richards called ‘The 94
James Faction’ was also expelled, making this the first factional purge in Antiguan history.  Many of 95
these dissidents joined the tiny middle-class Antiguan National Party or the Antiguan Democratic 
Labour Party, neither of which had an impact on elections.  As well as causing arguments within the 
96
ATLU, Bird’s autocracy was commented upon throughout wider society. On one end of the social 
spectrum sugar labourer Samuel Smith commented that “If it wasn’t the president’s idea, it wasn't any 
good.”  Meanwhile, the Governor reported as early as 1949 that “Mr Bird is suffering from a lust for 
97
power”  and in 1951 that “Mr Bird’s egomania is on the increase, and he is developing into a local 
98
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Hitler.”  Bird therefore had a widely recognised propensity for ousting opponents and censuring 
99
dissident opinion. This makes 1967 all the more significant because this dismissal or purge unlike the 
others resulted in a schism of the labour movement.  
Bird’s autocracy stemmed directly from the highly personalised nature of political power in 
1960s Antigua. Most significantly, the supreme and guiding law of the ATLU was not a manifesto or 
set of policies but the exclusive edict of Bird. Bird’s word was law because of the strength of his 
charismatic leadership - which is discussed elsewhere in this dissertation - and the lack of a codified 
manifesto to guide union activity. A 1961 booklet on ‘ATLU Rules’ lists the Union’s objectives in 
broad terms such as ‘maintain wages, conditions, and protect interests’, and ‘furtherance of lawful 
political objects affecting labour.’  These were deliberately ambiguous in order to maximise the 
100
union’s appeal to as many workers as possible and maintain acceptability in the eyes of the colonial 
administration and businesses. Lacking a codified manifesto encouraged spontaneous decision making 
by the President. Bird’s charismatic authority then made these decisions unquestionable in the eyes of 
many. This combination meant union members had no protection against Bird’s autocracy. 
Ultimately, in the words of Governor Baldwin, “No man must be against him and what he says must 
be obeyed.”   
101
 Bird’s autocracy was no outlier in the Anglophone Caribbean in the decades after WWII. In 
particular, Bird’s behaviour leading up to 1967 supports Paget Henry’s discussion of personal power 
accumulation in the pre-independence period. In relation to Caribbean political parties and nation 
states, Henry theorises that political power can be accumulated as a form of privately held capital 
which can be ‘reinvested’ through self-entrenchment in positions of power, withdrawal from base or 
popular control, and controlled use of factionalism.  This enlarged capital can then be exchanged for 
102
social status, commodity wealth, and more political power.  Each of these modes of accumulation 
103
were demonstrated through Bird’s leadership of both the ATLU and the ALP. Paget’s and others’ 
theories of power accumulation will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
The Public Response and Bird’s Charisma  
 
The foregoing discussion has argued that Walter’s dismissal and Bird’s authoritarianism were not 
unique in Antigua or the wider Caribbean. Why then did this dismissal lead to an unprecedented 
rupture of the Antiguan labour movement and establish the preconditions for partyism? The answer to 
this lies in the response of ordinary working Antiguans. Previous dismissals had not led to schism 
because the likes of Samuel James had not carried popular support, the nature of the purge was 
secretive, and Bird’s word was unquestioned by the majority of Antiguans. These conditions no 
longer applied in 1967. As has been discussed, through the 1960s, Walter cultivated significant 
personal support while Bird became alienated from his own base. Walter’s supporters were 
predominantly the young and the educated, less enthralled to Bird as their hero and more supportive 
of Walter’s calls for further socio-economic reform to forestall a new white capitalist hegemony. 
Finally, Walter ensured that his dismissal was a matter of public debate and initiated legal action so 
that all Antiguans would be cognisant of his ousting and able to make up their own minds whether or 
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not they could continue to support Bird’s autocratic rule. Ultimately, it was the reaction of working 
Antiguans that made 1967 a turning point. 
It must be emphasised that sources relating to the thoughts of working Antiguans are rare. 
Reasons for this have been outlined in the Introduction and include poor literacy rates, low incentive 
or resources to record thoughts, and poor preservation. Nonetheless I have tried to piece together the 
public’s response to the events of 1967 by drawing on all available data. Moreover, though we have 
little evidence of how people thought, we do have data about what they did and may draw inferences 
from those facts.  
One objective measurement from which we can draw inferences is the movement of working 
people out of the ATLU, voluntarily following Walter. On 16 May, 11 days after his expulsion, 
Walter established the Antigua Workers Union (AWU). There are no statistics on how many workers 
joined the AWU in its early months because no official count of workers was performed in 1967; until 
new contracts were negotiated in 1968 most AWU members were still officially members of the 
ATLU. However, it is commonly argued that around 70 percent of ATLU members abandoned Bird 
and joined the AWU.  Speaking to Alexander in 1979, ATLU second vice-president Bradley Carrott 
104
remarked that following the departure of 70 percent of its members, including all of its field officers, 
the ATLU had “almost ceased to exist.”  It is significant that field officers abandoned the ATLU 
105
because these were the men most involved in the day-to-day running of the union and in closest 
contact with its members. The departure of these officers deprived the ATLU of their expertise and 
connections and made a mass departure of rank-and-file members likely. It is notable that 70 percent 
of the ATLU’s membership defected despite the fact the AWU was not officially recognised by the 
government, the Antigua Employers Federation, or the majority of businesses. This demonstrates 
profound popular belief in the legitimacy of Walter’s leadership, supporting the points made earlier 
about him being seen by most as the truest representative of their interests. Like the ATLU before it, 
in the eyes of Antiguans the authority of the AWU and its leaders came not from legal sanction but 
from popular support.  
Another way the public reacted to Walter’s dismissal was through attendance at public 
meetings. The first of these was on 10 May, 5 days after the dismissal, at the Antigua Recreation 
Ground in St Johns. Talking about that crowd, Walter claimed “probably half of Antigua turn up” and 
that he had “never seen a crowd like that in all my life.”  Of course one would expect Walter to 
106
exaggerate the crowd’s size in order to present himself as a popular leader. Nonetheless, it cannot be 
disputed that a large number of Antiguans attended this explanatory meeting. This is hugely 
significant because it shows that for the first time Bird’s edict was not accepted as an unquestionable 
truth. By merely attending the meeting, workers implied they were at least sceptical about Bird’s 
version of events and wanted to know more. The 10 May meeting signifies the beginning of the end of 
Bird’s universal charismatic authority and signals the rise of partisan politics for the first time. To 
fully appreciate the significance of these events one must consider the important role of charismatic 
authority in Caribbean political culture.  
The role of charisma in Caribbean politics has been widely discussed and some scholars, 
including Nigel Bolland, Olwyn Blouet, and Paget Henry, even reference Bird in their discussions. 
Unfortunately, Walter has received little attention which is regrettable because Walter’s rise to power 
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has as much to reveal about charismatic leadership as Bird’s. To unpack charismatic authority, I am 
particularly drawing on Danns’s theorisation of ‘mesmeric’ or ‘new charismatic’ authority which 
emerged from the 1980s following his experiences in Guyana.  Some, including Paget Henry, have 107
criticised Danns’ work as too Guyana-centric and military/police focussed but I find his idea of the 
‘mesmeric leader’ insightful and applicable to the Antiguan case study.  Traditional Weberian 
108
charismatic authority stipulates that leaders gain authority through a perceived special ability which 
uniquely qualifies them to hold political power, usually for the purpose of reforming the existing 
socio-political system.  According to Danns, traditional Weberian charismatic authority is not 109
applicable to the modern Caribbean context because of several social and political differences 
between western Europe and the Caribbean, as well as a marked difference in the modus operandi of 
modern Caribbean leaders like Bird. The new charismatic leader is perceived to have a special ability 
to lead, but this stems from their membership of the majority group and their symbolism of the 
popular cause. This differs from Weberian charisma where the leader is deemed to be somehow 
unique or special and is themselves the cause, rather than representative of the cause.   110
The methods of new charismatic leaders also differ from the Weberian model, especially in 
the way the latter seeks to revolutionise or recreate society while the former operates entirely within 
the existing institutional political framework.  Bird gained power by participating in the colonial 111
political system, not revolutionising it. For Danns, new charismatic leaders gain power within an 
existing system - in this case being elected - by using popular agitation and rhetoric focussed on 
economic and utilitarian goals.  This focus on economy rather than social revolution is another 
112
feature that differentiates charisma from Danns’s new charisma. Once in a position of power, the 
resources available to the new charismatic leader, such as powers of patronage and appointment, can 
be exploited to generate a highly personalised form of political power. If maintained long enough, this 
personalisation of politics makes the new charismatic leader inseparable from the political office he 
holds. On gaining political power through constitutional decolonisation, the mesmeric leader must 
exchange the politics of agitation for the politics of stability. This involves turning the government 
institutions against which they previously rebelled into objects of popular trust and support. Danns 
proposes that the mesmeric leader can maintain control through a ‘personalised’ form of Weber’s 
rational-legal authority where institutionalised power systems are combined with extreme use of 
patronage and the removal of all dissenting opinion.  This perfectly describes Bird’s initial period in 113
power which the acting British Representative in the West Indies, Desmond Kerr, described in 1968 
as “maintained by a judicious mixture of benevolent paternalism and autocratic coercion.”   
114
However, Bird failed to transform government institutions (at the head of which Associated 
Statehood had just placed him) from objects of resistance to objects of trust. This exposed Bird as 
Premier to the same criticisms he had levelled against the prior colonial administration. This shift 
correlated with the previously discussed generational dynamic whereby a growing proportion of the 
population had less unquestioning faith in Bird’s authority and ability. These developments resulted in 
many members of the Antiguan working class perceiving Bird as leading a new elite sympathetic to 
the demands of white foreign capital. For these people, Walter was the most legitimate and effective 
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leader of the labour movement. The gradual collapse of Bird’s charismatic authority is demonstrated 
by workers’ attendance as Walter’s 10 May public meeting. 
The destabilisation of Bird’s charismatic authority can also be seen in the changing 
relationship between Bird and the public. Two days after Walter’s public meeting, the ATLU 
organised their own in order to challenge Walter’s narrative. That this meeting was called at all is 
significant because it is the first time Bird was put on the defensive and felt required to justify his 
actions to the public. Previously, Bird’s charismatic authority was such that his actions needed no 
explanation. The behaviour of the 12 May crowd reinforces this point. Even the pro-Labour ​Workers' 
Voice ​reported that Bird was booed and heckled to such an extent that he was forced to flee under 
police escort.  This behaviour shows the erosion of Bird’s charismatic authority and speaks to a 115
profound shift in the attitudes of working people which would later coalesce into political polarisation 
along party lines.  
 
The Role of the Media  
 
This chapter will end by exploring how the events of 1967 were presented in Antigua’s printed media 
and how Walter overcame personal attacks in the press to lead a new anti-Bird movement. 
Newspapers and pamphlets are a valuable source as they provide insight into how competing factions 
argued their points and how political rhetoric evolved over time. It is important to consider the 
debates and opinions to which working people were exposed on a near-daily basis as this impacted 
how they thought and acted. This is of particular relevance to 1960s Antigua where reading and 
discussing published material was a communal activity and where readership was a meaningful 
marker of one’s identity. A lifelong Labour activist told me that they would organise group readings 
of ​Workers’ Voice​ in their village and that these became a weekly community event with food and 
music, exclusively for Labour supporters.  The principal publications in 1967 were the pro-Labour 116
Workers’ Voice ​newspaper and the anti-Labour ABDM Pamphlets.  
The ​Workers' Voice ​was the official newspaper of the ATLU, with publication ranging from 
daily to weekly, depending on circumstances. Bird had close, unofficial authority over the paper’s 
content. Its editor was always a close ally upon whom Bird could depend to espouse a pro-Bird, 
pro-Labour message. Deviations from the party line were punished immediately. For example, in 
1964 Bird sacked the editor for publishing two articles questioning government policy, replacing him 
with Levi Joseph, a close friend.  ​For much of the period under study, the editor was Dorcas White, a 
117
young and talented Bird loyalist.  The author of most headline articles is not stated so we must 118
assume these are the work of White or other Bird-approved journalists, possibly even Bird himself. 
Other articles were written by Labour activists including John St Luce - a Labour executive and later 
an ALP Senator, Representative, and Minister. Moreover, the ​Voice​ was printed at the ATLU printery, 
so Bird and his ATLU leadership allies had literally close oversight of the paper and its content. The 
Voice ​must therefore be read as a piece of Bird-sanctioned Labour propaganda designed to maintain 
support for Bird and sabotage any efforts to draw power away from him.  
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In relation to Walter’s dismissal, the ​Voice ​initially maintained a ‘nothing to see here’ 
approach. However, as Walter’s popularity grew this narrative was replaced by a series of vicious 
personal attacks, which set the tone for the personalisation of party politics in years to come. In the 
1967-76 period Antiguan, political campaigning and the partisan media were almost entirely 
dedicated to negative campaigning. This is where campaigns and partisan media differentiate political 
groups from each other by attacking the integrity or ability of their opponent.  In a 2015 study on US 119
politics since 2008 Alan Abramowitz and Steven Webster concluded that negative campaigning 
directly contributes to polarisation by strengthening party loyalty and undermining trust between 
opposing groups.   120
On 7 May, two days after Walter’s expulsion, the ​Voice​ ran an editorial entitled “Who is 
responsible?” in which it detailed the responsibilities of a union’s General Secretary.  The piece’s 
121
gist was that a General Secretary is an employee of a union and must only act on the instruction of the 
union’s executive committee; the implication being that a secretary who acts beyond his brief ought to 
be fired. Even though George Walter’s name does not appear in this editorial the association is 
obvious. Similarly, the ​Voice​’s 10 May cover story discussed the appointment of Joseph Lawrence 
and the Sheppard brothers to senior positions in the ATLU without mentioning the fact that these 
appointments were necessary to fill vacancies left by Walter, Halstead, and Smith.  The most 
122
astonishing example of the ​Voice​’s ‘head in the sand’ attitude may be found in a 13 May cover story. 
In it the ​Voice ​conceded that heckling led to the ATLU’s 11 May public meeting being abandoned but 
went on to say that, otherwise “business went on at Union’s headquarters as usual”  Given the state 
123
of worker agitation at the time this is an extraordinarily bold claim which epitomises a blatant 
‘nothing to see here’ attitude. This demonstrates that even in the wake of Bird’s rejection by the 
public, the leadership behind the ​Voice​ were still hoping that their readers would ignore Walter and 
his supporters and that he would quietly disappear like previous purge victims. This demonstrates a 
misjudgement of the public mood by Bird, failing to appreciate the emotional strength behind 
Walter’s popular support and the extent to which his charismatic authority had been degraded.  
The dismissive narrative outlined above proved unsustainable in the context of obvious public 
support for Walter, prompting the ​Workers' Voice ​to launch character assassinations on ATLU 
separatists. The lead story on 14 May called Walter and Halstead ‘self proclaimed conspirators’ and 
accused them of ‘plotting and campaigning against the Union’s Executive’ and hiring ‘a gang of 
organised hooligans’ to heckle Bird at the 11 May meeting.  A week later the editorial accused 
124
Walter of ‘an attempt to bully democracy out of the mind of every worker’ and claimed his behaviour 
was ‘damaging to every workman and workwoman in the community.’  The shifting narrative of the 
125
Voice ​shows three things. First, Walter's popular support was so substantial that it could no longer be 
hoped that the anti-Labour challenge would simply die away. Second, it again shows Bird to misjudge 
the public mood - these attacks on Walter, by extension, attacked those who supported him and 
reaffirmed the notion in the minds of many that the Labour government was a new, out of touch, elite 
while Walter was the principal defendant of working people. By attacking rather than engaging with 
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disagreement, Labour set the tone for a ‘my party, right or wrong’ dynamic and introduced political 
absolutism into Antigua. This created the climate in which partyism and political polarisation would 
rapidly and permanently be established as defining features of Antiguan political culture.  
At the same time that the ​Workers' Voice ​issued attacks on Walter and his supporters, it began 
a frantic defence of Bird’s leadership to contrast with their attacks on Walter. A 7 May editorial 
invoked the ATLU’s democratic structure to defend the right of the executive committee to take bold 
action on behalf of the union.  On 24 May the editorial asked: “We wonder what would happen if 
126
there was not love for the people of this island in the heart of Premier V C Bird, President of the 
AT&LU”.  The article went on to call Bird a “fearless, determined, conscientious Leader” and 
127
claimed that the ATLU was “upholding what is right in the sight of God and man”. This impassioned 
defence of Bird, particularly its invocation of religious language in a highly Christian community, 
reinforces the points made above about the pro-Bird faction’s recognition of the seriousness of the 
pro-Walter movement and hence threat to its rule. It also complements the above points made about 
Bird’s recognition that there was a younger generation of workers, who did not feel a strong sense of 
obligation and loyalty to him. As with Bird's public address, this is the first time the publication had to 
make an effort to defend Bird’s position. Prior to this Bird could rely on his charismatic authority to 
maintain control. This highly personalised and romanticised focus on Bird’s personality reflects the 
personal nature of the ​Voice​’s attacks on Walter and established personalities as the focal points of 
political debate.  
As Labour launched its rhetorical campaign of ‘us versus them’ and focussed on personalities, 
its opponents were coalescing into a single movement. From here the term ‘Opposition’ will refer to 
the political group brought together by the momentum of Walter’s anti-Bird movement. As stated in 
the Introduction, there existed prior to 1967 a number of small political groups that did not support 
Labour, most notably Hall’s ABDM. However, they never won election to the House of 
Representatives (HoR) because of their perceived middle-class and/or white leadership and interests. 
Walter’s dismissal rallied these disparate groups by providing a popular base in the form of the AWU 
and a popular leader in Walter himself. Importantly, unlike the white Antiguan landowner Hall, 
Walter was a member of the Antiguan black working class, perceived to legitimately represent the 
interests of working people. Walter’s brother, Selvyn, reflected on this in his ​“​Of Dis and Dat'' 
column published in the Antigua Observer from 2011 to 2012. Here Selvyn Walter wrote of the ANP 
and ABDM that “people were distrustful of the black/white/middle-class/privilege combination” but 
when it came to Walter and the AWU they “were of the people. Their very own”  Walter was 
128
therefore seen to provide a leadership that was sincere and legitimate where Hall’s was not. Yet at the 
same time, Walter was able to draw on the institutional party structure of the ABDM and the 
experience and resources of Hall. This helps explain why, when it emerged, the Opposition appeared 
so well-formed and with a strong momentum to which Bird was pressured to respond.  
The growth of a united Opposition is demonstrated by the pamphlets or 'White Papers' 
published by the ABDM. These were weekly pamphlets secretly printed by Robert Hall throughout 
the 1960s.  They were distributed freely and shared widely before being destroyed, making 129
readership difficult to gauge accurately. From 1967 onwards, these pamphlets supported Walter’s 
anti-Bird cause and began to echo Labour’s focus on personalities and alarmist language. On 2 June, 
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one pamphlet accused Bird of fleeing to the USA to avoid questioning by the Secretary-Treasurer of 
the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL), Basil Blackman, whom Walter had invited to mediate in 
the dismissal dispute.  Attacking Bird as a coward refuted Labour’s assertions of the Premier’s 
130
statesmanship and presented him as childish and unfit to govern an independent nation. Moreover, by 
taking the initiative to involve the CCL Walter appeared as the bigger man and confident in the 
legality and legitimacy of his actions. Pitting one leader against another and arguing over their 
character was to become the defining feature of Antiguan politics and fed into a culture of partyism 
and polarisation.  
A subsequent AMBD pamphlet continued the narrative of Opposition formation. When 
Walter addressed a ‘mammoth crowd’ on 17 May, onlookers shouted “We must get them 
[government ministers] all out of the union” and called for Watler to “form a new union for us.”  
131
The pamphlet goes on to claim that the crowd demanded “we don’t want no government man in dey 
[the new union]. Dem a crook awe.”  As a politically motivated document this pamphlet’s account is 
132
likely to have presented an idealised version of events. Nonetheless, it is useful as an indicator of 
Opposition attitudes and reflects the political thinking leaders like Hall and Walter wanted at the 
centre of their new movement. The crowd’s supposed focus on getting the government out of the 
union suggests that, at that moment, the Opposition’s driving motivation was to establish union-party 
separatism as a norm in Antiguan political culture. This is significant because it shows that in its 
beginning the Opposition had a driving principle other than creating a political party and contesting 
elections to oust Bird. Adherence to an ideology of party-union separatism lasted for less than a year. 
By the end of 1968, the survival of the Opposition as a political group had become its own motivation 
and by 1971 partyism and the empowerment of one’s party had eclipsed party-union separatism as a 





1967 is arguably the most important year in Antigua’s modern history. As well as bringing Associated 
Statehood, 1967 ended decades of one-party hegemony and permanently challenged the elected 
dictatorship of Bird. Until 1967 Bird had confidently relied on his unchallenged positions as Chief 
Minister, President of the ATLU, and leader of the ALP to guarantee all-encompassing political 
power within Antigua. This permanently ended with the expulsion of Walter from the Union and 
resultant schism of the labour movement. Unlike previous purges, Walter’s dismissal generated a 
popular movement because of Walter’s polarity among rank-and-file workers, the emergence of a 
younger and more ambitious generation, and the ongoing debate about the Two Hats Problem which 
reached a crescendo in the context of Associated Statehood from February 1967.  
The schism of 1967 was highly emotionally charged with arguments couched in personalised 
language and drawing on rhetoric of treachery and betrayal. With the transfer of 70 percent of 
members and all field officers, the AWU emerged as a fully-formed and well-resourced union in 1967 
able to directly challenge the ATLU and, by extension, the ALP and Bird. This meant that an ‘us 
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versus them, all or nothing’ approach to politics was the default setting when a political challenge 
emerged. For Labour, the AWU was a trouble-making group of treacherous malcontents using 
decolonisation and economic change as a vehicle for self aggrandisement. For the AWU, Labour had 
become a new elite allied with big business and white investors at the expense of workers. The 
inability to understand, let alone respect the other side’s argument set the terms for political debate 
going forward and paved the way for political polarisation. By giving birth to popular political 
disagreement, 1967 established the preconditions for political polarisation, societal polarisation, and 
eventually pernicious polarisation.  
However, societal and pernicious polarisation were not guaranteed consequences of the 1967 
schism. The thing that drove Antigua into societal and pernicious polarisation was partyism - the 
desire for each side to win and maintain political control at any cost. Partyism developed in Antigua in 





Chapter Two: The formation of the PLM, civil unrest, and 
by-elections in 1968 
 
 
Seventeen years after the granting of Universal Adult Suffrage, the 
Opposition chickens, after surviving extreme political pressure, death 
threats, stonings, violence, economic boycotts, social ostracism, salvoes of 
racism and ridicule, had finally come home to roost in the Parliament of 
Antigua & Barbuda.  
133
 
Selwyn Walter, brother of George Walter, reflecting on 1968. 
 
 
The previous chapter showed that the expulsion of George Walter from the ATLU in 1967 resulted in 
a schism of the labour movement and set the scene for oppositional politics in Antigua. This chapter 
analyses the fallout of 1967 and shows that over a course of a year Antigua became politically 
polarised as, for the first time, two political groups competed for popular support. By the end of 1968 
Antiguan political culture was characterised by rhetoric that made appeals to people’s belief about 
different leaders and groups’ personality rather than to facts, policies, and ideology. The 
personalisation of politics and the extremist rhetoric used was driven by heightened partyism which 
prioritised control of government above all else.  
This chapter begins by examining the measures pursued by Labour to forestall the successful 
emergence of the AWU and maintain their own predominance. In particular, Bird mirrored 
contemporary Caribbean leaders in using legislation to impede the activity of potentially troubling 
unions, such as the AWU. Bird was aided in his opposition to the AWU by Antigua’s business and 
economic elite who had a shared interest in maintaining the status quo.  
This chapter then analyses the consequence of this repression which was two months of civil 
unrest. It is important to appreciate that the AWU was born through months of struggle and conflict 
because this confirmed hostile opposition as the foundation of Antiguan political rhetoric. The AWU 
literally had to fight for its survival in some cases and this, more than anything, concretised ‘us versus 
them, all or nothing’ as the driving thought process behind Antiguan politics.  
This chapter then addresses the establishment of the Progressive Labour Movement (PLM) in 
April 1968 and the four by-elections it won in August. The establishment of the PLM consolidated the 
development of oppositional politics in Antigua and facilitated political polarisation of Antiguan 
society. By the time of the August elections Antigua was clearly split between support of the ATLU 
and ALP or the AWU and PLM. Over subsequent years as these two groups adopted partyism as their 
ideology, political polarisation developed into societal and finally pernicious polarisation.  
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The Opposition - suppression  
 
The AWU was founded on 16 May 1967 and immediately faced challenge from the Labour 
government and business elite. For the government, control over the working population through the 
ATLU was central to political predominance. Labour's political leadership drew much of their 
legitimacy and authority from their seniority in the labour movement. Their claims to political power 
had begun, in the 1950s, through their championing of workers’ rights and they had gained positions 
in the colonial government by virtue of their authority within the ATLU. Moreover, the ATLU 
membership provided the majority of the ALP’s popular support and the structures and personnel of 
the ATLU were central in mobilising electoral support for the ALP. A comparative reduction in the 
strength of the ATLU would translate directly into a weakening of the ALP. Therefore, Labour 
pursued any measures reasonably available to them to prevent the successful emergence of a rival 
union. 
The reason the business elite was keen to suppress the AWU is more complex. ‘Business 
elite’ refers to the predominantly white British and American businessmen who founded and ran 
industries and tourism-related enterprises in Antigua, most of which were large-scale employers such 
as West Indies Oil and hotels represented by the Antigua Hotels Association. Through the Antiguan 
Employers Federation (AEF, established in December 1950), the business elite worked together to 
maximise the profitability of their enterprises. Strategies used by the AEF included synchronising 
rates and modes of payment, contract lengths and terms, and relations with external markets and 
industries. The AEF also used their monopoly on Antigua’s industry and tourism to lobby the 
Government for favourable business conditions. For example, in March 1968 David Shepard, a chief 
investor in the Hawksbill Beach Hotel, threatened government officials with reduced investment in 
Antigua should hotel employers be excluded from wider industrial dispute arbitration.   
134
The preeminent position of the business elite was most acute in the tourism sector which was 
almost entirely owned by a small clique of white foreign investors. Faced with the decline of sugar, 
Bird sought massive direct investment in tourism from capital-rich private companies who could 
quickly build the hospitality infrastructure necessary for Antigua to gain a competitive advantage in 
Caribbean tourism. To attract investment, foreign capitalists were made to ‘feel at home’ in Antigua 
through government incentives ranging from lucrative land deals, to favourable property rights, to 
duty exemptions, all of which created perfect ‘conditions of capital realisation and expatriation’.  
135
Strikingly, as early as 1961 economist Carleen O’Laughlin (University of the West Indies) warned 
about the long-term problems presented by the exploitation of Antigua’s ‘natural tourist facilities’ by 
this new foreign capitalist elite.  The result of this investment was that while Antiguans gained 
136
political control through constitutional decolonisation, in Trevor Farrell’s phrasing ‘ownership and 
control of the commanding heights of the local economy remained firmly in the hands of metropolitan 
investors.’   
137
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Bird’s leadership had facilitated and encouraged the economic takeover by (mostly foreign) 
white investors. Paget Henry has charted Bird’s abandonment of black socialism - advocating total 
social and economic restructuring of the post-plantation society - in favour of an accommodationist 
and ultimately capitalist state.  Recognising the need for immediate investment in tourism, Bird 
138
created an Antiguan example of ‘industrialisation by invitation’ - a common Caribbean strategy of 
economic development described by the nobel-prize winning St Lucian development economist W. 
Arthur Lewis as the stage when governments incentivised foreign investment in new industries 
through tax breaks and other mechanisms. The result was a relationship between the Antiguan 
government and the economic elite founded upon cooperation and, if anything, subordination of the 
state to the wishes of the economic elite.  Ergo, Antigua’s business elite had a vested interest in 
139
maintaining the status quo which had enabled them to monopolise the tourism sector and maximise 
the profitability of their enterprises. An ambitious and energised AWU threatened to rejuvenate the 
labour movement and political turmoil could strip investors of their favourable terms. The ATLU 
meanwhile, under Bird’s leadership, was at least a known enemy and likely to be more amenable to 
the business elite’s goals than an unknown and ambitious AWU. Business thus joined the Labour 
government in opposing the successful emergence of the AWU.  
The first way the government tried to suppress the AWU was through a series of laws 
designed to curtail the power of trade unions and expand government control over organised labour. 
The 1967 Trades Dispute (Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance established an Industrial Court 
modelled on that in place in Trinidad and Tobago.  This law stated that industrial disputes must be 
140
argued before and settled by the industrial court and that no union-organised industrial action could 
take place in relation to a matter once it was before the court. This effectively moved the arena of 
industrial relations away from the public sphere and closed it inside a courtroom. It also took authority 
and initiative away from labour leaders like Walter and Halstead and gave it to government-appointed 
judges. These judges were chosen by the government and selected to represent the government, 
businesses, and workers. The Labour government could therefore rely on two of the three judges 
deciding against any legal action brought by the AWU.  It was false, therefore, for Labour’s Minister 
141
of Labour, Lionel Hurst, to claim the law “assured the equilibrium of the economy.”  Rather, this 
142
Act strengthened the Bird government’s control of the economy at the expense of trade unions and in 
particular the AWU. It is important to note, however, that this law hindered the work of the ATLU as 
much as that of the AWU. The 1967 Act therefore marks the first significant act of partyism by 
Labour - Bird’s government passed a repressive law designed to maintain the party’s control of power 
even if it meant impeding the work of their own supporting union. This is an example of party 
survival at any cost becoming the driving force in Antiguan political culture.  
A second method used by the government to impede the successful emergence of the AWU 
was to deny the new union the legal authority to negotiate on behalf of workers. This was done 
through a legal technicality, exploited by the Labour government working in tandem with employers. 
In 1967, there were no laws restricting the formation of trade unions. The 1967 Constitution itself 
guaranteed all Antiguans the right to form and join any trade union of their choosing and protected 
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such organisations from government interference.  This affirmed the provisions of a 1962 
143
colonial-era law legalising workers’ combinations.  The AWU could therefore officially and legally 
144
begin operating from its Tanner Street headquarters on 1 June 1967.  However, legal protections 
145
guaranteeing the right to industrial action only applied to unions formally recognised by employers. 
This recognition relied on establishing the level of union support in a workplace through an official 
‘count’ of workers. The loophole identified by the government and exploited by employers was that 
an official count could be denied whilst existing contracts, as negotiated by the ATLU, were in effect.
 This meant that the AWU could only function with legal sanction and protection after existing 
146
contracts at each firm expired; any industrial action before would be a breach of the law, entitling 
employers to terminate contracts with AWU members. In this way, the Labour government was able 
to legally inhibit the work of the AWU without denying its right to exist.  
Labour presumably hoped that circumscribing AWU activity would deter further defection 
from the ATLU and entice converts back. This was a misjudgement of public opinion and failed to 
recognise the emotional and principled element of Walter’s support. Rather than encouraging 
ex-members to return to the ATLU, the government’s refusal to allow the AWU to operate had a 
rallying effect on the new movement. By using legal technicalities to suppress worker activism, Bird 
appeared to have more in common with the old colonial administration than with the modern labour 
movement. Like many of his Caribbean contemporaries, Bird ended up becoming the anti-labour 
government elite he had set out to oppose. In this regard, Noguera’s reflections on Eric Gairy may be 
directly applied to Bird’s 1967-71 political decline: ‘By the time his regime collapsed, he had become 
a part of what he had once fervently opposed - a member of Grenada’s ruling elites. His ties to the 
peasant and working class majority were now reduced to a distant memory.’  
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Following the government’s lead, Antiguan employers refused to recognise or negotiate with 
the AWU as illustrated by the Camacho-Jarvis case of 1968.  Shop worker and new AWU member 
148
Janet Jarvis was sacked by her white employer Rose Gamacho, who refused to negotiate with Jarvis’ 
AWU representatives. Gamacho was supported in this instance by the government who agreed that 
because Jarvis had been employed as an ATLU member on a contract negotiated by the ATLU, the 
AWU had no right to represent her in matters relating to that contract. In this way, the government 
and employers engineered a situation whereby joining the AWU was tantamount to forfeiting all trade 
union protection. However, AWU supporters organised a protest outside Ms Gamacho’s shop until 
she agreed to negotiate with the AWU.  Camacho herself identified that in this instance the AWU’s 
149
picket was not about her but ‘what they are really fighting against is the Government and the Antigua 
Trades and Labour Union.’  Though small in scale, this incident demonstrates the conflict between 
150
the new AWU and the Labour-business hegemony. The success of the AWU’s picket established the 
AWU as an effective organisation in the eyes of its supporters and a formidable and disruptive 
opponent in the eyes of employers. This example also illustrates how throughout 1968 every political 
or labour-related episode served to further polarise the two sides, escalate extremes of opinion, and 
entrench viewpoints. 
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The Opposition - emergence  
 
The suppression of the AWU created an unstable tension in Antigua. It should be emphasised that in 
the Anglophone Caribbean trade unions represented the first organisations of democratic expression 
and activism, usually predating political parties and democratic participation. To repress a trade union 
was therefore tantamount to anti-democratic colonial-style despotism and provoked understandably 
extreme reactions. Furthermore, by suppressing the AWU Bird excluded many Antiguans from the 
political space. Pedro Noguera has shown that charismatic leaders, like Bird, have a tendency to 
dominate political landscapes to such an extent that ‘traditional forms of resistance are futile.’  The 
151
most obvious form of political resistance in Antigua’s case was union-organised industrial action but 
it also included the ability of the AWU to organise as an official union, to hold rallies and meetings, 
and take part in workplace negotiations. All of these forms of expression were closed off by Bird’s 
efforts to maintain his position and the vested interests’ goal of perpetuating a beneficial status quo.  
 With traditional means of expression unavailable to AWU supporters, this state of tension 
culminated in a period of civil unrest. This mainly took the form of illegal strikes and demonstrations, 
but there were flash points of violence and property damage which culminated in a State of 
Emergency and British intervention. It is notable that Antigua’s year of unrest fits a regional pattern 
of heightened political violence and expression, particularly in relation to workers’ rights and racial 
equality. In 1967 and 1968 the US Civil Rights Movement underwent drastic changes, including the 
establishment of the Black Panther Party in October 1967 and the assassination of Martin Luther King 
in April 1968. In a regional context, there were race riots in Guadeloupe and the crisis of Anguillia’s 
secession from St Kitts-Nevis, both beginning in May 1967. These issues were discussed in Antigua’s 
public sphere and articulated through popular media such as calypso and soca music. In 1969, 
Antiguan calypsonian MacLean “King Short Shirt” Emmanuel reflected on MLK’s assassination, 
unrest in St Kitts, and Antigua’s state of emergency in his song ‘Racial Violence’.  Similarly, Joseph 
152
Hunte’s first publicly performed song of 1969, ‘We Shall Overcome’, draws parallels between the 
Civil Rights Movement, Antigua’s struggle for a workable democracy, and Afro-Caribbean struggles 
against slavery.  These songs demonstrate the great extent to which civil protest and abuses of 
153
government power were understood and discussed by working-class Antiguans and help partly 
explain the rapidity and unprecedented energy with which civil unrest broke out in 1968.  
Antigua's Civil unrest predominantly took the form of illegal strikes. These often began as 
workplace issue-strikes before escalating into general and sympathetic walk-outs, all organised by 
Walter. It must be emphasised that strike action had a major effect on Antigua and was a more 
effective tool there than in larger economies such as the UK. This is because, firstly, Antigua’s 
economy was highly dependent on the export of agricultural goods, especially sugar. A stoppage at 
any stage in this trade - from farm to dock – posed huge economic risks. Additionally, while 
transitioning to a tourism-based economy, the Antiguan government relied on enticing foreign capital 
to invest through incentives such as tax breaks and property rights but also through providing a stable 
internal market and economy. Erratic strikes which the government was powerless to control 
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disincentivised investment and caused further difficulty for the government. The strike was thus a 
powerful tool for the AWU and formed the basis of civil disobedience and unrest.  
The most effective strikes were among waterfront workers responsible for loading and 
unloading cargo ships. Though small in number (350 workers), this sector was the cornerstone of the 
Antiguan economy and most of its workers were supportive of the AWU.  The waterfront had a 
154
disproportionate impact on the economy for two reasons. First, as previously stated, in 1968 Antigua 
still relied heavily on the export of agricultural goods. The most important in this regard was sugar 
which was a state-owned industry so the inability to sell sugar contributed doubly to the government’s 
trouble. Secondly, in the 1960s Antigua’s trade deficit of US$9,648,000 was the largest among 
British-controlled Caribbean islands.  This meant Antigua was reliant on imports of everything from 
155
supplementary foods to consumer items, as well as the materials, furnishings, and luxury goods 
required by the growing tourism sector. A strike on the waterfront would therefore pose further 
trouble for the burgeoning tourism sector and have a disproportionately negative impact on the middle 
and upper classes who relied on a constant inflow of consumer goods. Recognising Walters’ 
popularity among waterfront workers, Deputy-BGR Kerr referred to the St John docks as the AWU’s 
‘heartland.’  Similarly, Bird conceded that the epicentre of AWU support was ‘principally on the 
156
waterfront.’   
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With the waterfront as a core, the AWU organised larger strikes and ultimately called for a 
general strike for 12 February 1968. This was announced in a joint press release on 31 January 1968 
issued by all opposition groups working together. This document is significant as it was the first 
formal act carried out by a united Opposition, representing the coming together of the coalition of 
discontent into a united group. The statement delineated 14 points of grievance with the Labour 
government which it accused of ‘continued illegal, undemocratic, and unconstitutional actions’ and 
called for a general strike to indicate ‘a vote of no confidence in the Government of Antigua.’  The 
158
strike was to take place on 12 February and foreign media were invited to observe. This invitation is 
notable because it presents the Opposition as a legitimate and authoritative ‘official Opposition’ in the 
Westminster style, granted recognition and status by the world’s media. The ABDM separately 
published a series of their White Papers to echo the press release and maintain enthusiasm for the 
strike. For example, on 10 February the ABDM called on Antiguans to ‘protest against the oppression 
and the subjugation we are all subjected to by Antigua’s dictator, V C Bird, and his government.’  
159
The language used here reaffirms the notion that the AWU’s fight for recognition represented the 
struggle of all oppressed groups against tyrannical governments. Again, Bird was presented as out of 
touch with working people, while Walter and the AWU were perceived to be the new and truest 
advocates of the working man’s cause. 
The Opposition demonstration accompanying the 12 February general strike attracted an 
estimated minimum of 6,000 peaceful supporters from a total Antiguan population of 62,521.  The 
160
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fact that almost 10 percent of Antiguans demonstrated in St John’s shows the popularity and 
momentum harnessed by the Opposition. This is particularly the case when one considers that these 
6,000 demonstrated despite pro-Labour intimidation and threats to personal safety, the threat of police 
action to curtail the demonstration, and the potential of recrimination from the government or 
pro-Labour elements in the community or the workplace. These 6,000 men and women may thus be 
taken as representative of a much broader pro-Opposition population. Ultimately, the scale of these 
demonstrations showed that there was a huge section of working society deeply opposed to the 
Labour leadership and wanted change - so committed that they were willing to risk recrimination and 
retribution. In the long term, these demonstrators also proved that there was the popular momentum 
necessary on which to build a viable opposition political party.  
It is notable that this strike and demonstration attracted so much support, despite extensive 
preemptive measures by the Labour government to forestall and even criminalise it. In the days and 
weeks leading up to 12 February, Bird’s Labour used the powers of the government to suppress 
critical voices and prohibit opposition activity. They did this through legislation, use of the police and 
security forces, and declaring a state of emergency. It should be highlighted that from February 1967 
Antigua was an internally self-governing state which meant that the Bird government had a greatly 
expanded ability to use government powers to impede the work of an opposition movement. First of 
all, the government passed a Public Order Act in 1968 which curtailed the ability of the AWU to host 
public meetings and rallies by requiring Ministerial approval for such meetings and criminalising 
public gatherings that did not have prior permission.  It was part of a pattern of anti-expression and 
161
anti-activism laws passed throughout the Caribbean in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Notable 
comparisons are Trinidad’s 1965 Industrial Stabilisation Act, Dominica's 1968 Seditious and 
Undesirable Publications Act, and Barbados’s 1970 Public Order Act.   162
A second tool used by the government was the use of police to disperse critical 
demonstrations including peaceful picketers outside the Administration Building in February.  
163
Thirdly, the government granted itself more extensive powers, such as the ability to impose a curfew, 
through a State of Emergency which was declared in March 1968. Finally, the government inhibited 
AWU access to public buildings and spaces like schools or the recreation ground to stage rallies and 
also denied them the opportunity to broadcast announcements over the state-operated radio. At its 
most extreme, the government was able to call for British aid in deterring civil unrest. On the same 
day the press release was issued, the Antiguan Government made a request to the British Colonial 
Office to be provided with military equipment - including submachine guns and armoured cars - for 
use in case of civil disorder.   
164
Ultimately the February general strike and demonstration was unsuccessful. Recognising the 
coercive authority available to the government and wishing to avoid accusations of causing societal 
breakdown, Walter deescalated the situation and tensions were eased for a month. During this time the 
AWU continued to spread its anti-tyranny message and to test the strength of public opinion in favour 
of a new strike-movement. A renewed effort began in March 1968 when the Antigua Hotels 
Association (AHS) refused to recognise the rights of AWU workers at their hotels. This led to strikes 
in which between 80 and 95 percent of all workers at five hotels walked out on strike in the second 
161 Public Order Act, Angitua and Barbuda, 1968. 
162 Alexander, ​A History of Organised Labour in the English Speaking West Indies​, 182. 
163 “AWU Pickets Administration Building”, ​Workers' Voice , ​February 20, 1968, VHPC. 





week of March 1968.  This escalated into a general strike on Friday 15 March which closed the 
165
waterfront and large businesses including West Indies Oil.  
The daily dispatches from the British Government Representatives testify to a volatile 
situation from 16 to 20 March. During this time Bird’s government was deemed to have lost control of 
St John’s and an 18 March State of Emergency was shown to be ineffective and reducing unrest.  
166
Reports assert that there was shooting, use of tear gas, molotov cocktails, and rioting, all of which left 
the police unable to cope and obliged Bird to call for UK aid in maintaining order.  However, by the 
167
time HMS Leopard arrived the situation had been deescalated by a conference called by the Governor 
on 20 March at which Bird and Walter agreed to resolve the situation peacefully. With representation 
from Labour, the AWU, the ABDM, and employers, this conference resolved to terminate the State of 
Emergency as well as all strikes and protests, allow all strikers to return to work without prejudice, 
and create four new constituencies to give Opposition voices the chance of a platform in Parliament. 
These resolutions were announced to the public the same day in a joint broadcast wherein Bird and 
Walter appealed for calm and reconciliation. While a small number of extremists on both sides 
continued to cause violence, Kerr reported that ‘the vast majority of the population, having had one 
look at the abyss for which they were headed, were glad to have been rescued from destruction.’  
168
The Antigua Christian Council declared a national day of prayer to give thanks for the end of 
hostilities.  
169
The conduct of each side in this brief period of civil unrest highlights the development of 
polarising party politics in Antigua and the permanent collapse of Labour’s hegemony. The most 
striking feature of the unrest was the enthusiasm expressed by Walter’s supporters. Thousands 
protested and participated in strikes despite significant deterrent in the form of criminalisation of their 
activity and the threat of workplace dismissal and intimidation by Labour loyalists. This publicly 
demonstrated support shows that many Antiguans held a deep and sincere commitment to the 
Opposition able to withstand the repressive effort of business and government. This commitment was 
particularly profound and emotionally charged because for the AWU, the battle for union’s rights was 
inseparable from the wider regional struggles for working-class freedoms and democracy. This was 
expressed most emphatically in a March White Paper which deserves quoting in full: 
 
Thousands of people stood up, fought the police, Defence Force, and 
Defence Reserves and beat off emergency forces with stones, bottles, sticks, 
knives and other missiles. The shots fired by the defence troops meant 
nothing to the people. In this, the battle of Antigua, the battle for freedom 
and democracy was won.  
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This romanticised account encapsulates the way 1968’s civil unrest was seen as part of a wider 
struggle for democratic rights and freedom. Conceiving of the AWU cause as a struggle for freedom 
encouraged an all-or-nothing approach to politics which encouraged hard-line thinking and facilitated 
polarisation. 
The experience of Civil Unrest also damaged Labour's reputation in the eyes of AWU 
supporters and sympathisers. Repressive government action strengthened Opposition arguments that 
Labour had abandoned the working class in favour of allying itself to white foreign capital. For 
example, during the AWU’s general strike the government publicly supported West Indies Oil and the 
AHA in taking a hardline against strikers and saying ‘they will dismiss all strikers who do not return 
to work on [the following] monday.’  Furthermore, Labour actively aided the employers during the 
171
strike by providing strike-breakers through the ATLU. These acts came in addition to the Public Order 
Act and use of the police to disperse peaceful AWU meetings. This showed Labour to be on the side 
of business and their own supporters rather than the majority of workers. Moreover, faced with civil 
disobedience, rather than negotiate and compromise the Labour government adopted a stricter and 
more closed-minded approach to the Opposition. In relation to the March protests, British 
Representative Roberts remarked that ‘In [their] new mood government are much less ready to listen 
to, let alone accept, outside advice than was [the] case in February.’  In other words, Antiguan 
172
politics was becoming increasingly absolutist and there was decreasing room for cooperation. As will 
be shown in the next chapter, this resulted in party political polarisation on an extreme level.  
Specific to the leadership of Bird, the experience of civil unrest in 1968 further undermined 
his charismatic authority in the eyes of non-Labour loyalists. Bird used the same methods of 
repression against the AWU that the colonial administration had used against the ATLU in the 1940s 
and 50s. The most explicit of these was enforcing a curfew. As Sutton has emphasised, personal 
freedom and mobility had a special place in the Caribbean conscious because of the legacy of 
restricted mobility in the era of slavery and indentured labour.  A curfew thus had greater 
173
significance in Caribbean politics than other locations and further supported Opposition assertions that 
Bird had become more aligned with the white economic elite than the Antiguan working class. This 
made Bird susceptible to the same methods and rhetoric of attack which he had used against the 
colonial administration and which he had taught to the labour movement. The use of colonial-style 
methods of repression meant Bird’s power was not ‘perceived by the ruled as fair and correct’ - a 
necessary feature in charismatic leadership.  Instead, Bird’s actions testified to a growing ideological 
174
disconnect between himself and the majority of Antiguan people. As VanDyke has argued, an 
ideological disconnect between the leadership and base is one of the main causes for political party 
failure as it exposes the leadership to challenge from more relatable or likable potential leaders.  
175
This was the case in 1968 Antigua where Walter was seen by a majority of the working class as the 
more authentic and effective representative of the working class. This identity provided Walter 
legitimacy and authority and enabled him to take up the mantle of ‘working man’s champion’ that 
Bird had abandoned.  
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The AWU’s first year was thus characterised by a fierce struggle for existence and 
recognition. Research conducted in 1971 by Joseph Raphael, then a Masters student at Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, concluded that 85 percent of the major strikes and stoppages of 1968 
were directly caused by the employer’s refusal to recognise the AWU while no strikes were instigated 
by the ATLU  This struggle instilled in supporters a highly energised commitment to the AWU’s 
176
cause as a fight for justice and democracy as well as labour rights. For AWU members, the notion of 
fighting for their right to organise had a similarly galvanising and emotional effect as the earlier 
struggle of the ATLU against colonial governments. The notion that the fight for the AWU was about 
more than just workers’ rights instilled in the movement a deeply emotional commitment. This 
underpinned the extreme polarisation which was to follow and contributed yet more to the 
personalisation of Antiguan politics and the rise of party membership as a marker of social identity.  
 
By-elections in 1968  
  
The inability of the AWU to function demanded its involvement in politics. The experience of 1967 
showed the Opposition that the political-economic system in which they operated was being used by 
government and business to maintain the status quo in contravention of significant public opinion. 
Systemic transformation required legislative changes and this necessitated the entry of the Opposition 
into politics. This echoed the 1940s when the ATLU recognised that securing change for working 
people was most effectively done through participating in the political process. Democratic success in 
Antigua required a well-organised political party able to compete with the experienced and 
well-financed ALP. Moreover, the new party needed to be based on wide popular support able to 
legitimately appeal to the working class. Previous experience showed that Hall’s ABDM was unable 
to gain popular support because of its perceived middle-class nature. It followed, therefore, that a new 
party should be established in close association with the AWU and with the express goal of helping 
the AWU combat Bird’s hegemony.  
The new party was the Progressive Labour Movement (PLM.) The PLM was a broad 
coalition of anti-Labour politicians and activists brought together by George Walter and Robert Hall. 
As with trade unions, in 1968 there was no legislation regulating the formation of political parties in 
Antigua and the PLM was formally established on 24 April 1968. It is a peculiar feature of Antiguan 
politics that Labour has only ever been defeated in an election by a new party resulting from a 
coalition of different groups. This happened with victories in 1971 by the PLM and in 2004 by the 
UPP.  One of the most striking features of the PLM’s early support was that it included people of all 
177
classes and ethnicities, from the white land-owning Robert Hall to the Black Power writer Tim 
Hector. BGR Charles Roberts called this new party an ‘unnatural alliance,’ suggesting he thought it 
was unsustainable and doomed to fail.  George Walter’s brother, Selwyn, was understandably more 
178
charitable when he described the PLM as ‘a heterogeneous collection’.  The PLM’s diversity is 
179
significant because all previous Antiguan political parties had shown distinct class identities. For 
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instance, Antigua’s small professional middle class had given its electoral support to minor parties 
like the Antigua National Party (ANP), whose candidates were mainly lawyers and professionals such 
as Louis Lockhart and Claude-Earl Francis.  The fact that the PLM was able to quickly and 
180
effectively co-opt middle-class candidates and voters suggests that class was declining as a motive of 
political behaviour in 1960s Antigua. Rather than ethnicity or class, Antiguan politics became more 
defined in party-political terms; namely, ‘Labour’ or ‘Opposition.’ This was a nascent partyism 
whereby the survival and empowerment of one’s party group became the driving factor behind 
political action and eclipsed other incentives such as ethnicity or class. 
It is striking that the PLM case study confirms and complicates conventional theory on party 
formation in the Anglophone Caribbean. On the one hand, the PLM fits the pattern of political parties 
emerging out of trades union and using the rhetoric, infrastructure, and leadership hierarchy of that 
union as the framework for a political party.  On the other hand, it is unusual that a second popular 181
union-party group only emerged 28 years after the first. Only from 1967/68 onwards did Antigua 
begin to mirror its fellow Anglophone Caribbean nations and adhere more closely to conventional 
notions of the Westminster System, of which competitive multi-party politics is a hallmark.  182
The PLM was established in April 1968 to contest four by-elections to be held in August. At 
the 20 March Govenor’s meeting, called to settle civil unrest resulting from suppression of the AWU, 
four new constituencies had been established. This was the result of compromise on both sides. 
During negotiations the Opposition had requested Bird’s government resign and a General Election be 
held while Labour refused to capitulate at all; in the end four new constituencies were established to 
allow the Opposition an opportunity to have representation in Parliament but allowing the Labour 
government to complete its term in office.  The four constituencies were negotiated so as to prevent 183
either Labour or the Opposition having an easy contest in all four seats. In the elections on 22 August, 
the four-month-old PLM won all four seats. Reuben Harris, Donald Halstead, Sydney Prince, and 
Robert Hall were elected, with the latter becoming Leader of the Opposition in Parliament.  
Before analysing the result, it must be recognised that a notable feature of the 1968 
by-elections was a low turnout of 44 percent.  This is surprising considering the energised political 
184
climate and the high-stakes context of the first genuinely contested Antiguan elections. However, low 
turnout should not be seen as evidence for voter apathy. Rather, it can be explained through a brief 
appreciation of several important theoretical considerations relevant to young democracies and 
postcolonial states. Firstly, the notion that public grievance correlates with high voter turnout is 
Euro-centric as it neglects the fact that democracy as a method of grievance resolution was new in 
colonial settings. Here, other methods such as strikes and protest have a longer and more proven 
tradition and were viewed as more effective and legitimate means of expression than voting. 
Secondly, in colonial societies, politics was regarded as a piecemeal process with changes resulting 
from direct action called to resolve a specific issue - such as the sacking of an employee. There was 
not the political culture of ‘storing up’ grievances to be vented at the next election which characterises 
more established democracies like the UK. The practical result of this ‘act now’ political culture was 
that during periods of relative calm - such as August in Antigua in 1968 - there was little motivation 
to become politicised and perform political acts such as voting in by-elections.  
180 “Antigua and Barbuda, past election results: 1951-2014,” ​Caribbean Elections​. 
181 ​Bishop, Corbett, and Veenendaal, "Labor Movements and Party System Development,” 4. 
182 Bishop, “Slaying the ‘Westmonster’ in the Caribbean?" 422. 
183 Report on Antigua Disturbances, Kerr to Thompson, 9th April, 1968, Antigua Political Affairs: (Internal) 
Political Situation, c.1967-69, FCO 43/57, TNA. 




And finally, we must consider the role of ‘violence’ in colonial politics. Colonialism is a 
social system predicated on a permanent state of violence.  In this context, ‘political violence’ refers 
185
to methods of expression available to colonial societies, such as strikes and protests, most of which 
were declared illegal by the colonial authority. As Koelble has shown, political system changes - such 
as the introduction of Antiguan universal suffrage in 1951 - do not eliminate violence-culture by 
themselves because the socio-economic characteristics of exploitation, repression, and racism persist 
beyond political changes.  A culture of political violence, an ‘act now’ tradition, and a distrust in 
186
democracy, it could be argued, combined to reduce voter turnout in many colonial societies, including 
Antigua.  
But there are certain characteristics of Antiguan politics which also help to explain the 
reduced turnout in the 1968 by-elections, including voter intimidation - which ranged from gang 
activity at rallies to burning down campaigners’ homes, which was a common characteristic of 
Antiguan politics and disincentivised fuller political participation. While later Antiguan elections were 
monitored by outside organisations like the Commonwealth Observer Group but these early elections 
were not. To gauge the prevalence and effectiveness of voter intimidation we must look to anecdotal 
evidence and archived media records. As well as intimidation, turnout in 1968 was reduced by the 
confusing political context in which they were conducted. The by-elections were the complicated 
result of months-long high-political negotiation between political leaders and colonial authorities. 
This behind-closed-doors politicking was the opposite of ‘act now’ culture and alienated many 
would-be voters who were confused by the notion of a by-election and unable to register in time for 
voting in August.  A lot of would-be-voter confusion and disinterest is attributable to the failure of 187
the ALP and PLM to function effectively as mobilising agents in the run up to the by-elections.  For 
188
example, neither party produced any campaign literature or manifesto for the elections and there is no 
evidence of an effort to register voters or to maximise turnout.  
There is no demographic data about the class, age, or gender of voters as exit polls and 
demographic surveys were not conducted. Nonetheless, there are some important insights to be drawn 
from the election results. Three of the four by-elections were straight contests between ALP and PLM 
candidates. In St George there was a third candidate, Norris Isaac who ran as an ABDM candidate. 
Overall the PLM won 71percent of the popular vote.  The most successful PLM candidate was 
189
Donald Halstead, who secured 627 votes, representing 80 percent of the votes cast in that 
constituency. This is a meaningful victory because Donald Halstead was Walter’s deputy and had 
been expelled from the ATLU at the same time. Since May 1967 Halstead had been, like Walter, 
highly vocal in his critique of Bird’s regime and a staunch advocate of union-party separatism. The 
size of Halstead’s victory demonstrates that voters were broadly in support of the Opposition 
movement and opposed to the continuation of the Bird party-union regime. That this happened in the 
constituency of St John’s City North gives even more evidence that the AWU/PLM was most popular 
in urban areas with high concentrations of younger voters in newer jobs ,such as manufacturing or 
dockworking. It should also be noted that Halstead was remarkably charismatic and a great deal of his 
vote share may have been generated through this personal affection, not his political party platform. 
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However, this does not detract from the fact that a victory of this size represents a popular rejection of 
Bird and Labour and an approval of the Opposition. 
The huge support shown for the PLM demonstrates the development of Antiguan partyism in 
several ways. Firstly, over 3,000 people, or 70 percent of those voting, were motivated to vote for a 
new party which was an unknown entity in the Antiguan political scene. They did this despite the fact 
that the PLM encompassed a wide spectrum of political opinion from Robert Hall to Tim Hector. 
These voters were so ardently anti-Labour and pro-Opposition that the nature of the Party’s platform 
was of less importance than the simple fact of voting for the Opposition. This demonstrates early 
partyism because PLM voters were not voting for an ideology or set of policies but were supporting a 
party whose defining feature was its party identity and its opposition to Labour.  
Equally, it is significant that despite the chaos, civil unrest, and authoritarian government 
measures exhibited over the preceding months, over a quarter of voters in these elections still voted 
for the governing party’s candidates. This demonstrates faith in the Bird regime which may be 
symptomatic of the sense of duty to support Bird discussed earlier, the role of patronage or voter 
intimidation, profound opposition to the PLM, or a combination of all three factors. These issues will 




Antiguan political polarisation came of age during the tumultuous events of 1968. Following directly 
from the fallout of the 1967 labour schism, 1968 was the year in which non- and anti-Labour groups 
coalesced into a recognisable and united Opposition, represented by the AWU and the heterogenous 
PLM. After 1968 Antigua mirrored other Anglophone caribbean countries in that it had oppositional 
politics, though it was unusual in that one of the two parties was a heterogenous opposition group 
rather than a well-defined political party. Nonetheless, the struggles of the AWU and the formation of 
the PLM demonstrated and exacerbated the division of Antiguan society into two hostile political 
groups. The civil unrest that resulted from the Labour government’s efforts to suppress the growth of 
an opposition supercharged anti-Labour forces, giving an emotional aspect to their newfound political 
identity. This in turn deepened the division between supporters of Labour and the Opposition and 
curtailed rational debate and compromise in favour of emotional and absolutist attitudes towards 
political conflict. This approach to politics prioritised partyism as the driving force in Antiguan 
political culture because each side saw the attainment of power as their first and ultimate objective, 
even at the expense of all else.  
This absolutist oppositional politics had deep roots in Antiguan society, stretching back to 
practices of slavery in the colonial period when Antiguan society was maintained through a constant 
state of violence. This violence-based form of politics continued into the twentieth-century labour 
movement when trade union activism pre-dated democratic politics. This oppositional and aggressive 
form of politics was well-suited to the form of two-party politics which the emergence of the AWU 
and PLM facilitated. These violent traditions, combined with the emotional nature of each party’s 
sense of loyalty and purpose, cultivated attitudes whereby party and leadership were quasi-religious 
infallible entities to be defended and promoted at all costs. The immediacy with which this partisan 
attitude developed in Antigua is demonstrated by the 1968 by-elections during which a brand new 
party was able to secure a landslide despite its heterogeneous leadership and lack of a policy platform. 




division of Antiguans based on their party affiliation. From 1968 onwards party loyalty became a 
dominant source of identity for Antiguans and the division between Labour and the Opposition 





Chapter Three - The 1971 General Election 
 
 
I have concluded that the fight for political power between political parties 
has the potential to destroy democracy, to terminate friendships and 
comradeship, to ruin years of development and to endanger the well-being of 
a nation’s people.   
190
 




The foregoing chapters have examined the nature and consequences of the 1967 schism. In particular, 
it has been shown that the formation and electoral success of the PLM in 1968 established 
oppositional politics in Antigua and contributed to political polarisation of the Antiguan community. 
This chapter turns its attention to the theory of societal polarisation and how it applies to the Antiguan 
experience leading up to the 1971 General Election. The following will show that, faced with a 
General Election, both Labour and the AWU/PLM fully adopted partyism as their guiding policy, 
abandoning all other principles in the ‘all or nothing’ pursuit of political power. In this pursuit, 
partyism encouraged political strategies and rhetoric which escalated the emotionally charged and 
hostile character of Antiguan politics. By doing so, partyism directly contributed to the societal 
polarisation of Antigua.  
As outlined in the Introduction, my approach to societal polarisation draws on recent 
scholarship by Jennifer McCoy and others.  While this dissertation benefits from McCoy’s work, it 191
also has a contribution to make. For example, while McCoy et al’s 2018 study considers the examples 
of a range of established and postcolonial democracies from the USA to Venezuela, it fails to 
acknowledge how theories of polarisation may apply to very small states. This dissertation argues that 
Antigua’s small size directly contributed to a quicker and more extreme experience of polarisation. 
Moreover, this dissertation shows that theories designed to explain phenomena happening in 
democracies today can be projected backwards to illuminate past events such as those under 
investigation here.  
According to McCoy et al, societal polarisation describes a state in which political 
polarisation has spilled over into everyday life.  This means that one’s membership of a political 
192
party dictates what newspaper one reads, the clubs one’s children attend, and how one is treated in the 
workplace. In this way, ​political identity (party membership) consumes or supersedes all other 
markers of social identity such as class, ethnicity, regionality, or profession. In some cases these lesser 
identities become ‘aligned’ with the macro political identity, such as in the US where Republicanism 
has purposefully courted support from people who identify as socially conservative, Christian, 
wealthy, and so on.  Such social differences are ‘part of the democratic game’ and contribute to a 
193
vibrant political milieu, but when they become wholly aligned with a political movement they widen 
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the gulf between two parties, making the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy more visible and explicit.  
194
Alternatively, these lesser identities can become ‘flattened’ by the greater political cleavage, meaning 
they are reduced in perceived importance next to the overriding identity of party membership.  This 
195
in part results from the fact that partisanship exerts ‘a stronger psychological bind’ than other forms of 
social affiliation.   
196
This Chapter will show that in the run-up to 1971, Antigua became societally polarised. This 
was a gradual development resulting from several simultaneous processes. Crucially, each of these 
causal processes were themselves motivated by the political ideology of partyism. As partyism 
prioritises party survival at any cost, it encouraged policies and actions which emphasised hostility 
between opposing parties and strengthened the role of party membership as a social identity. The most 
impactful example of partyism contributing to societal polarisation is the streamlining and 
Walterisation of the PLM ahead of the 1971 election. This focussed the party into a clearly defined 
homogenous group that was defined entirely in terms of its hostility to the ALP. This chapter will go 
on to show that the 1971 election itself was a highly emotionally charged affair with political rhetoric 
focussing on judgements about personalities rather than politics. Moreover, it will be shown that 1971 
marked an apogee of societal polarisation, with partyism and party-conflict dominating politics and 
society to the exclusion of all other principles and ideology.  
 
The State of Party Politics prior to 1971 
 
The party-political divide that emerged in 1968 between the ALP and the PLM was highly 
emotionally charged and expressed in highly personal and alarmist language. However, the PLM 
lacked the cohesion necessary for this political polarisation to morph into societal polarisation as 
described above. This was because the PLM’s heterogenous leadership facilitated and even 
encouraged a diversity of opinion and belief at the level of the party’s executive. Societal polarisation 
depends upon two very clearly defined groups operating in stark opposition to one another. For this to 
have happened in Antigua in 1968 there would have needed to be a stream-lining of the PLM’s 
leadership; that is, a party wholly united around a single cause - its own survival. This, however, 
changed in the years leading up to the 1971 general election.  
This change happened through a process of what I would call ‘Walterisation’; that is, George 
Walter’s ‘internal domination’ over the party.  Though the PLM had been established as an 
197
independent political party led by Robert Hall and supported by the AWU, the influence of the union 
over the party grew between 1968 and 1971. This represented a relaxation of the founding principle of 
party-union separation, Walter’s solution to the Two Hats Problem. The reduced importance given to 
this principle is a marker of partyism because principles or ideologies that are not specifically 
designed to advance the party's interests are severed. The most obvious instance of Walterisation was 
Walter’s replacing Hall as leader of the PLM.  
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Throughout 1968 and 1969, George Walter expressed frustration with what he called the 
‘cavortings of the PLM’ and their failure to ‘form a united group’ in the House of Representatives. . 
198
Walter was particularly annoyed that Hall failed to instigate meaningful debate in the House and 
relied on ‘abuse of government and a desire to open up old sores.’  This was interpreted by Hall’s 
199
constituents as ‘subservience’ and lost him ‘considerable support’.  Incidentally, this accusation is 
200
the first demonstration that there was in fact little ideological difference between the PLM and ALP 
and the only meaningful point of opposition was party-political polarisation.  
At the 1969 PLM Conference, Walter used his personal influence to ensure that 90 of the 370 
delegates were leading figures from the AWU. These voters formed a ‘union caucus’ which, along 
with 90 additional delegates, voted Walter to replace Hall as PLM leader. Hall received 80 supporting 
votes, while 110 abstained. According to acting British Government Representative Reiss, this high 
abstention rate resulted from intimidation by Walter’s union caucus, which political delegates saw as 
‘evidence that the AWU were trying to dominate the political party.’  After becoming leader, Walter 
201
officially resigned his Union leadership position in accordance with the principle of union-party 
separatism. However, his replacement was his close friend Ketihlyn Smith and thus he was able to 
exert direct personal influence. As leader, Walter hoped to create ‘a sound Party machine’ able to take 
on the ALP.   
202
Further facilitating the Walterisation was the appointment of Walter supporters and AWU 
loyalists to prominent positions in the PLM. In November 1969, British Representative Kerr reported 
that Walter had ‘cut down to size’ prominent political figures like Tim Hector and Donald Halstead, 
but that ‘a good deal more had to be done to put the party into shape’.  A petty example of how 
203
Walter cut Halstead ‘down to size’ was to restrict the amount of time he was permitted to speak at 
public meetings from his customary 60 minutes to less than 20.  The proactive demotion of factional 
204
leaders like the radical unionist Halstead and the intellectual Hector is an example of the 
self-entrenchment mechanisms used by political leaders. Drawing on Michels (1968), Paget Henry has 
identified four methods of ‘political accumulation’ that enabled Antiguan leaders to use their position 
to gain authority and power in a self-replicating cycle of aggrandisement: self-entrenchment, 
withdrawal from base control, factional competition, and political-social capital conversion.  
205
Walter’s takeover of the leadership and his debasement of Halstead and Hector in favour of his own 
aggrandisement are early examples of these methods of political accumulation at work in the PLM. 
They also foreshadow the internal domination that was to occur during the PLM’s time in 
government, and be examined in the next Chapter.  
It should be emphasised that Walter’s takeover happened less than a year after the expansion 
of the rights and responsibilities of the office of Leader of the Opposition, as negotiated by Robert 
Hall. On 7 December 1968 Bird, Hall, and their associates met to discuss and agree a formalisation of 
the role of the Leader of the Opposition, which until then had no official status in Antigua or 
provision under the 1967 Constitution. That meeting agreed to: the establishment of an office for the 
Leader of the Opposition; the provision of support staff and funding to that office; the appointment of 
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Members of the Opposition to statutory bodies and committees; and a discussion going forward on 
shared use of state-operated radio, television, and buildings for party political purposes.  When 
206
Walter assumed party leadership, he thus did so over an entrenched political machine with an 
established position and staff. This further enabled Walter to reorganise the PLM by providing official 
control over resources from jobs to sanctioned meetings, all of which could be used to build 
personalised patronage and support.  
The ‘Walterisation’ of the PLM illustrates VanDyke’s recent assessment of factors affecting 
new party sustainability. Writing about the experience of modern Latin American democracies, 
VanDyke (2018) has demonstrated that while ‘external appeal’ contributes to immediate or short-term 
electoral success, long-term party sustainability requires ‘internal domination’ of the party by the 
leader.  Defined as ‘uncontested, pre-eminent power within one’s party’, internal domination stems 
207
from external electoral appeal; cross-factional ties;moral authority (the leader’s credibility and respect 
among party members, usually derived from their pre-political background); and ideological 
alignment with the base.  Walter exhibited all of these factors. His external electoral appeal was 
208
demonstrated by the mass support given to the AWU immediately after its establishment and the 
enthusiasm of its members for industrial action organised by Walter. Walter’s moral authority and 
ideological alignment with the base both stemmed from his identity as a balck working-class trade 
union activist perceived to espouse a purer and more socilaist worker-centered ideology than the Bird 
regime. Finally, Walter’s propensity for cross-factional collaboration was demonstrated by his 
bringing together the broad coalition of discontent to form the PLM. These factors allowed Walter to 
dominate the PLM to a degree that matched Bird’s control over the ALP. In turn, this domination 
gave Walter sources of patronage which, as recent scholarship has demonstrated, while not conducive 
to long-term and durable party cohesion, did help to consolidate Walter’s position.   
209
Walter’s takeover of the PLM furthered polarisation of Antiguan political culture. It did this 
by tying the party more closely to the AWU and creating a more defined movement in opposition to 
Bird’s Labour. Polarisation is most effective and damaging when the two opposing groups are clearly 
defined, thus allowing sharper and clearer contrasts to be drawn between them. Walter’s takeover 
removed ambiguity over the PLM-AWU relationship and reduced the diversity of opinion expressed 
at senior levels in the party. This meant that the PLM was more clearly contrasted with Labour and 
the PLM-ALP divide became even sharper. 
 
1971 - The campaign and the result 
 
Following the Walterisaton of the PLM, Antigua prepared for the 1971 elections in a context of 
polarisation and partyism. The campaigns themselves demonstrate this through their lack of 
ideological or policy content and a focus on personalities and hostile rhetoric. Notably, the 1971 
manifestos were the most comprehensive and highest quality political documents made in Antigua up 
to that point. However, there was little contrast between the parties in terms of policy or ideology. 
Both the PLM and the ALP followed a loose principle of capitalist-labourism, the doctrine that 
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aspired to improve the lives of working people whilst recognising constraints imposed on a peripheral 
post-plantation society in a globalised capitalist economy.  Most importantly, both parties realised 
210
the need to prioritise investment by foreign capitalists into the young tourist sector. The 1971 election 
was therefore a decision not between two competing ideologies or visions for Antigua, but between 
two groups vying for the chance to implement the same vision. This is most easily shown through a 
comparison of the two manifesto’s main points - tourism and leadership.  
An important contextual consideration is that 1971 was the first genuinely contested Antiguan 
general election and the first to produce significant electioneering literature. Prior to 1968 many 
electoral seats went uncontested with the ALP winning every campaign in which they stood, and the 
only campaign literature were small and vague booklets on the labour movement. In contrast, the 
1971 election heralded the period of extensive and expensive political campaigning following the 
establishment of a popular well-funded second party and an Official Opposition. The introduction of 
sophisticated manifestos is part of a wider maturation of the Antiguan political process which boosted 
voter participation, as outlined below. 
The two manifesto’s handling of tourism demonstrates the lack of ideological difference 
between the ALP and PLM.. This was the most important issue facing Antigua in 1970-71 and both 
parties were united in recognising a need to attract foreign investment. Tourism was the third topic in 
the ALP’s manifesto - coming after leadership and finances. The early placement of tourism, ahead of 
sugar, agriculture, and industrial relations shows that the ALP recognised the primacy of this sector 
which employed 60 percent of the workforce in 1971.  The ALP claimed it would be ‘giving every 
211
encouragement to the tourist industry’ and aspired to ‘maintain our position in this very competitive 
and sensitive industry.’  To do this, the ALP made pledges including making state-owned 
212
ex-Syndicate Estates land available to Antiguans establishing entertainment enterprises and attracting 
‘financial agencies’ to Antigua to develop tourism. The ALP also placed an emphasis on education 
and training as pathways to maximise Antigua’s benefit from tourism. In 1971 all high-paying tourism 
jobs were reserved for foreigners with training and experience in the hotel industry. This meant that 
the highest wages went to foreigners, who often sent their cash home. Training was seen as a way of 
increasing Antiguans’ participation in the tourism sector whilst not impinging on the ‘make 
investment welcome’ approach that characterised 1960s fiscal policy. We can therefore see training as 
part of the capitalist-labourist ideology guiding Antiguan politicians at this time - they wanted to 
increase the opportunities of working people but would not contemplate reforming the structure of the 
island's capitalist economy to do so. This approach had already shown some success: in 1969 the 
Hotel and Catering School trained 300 school-leavers in low to middle-level jobs in the hotel trade 
from cleaning to reception staff and had provided scholarships for further hotel training in North 
America and Europe.   
213
The PLM’s treatment of tourism in its electioneering material contains the same 
capitalist-labourist ideology. The PLM also pledged to expand hospitality training and maximise 
Antiguan’s benefit from the industry - for instance by exploiting Carnival as a tourist attraction. Under 
the PLM’s plans the tourism sector would continue to be owned by foreign investors and profits 
would continue to leak abroad. This shows that the PLM were equally resigned to the fact that the 
economy was and would be controlled by foreign capital and the best Antiguans could hope for was 
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employment in hotels and trickle-down benefit through tourist spending. No systematic economic 
reform was proposed such as tax breaks for local businesses and tax increases on foreign-owned 
companies operating in Antigua. It is striking that the PLM were so unambitious in opposition, when 
opposition parties are usually more aspirational than governing parties. This suggests that even in 
opposition, the PLM recognised the incontrovertible fact that as things stood, Antigua could not afford 
to do anything to deter investment. Furthermore, it suggests that the PLM as a campaigning party did 
not need to be ambitious in its manifesto because policy and ideology played a minimal role in 
Antiguan politics. To an extent, the party could rely on societal polarisation to secure its necessary 
support, it did not need to court voters with campaign promises or policy ideas. Again, this shows the 
existence of partyism whereby all other principles and ideologies become subservient to the party’s 
survival and empowerment.  
Partyism is also demonstrated by the manifestos’ only meaningful area of disagreement - the 
past record of the Bird regime. Both the ALP and PLM opened their manifestos with attacks on the 
opposing party and praise of their own leaders and members. These arguments are couched in 
strikingly hostile terms and the rhetoric focuses entirely on personalities, not policies. For example, 
the PLM condemned Bird’s premiership, claiming 'Bird and his Labour Party have FAILED Antigua’ 
and left a legacy of ‘scandals and charges of corruption’.  Over three pages the PLM delineate every 
214
grievance with Bird’s government under headings such as ‘Electricity’, ‘Roads’, and ‘Agriculture’.  
215
The PLM was uniquely positioned to conduct this attack on the ALP because, as a young party 
without a government record to defend, the PLM were able to attack the government without exposing 
themselves to a similar tactic of critical evaluation from their opponents.  
In contrast, the ALP manifesto began with a defence of Labour’s record. Of special 
significance is the presentation of Bird and Labour as well-experienced statesmen. The section ‘A 
Party of Political Leadership’ connected the ALP with ‘Political developments in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean’ such as democracy and Associated Statehood.  The linking of Labour and decolonisation 
216
invoked the notion of duty by implying that voters have an obligation to vote for Labour as it was 
Labour which secured them that right to vote in the first place. Regarding Labour candidates, the 
manifesto claimed they were ‘motivated by sincerity and dedication.’  In contrast, the PLM 
217
candidates were accused of ‘vindictiveness, subversion or treachery.’  This is a good example of the 
218
personalisation of politics typical of partyism in a polarised society. Most importantly, the language of 
‘treachery’ reflects the notion of ‘the other’ as a threat to party or national survival which is a 
well-established feature of extreme polarisation.   
219
The 1971 manifestos show that at this time there was no meaningful ideological difference 
between the PLM and the ALP. Instead, the parties were defined in terms of their differentiation from 
and opposition to one another. Lacking policy difference, the election campaign focussed on the 
personalities of political leaders, often deploying language of incompetence or treachery. In an 
already polarised society, this rhetoric compounded the hostility between supporters of the ALP and 
PLM and further deepened the divide between the two groups as each saw the other not simply as on 
the wrong side of an argument but as dangerous. This was the same rhetoric that was being asserted 
daily in the partisan printed media. For example, the day before the election, the PLM-backing 
214 PLM Manifesto, 1970, PP.AQ.PLM.1, SHL, 2. 
215 PLM Manifesto, 1970, 2-4. 
216 ALP Manifesto 1970, PP.AQ.ALP.3, SHL, 5. 
217 ALP Manifesto 1970, 3. 
218 ALP Manifesto 1970, 3. 




Antigua Star​’s editorial implored readers to vote PLM on the basis that only the PLM has ‘the kind of 
men who possess the know-how to redeem Antigua.’  Again, vague assertions about the personality 
220
of individuals is posited as the basis on which people should cast their vote. Void of ideological 
debate and policy difference, Antiguan politics in 1971 was thus less about ​how ​Antigua should 
develop, but ​who​ should control the development.  
 
The results of the 1971 election further demonstrate how ingrained partyism and societal polarisation 
had become, specifically the high turnout. It should first be noted that the electoral system used in 
1971 was outdated, controversial, and confusing. Just six months before the election, an Elections Act 
was passed which mandated for voter registers to be compiled ahead of the election. Controversially, 
rather than requiring all voters to register anew to reflect the new constituency layout post-1968 (as 
the PLM Representatives demanded), the Act merely redistributed names already on the register from 
1965 and allowed for unrecorded voters to register in person.  It was feared that this would open the 221
voting process to corruption by duplicating older voters (the majority of whom supported Labour) 
who would remain on the register in their old constituency and could register in their new one.  222
Simultaneously, it was feared that younger voters who had come of age (21) since 1965 and were 
majority PLM supporters would not be registered in time to vote. Further confusing the election, 
constituency boundaries were decided by area rather than population and had not been adjusted to 
take into account high levels of urbanisation and migration to St John’s over preceding years. This 
created population imbalances between constituencies; for instance St John’s Rural West had 3,720 
registered voters while St Philip South had 1,094.  A report prepared after the election urgently 223
advised ‘modernising the present electoral system.’  As there was no international observation of 224
these elections and the winning PLM saw no benefit from a post-election enquiry it is not possible to 
assert the practical consequences of the corruption and confusion made possible by the outdated 
system in 1971.  
Despite the confusion and accusations of corruption, the 1971 General Election was (in terms 
of numbers of people voting) the largest democratic exercise in Antigua up to that point. Between the 
previous general election in 1965 and 1971, the number of votes cast increased by 84 percent from 
9,134 to 16,765.  The number of registered voters increased in the same period by 43 percent.  This 
225 226
far exceeded the rate of population growth which in the same period was only 9.6 percent.  
227
Moreover, the 55 percent turnout was the highest since 1956.  55 percent may appear low given the 
228
context, but reasons for this are numerous and echo factors discussed in the previous chapter in 
relation to the low turnout in 1968, including voter intimidation, lack of trust in the political system, 
and confusion over the voter-registration process. Nonetheless, the 1971 election, it could be argued, 
was the most popular democratic exercise in Antiguan history. This demonstrates two phenomena 
which point to societal polarisation.  
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First, prior to 1971 the ALP and PLM developed as mobilising agents able to ‘get out the 
vote.’ Though the 1967 Constitution theoretically established the Westminster System in Antigua, 
many of the customs of that system - such as competitive party-politics, separation of powers, and 
contested elections - were lacking. By 1971 these Westminster-deviations had been resolved through 
the emergence of a viable opposition party and the introduction of an Official Opposition. Part of this 
democratic maturity was a sophistication of voter-mobilisation mechanisms which increased public 
political participation. Higher quality manifestos produced for 1971 are an example of this political 
maturity. This development partially explains higher turnout in 1971 as the parties worked to 
maximise voter registration and turnout. Democratic maturity reflects partyism because it shows the 
two parties developing into coherent and well-organised political machines. This complemented other 
processes such as the Walterisation of the PLM and made the divide between PLM and ALP more 
pronounced and restricted room for apathy or overlap. Developing into more coherent political 
machines facilitated a more rapid and permanent drift apart and contributed to long term polarisation. 
Secondly, increased political participation reflects the role societal polarisation had in 
squeezing the ability of Antiguans to simply ignore politics. As party-politics permeated the entire 
bandwidth of daily experience, from employment opportunities to the newspapers one reads, the 
ability of Antiguans to be politically disengaged was reduced. This is demonstrated by a huge 
mobilisation of previously disinterested voters, as revealed by electoral data. Between the general 
elections of 1965 and 1971, the number of Labour votes fell by only 12 percent, or 866 votes. 
However, in terms of vote share, Labour support fell by 52 percent from 80 to just 38 percent in 1971.
 This data means that in the 1971 general election, the PLM drew a few votes from the ALP but 
229
most of its 9,761 votes came from a reservoir of people who had not voted before. This reveals a 
significantly reduced space for political disinterest. The reason for this was societal polarisation which 
effectively forced increasing numbers of people to choose to support either the PLM or ALP. A main 
way this was done was through workplace discriminiation whereby employers would favour 
applicants who shared their party loyalty. Additionally, the 1967-71 experience of repression and 
opposition taught those sympathetic to the AWU cause that political participation was a necessary 
activity. The tense and emotionally charged context of the election gave this sense of obligation a 
degree of urgency, further motivating increased turnout.  
The results of 1971 thus demonstrate the presence and efficacy of partyism. Partyism 
generated a tense and high-states political environment wherein political rhetoric about treachery and 
duty mobilised the electorate to unprecedented levels. People felt the need to vote in large numbers 
even through there was little ideological difference between the two competing parties. 
Conventionally, this would produce apathy and reduce the urgency of democratic participation. 
Instead, competing beliefs about the personalities and character of the opposing parties served to raise 
interest in politics to levels never seen before. By 1971, both parties had become well organised and 
streamlined groups, defined chiefly by their hostility to one another. The strong performance of both 
parties in the election showed that two-party politics was to become a permanent feature of Antiguan 
political culture. This would act to deepen societal polarisation and widen the divide between 
supporters of the ALP and PLM.  
 
Labour’s Defeat in Context 
 




There are two contexts to view Labour’s 1971 electoral defeat. First, a Caribbean-wide extremist lurch 
in politics illustrated by the emergence of Black Power, left-wing movements, and repressive politics. 
And second, the widespread rejection of well-established working-class parties in favour of new and 
often coalition-based groups in the smaller nations of the Eastern Caribbean. Of these, the latter 
context is more applicable to the Antiguan experience.  
In the Caribbean, the ALP’s defeat coincided with a shift towards political extremes of 
activism and reactionary government policy, epitomised by the rise of Black Power movements in the 
1960s and 1970s. The growth of Black Power was part of a wider reorientation of international 
political discourse in the late 1960s which recalibrated the focus of working people’s struggles away 
from a Cold War era east-west dichotomy and towards the quasi-colonial exploitative relationship 
between the global north and south.  In the Caribbean, Black Power refers to a loose socio-political 
230
movement ranging from organised political parties to public demonstrations.  In contrast to the US, 231
Black Power in the Caribbean was often economically or institutionally focussed, concerned with 
resolving the long-term consequences of colonial rule and the continuation of light-skinned or white 
political and economic control.  An example of such a group was Trinidad’s National Joint Action 232
Committee, established by Geddes Granger in February 1969 to critique the reliance of Eric Williams’ 
economic programme on white capital investment.   
233
Despite its significance in the Caribbean’s more well-studied nations such as Jamaica and 
Trinidad, Black Power failed to mobilise significant popular support in the Eastern Caribbean. Black 
Power parties in the Eastern Caribbean remained fringe groups such as the United Black Socialit Party 
in Dominica, the Forum group in St Lucia, and the Afro Caribbean Liberation Movement in Antigua.
 There are several reasons Black Power did not become a powerful political force in the Eastern 234
Caribbean. For one thing, there was no academic community through which Black Power ideas could 
be discussed and disseminated to the young and politically active. In Jamaica the University of the 
West Indies at Mona served as a headquarters for the discussion and development of the Black Power 
philosophy of writers from C L R James to Watler Rodney.  No such institution existed in the 
235
Eastern Caribbean. Moreover, many Eastern Caribbean countries, after 1967 were internally 
self-governed by majority or entirely black parliaments and governments. In this setting, the 
overwhelming socio-political priority became resolving the problem of white economic dominance in 
their economies, especially over the growing tourism sector. The political energy and space that could 
have been occupied by Black Power Movements was therefore consumed by economic and structural 
debates around how to wrest control of the economy away from white capitalists. In Antigua, this lack 
of political space, combined with the unassailable dominance of the ALP and PLM meant that Tim 
Hector's ACLM won just 1.19 percent of votes in the 1980 General Election.   236
The more appropriate context in which to analyse Labour’s defeat is therefore the Eastern 
Caribbean. In the late 1960s and early 1970s many Eastern Caribbean electorates turned away from 
ruling and well-established parties. Defeated parties include the St Lucia Labour Party in 1964, the 
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Montserrat Labour Party in 1966, and the People’s Political Party in St Vincent in 1967. This rejection 
had similar motivations as the rise of Black Power and leftist groups in the wider Caribbean. Most 
importantly, the failure of Labour governments to translate local political control into local economic 
advancement resulted in what Kate Quinn has called ‘a crisis of failed expectations’.  In the Eastern 
237
Caribbean, rather than an intellectually-driven shift towards Black Power or left-wing politics, this 
crisis was articulated through a wide-spread rejection of established parties and their charismatic 
leaders. As Pedro Noguera has demonstrated, the failure to meet popular expectations was a particular 
threat to charismatic leaders such as George Charles, Ebenezer Joshua, William Bramble in each of 
the above-mentioned countries.  This is because such leaders gained and sustained support through 
238
popular belief in their special ability to deliver improvements for working people. Charismatic 
authority is not self-sustaining but needs constant reaffirmation through demonstrations of the leader’s 
special ability.  Such demonstrations could include the provision of sufficient jobs and opportunities, 
239
a drastic improvement in living and working conditions, and a perceived reduction in the power of 
foreign capitalists in the local economy. In the absence of such demonstrations, popular belief in the 
special ability of the leader crumbles and voters turn to alternative parties. 
Placing the ALP’s defeat in the Eastern Caribbean context helps to explain why the ALP was 
defeated by an opponent that was not drastically ideologically different and did not draw on notions of 
Black Power or left-wing politics. As shown by the comparison of the manifestos, the PLM did not 
provide an ideological alternative to the ALP but instead offered a difference of leadership and 
personnel. This is because the PLM did not ​need​ to provide an ideological alternative in order to 
capitalise on popular dissatisfaction. Rather, the PLM needed to reinforce notions of Labour 
compromising with white capital and compound the criticism with accusations of incompetence. 
Furthermore, by simply providing a viable alternative, the PLM attracted votes from those who were 
simply fed up with the Bird regime’s continued failure to deliver on their promises. The ‘crisis of 
failed expectations’ thus fuelled partyism by driving voters in the Eastern Caribbean to 
enthusiastically support a party based solely on its opposition to the government. In this sense, it 
benefited the opposition party to be as hostile and emotive as possible in its anti-government attacks.  
Partyism thus encouraged extremist and alarmist rhetoric which in turn deepened animosity 
between opposing sides and exacerbated societal polarisation. Without policy differences to debate, 
partisan politics focussed on accusations of treachery and personal incompetence based on party 
affiliation. Extremist rhetoric and totalitarian attitudes towards opposing parties entrenched societal 
polarisation by stoking hostility between members of opposing parties and reducing the space for 
rational debate and compromise. At the same time, partyism’s focus on parties and personalities 
reduced the public intellectual space available for creative solutions to the crisis of failed 
expectations, such as those espoused by Tim Hector’s ACLM. When principles like socialism or 
Black Power were articulated, they could not appeal to a wider audience because by the 1970s party 
competition had become the driving force in Antiguan political culture. Partyism and the polarisation 
it fuelled were thus self-enforcing phenomena: discontent led to desperation which encouraged 
partyism which reduced the opportunity for creative political solutions, which led to further 
discontent, which led to more hardline partyism, and so on. The ability to create a barren 
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political-intellectual environment where creative ideas were suffocated has been one of the most 
damaging long-term effects of partyism in Antigua. 
 
Loyalty in Antiguan policial culture  
 
A characteristic of a societally polarised society is ‘emotional loating, fear, and distrust.’  This was 240
the case in Antigua in 1971, as shown by the alarmist language used by political activists and the 
growing social divide between supporters of opposing parties. This was also made clear to me by 
every interviewee to whom I spoke in November and December 2019. One, a lifelong Labour 
supporter, told me that the 1971 election instigated a feud in his family, with one side choosing to vote 
PLM for reasons that he still claimed to be unable to explain.  Conversely, a current UPP supporter 241
commented that it was common to receive verbal abuse and physical intimidation if you walked 
through or rode the bus through a Labour village. Though she did not admit to being a victim of 
politically motivated violence herself, she did claim that in the 1970s in particular it was common for 
politics to be the cause of much physical violence between men.  The son of an early PLM 242
campaigner claimed that his family home had been burned down by Bird loyalists because his father 
was an early supporter of Hall, the ABDM, and then the PLM.  Such anecdotal evidence is 243
commonplace in Antigua and to an alarming extent appears accepted as a natural feature of 
democratic politics. 
While high emotionality is a common feature of all societally polarised societies, there were 
several features of Antiguan political culture in 1971 that made politics in Antigua at this time 
particularly emotionally charged. These factors are: emotional hijacking, self-entrenchment of 
political decisions, the moral aspect of political decision making, and the irreversibility of political 
decisions. Appreciating each of these enables us to understand more fully why Antiguan political 
culture became so emotionally charged during and after the 1971 election. 
The first factor contributing to an emotionally charged political climate is what Keisha 
Mitchell (University of the West Indies) calls ‘emotional hijacking.’  This is a process whereby 
244
political campaigns purposefully appeal to feelings and beliefs to gain support or undermine 
opponents. In acute cases, Mitchell continues, ‘all rational thought disappears’ and evidence-based 
argument is replaced entirely by emotional and belief-based rhetoric.  This was the case in Antigua 
245
in 1971. By this time, partyism had couched political discourse in party-political terms and based 
arguments on personalities rather than facts. The effect of emotional hijacking is demonstrated by the 
parties’ manifestos. For example, the ALP asserted that the sugar industry ‘will perform an ever 
greater role in the structure of the State.’  This claim was completely wrong because the 1966 Evans 
246
Report had concluded there was ‘no long term future for the sugar industry in Antigua’ and that the 
sector must be closed down as quickly as possible.  That the ALP could make such an assertion 
247
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shows that facts played such a minimal role in political debate that a centrepiece of Labour’s 
manifesto could be objectively incorrect without significant consequences. Unquestioning faith in the 
party meant that evidence contradicting the leader’s word could be disregarded. Emotional hijacking 
contributed to societal polarisation by making it difficult to argue with political opinions that have no 
basis in evidence and are thus ‘not only objectionable but also unintelligible’.  This generates 
248
frustration and suspicion which further widens the divide between supporters of opposing parties and 
contributes to the mistrust characteristic of societal polarisation.  
The second reason Antiguan party loyalty was so emotionally charged relates to what Stephen 
Greene called Perceptual Screen Theory (PST.) PST states that members of a group interpret 
information differently so as to favour their own party - the ‘in-group.’  ​This was demonstrated in 
249
1990 by Mackie et al who surveyed students’ responses to arguments written by members of their 
own university (the in-group) and members of another (the out-group.)  They found that the identity 250
of the source had a direct effect on the respondents’ agreement or disagreement with the argument, 
with respondents agreeing strongly with the in-group argument. More recently, Paul Hanel et al 
surveyed British and American participants to see how PST affected people’s responses to 
‘aphorisms’ or quotes with no clear political motivation. They found that in all cases aphorisms 
thought to originate from the in-group created stronger agreement than aphorisms from the out-group, 
showing PST to apply to any claims, not just political statements.  This is of great relevance to 251
politics where much ‘headline’ political rhetoric concerns generalist, inclusive aphorisms; Hanel et al 
reference Theresa May’s ‘strong and stable leadership’ aphorism for example.  Knowing that 252
non-political aphorisms of this kind can produce hostile opposition between competing parties helps 
us understand why Antiguan politics became so emotionally-charged even in the absence of 
ideological disagreement between the ALP and PLM. PST is particularly effective in small and 
developing states like 1970s Antigua because low levels of education and poor telecommunication 
facilities mean exposure to non-partisan media is minimal to begin with and one has a greater reliance 
on other in-group members for news and opinion. Postcolonial states therefore have a built-in 
vulnerability to PST. 
The third factor contributing to Antigua’s emotional political culture in 1971 was the moral 
component of political decision making. This issue is not unique to Antigua or the Eastern Caribbean 
but it is made acute in small states like Antigua where one’s party loyalty is well known and widely 
discussed. This factor draws on social identity theory’s explanation of how one’s self-perceived 
membership of a group influences one’s social and political attitudes and perceptions. In particular, 
the perceived differences between the ‘in group’ and the ‘out group’ are emphasised beyond reality.  
253
At the extremes, this can spill over from perceived political differences into social differences which 
results in moral judgement being associated with different political opinions - a hallmark of societal 
polarisation. For example, many Labour supporters today invoke impassioned language of treachery 
and sabotage when discussing PLM support in 1971.  One anti-Labour interviewee claimed that the 
254
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motives of voters in 1971 were ‘always in question.’  Generally, opponents accused Labour 
255
supporters of being a ‘bought vote’ - bought either by the government or by big business, either 
through bribery or patronage. On the other hand, PLM voters were accused of turning their backs on 
the black working-class cause and conceding defeat to white economic control in the hope of short 
term financial rewards.  This judgement-laden political attitude was stoked by party rhetoric which 
256
purposefully ‘stoked and mobilised anger in order to gain and maintain support.’  Again, this factor 
257
reduces the space for discussion and mutual understanding, compounding the polarising effects of 
non-rational decision making and echo-chamber thinking. 
The final reason Antiguan political culture was so emotionally charged in 1971 was the 
irreversibility of political decisions. In his memoir, ​The Comeback Kid​, Lester Bird (ex-Prime 
Minister and son of V C Bird) said that only 10 percent of Antiguan voters require persuasion at 
election time, the vast majority will not change their support.  Another ex-minister told me that Sir 
258
Lester’s 10 percent is an overestimation, and winning elections is about persuading a ‘tiny minority’ 
of voters who can usually be bought with job offers.  This irreversibility results from what I call a 
259
two-phase entrenchment experience. Phase one inculcates party membership as a social identity from 
childhood, handed down to children by their parents and enforced through play groups and clubs that 
reflect the parents’ party affiliation.  As with religious belief, political party leanings and in some 260
cases loyalties are present by adolescence.  Russell Dalton has pointed to the inconsistency of party 261
support in new democracies in central Europe, Africa, and East Asia as evidence of the potency of 
party support when passed from parent to child.  The second phase of entrenchment happens in 262
adulthood through workplace patronage or intimidation. Two of three public sector workers 
interviewed in November 2019 reported being arbitrarily fired for being members of the ‘wrong’ party 
in the 1970s; the third claimed to have been threatened with dismissal if they didn’t vote in the 1976 
election.  The idea of jobs being used as a reward or punishment for political loyalty was confirmed 263
as a common-knowledge political strategy by an ex-minister.  Multiple interviewees, including the 264
same ex-minister as well as two retired workers and a non-Antiguan resident, commented that an 
exchange of public sector workers wa s a common event following every election in Antigua whereby 
supporters of the outgoing party were fired and replaced by supporters of the new governing party.  265
Resigned acceptance of partyist corruption at this level is an example of how, once societal 
polarisation is set in motion, it becomes self-sustaining because a majority of people either seek to 
benefit from it or find it more convenient to just ‘go along with’ it.  The promise of rewards for 266
loyalty and punishments for apostasy encourage fervent and public displays of unquestioning party 
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support. In tandem with the other three factors, this heightened the emotionally charged nature of 




The foregoing had shown that by the 1971 General Election Antiguan political culture was 
characterised by societal polarisation. This had been driven by the ideology of partyism which drove 
opposing sides to pursue any strategy that would undermine their opponent and bring them political 
power. Such strategies focused on negative campaigning, particularly attacking the character of 
opposing leaders and party members. The emotionally-charged content of these attacks fed into a 
culture of distrust and hostility which widened the gulf between supporters of the ALP and PLM. 
Emotional hijacking by political leaders instigated a hostile and competitive political environment 
which then became self sustaining through echo-chamber exposure in the partisan media and 
entrenchment of party membership as a social identity. 
By the 1970s party membership had a huge impact on diverse areas of Antiguan daily life. 
This chapter has focussed on the employment and shown how party membership led to workplace 
discrimination, particularly in the public sector. It has also been shown that low level workplace 
corruption - whereby members of the governing party are ‘rewarded’ through employment and 
members of the opposition party are ‘punished’ with dismissal - has become an accepted part of 
Antiguan employment culture. The high degree to which party politics has interfered with 
conventional employment standards is a perfect example of societal polarisation. 
It has also been shown that partyism squeezed Antigua’s political intellectual space in this 
period by restricting the room for any opinion or idea that did not contribute directly and immediately 
to the empowerment of the party. This led the PLM to abandon their foundational principle of 
party-union separation. It also meant that neither the ALP nor the ALP came up with creative 
solutions to the problem of white and foriegn ownership in the tourism economy, and instead both 
embraced capitalist-labourism as the general ideological basis for their 1971 campaigns. Partyism’s 
ability to suffocate political debate also diminished the opportunity for intellectuals like Tim Hector 
and Black Power activists to gain popular support or interest in their ideas. This helped to generate an 
intellectually barren political environment in Antigua, where creative policies were forsaken in favour 
of more negative campaigning and the politics of hostile opposition. Through the partisan media, 
experience of workplace and other partisan discrimination, and the development of political parties as 
social identities, societal polarisation became self-sustaining. The next chapter will show that in the 


















 Chapter Four - The 1976 General Election  
 
 
Antigua has become - like Germany - a nation of two peoples. There is too 
much hate for one another. Too much suspicion and envy against our 
brother. Hopes and fears have been crushed. Our people are in despair!  
267
 
Foreword to the 1976 Labour Manifesto. 
 
 
Chapter three demonstrated that by the 1971 General Election, Antigua had become societally 
polarised along party lines. This chapter will show that between 1971 and 1976, Antigua experienced 
pernicious polarisation. As outlined in the Introduction, pernicious polarisation, according to McCoy 
et al, is when the societal polarisation of a society causes ‘problems of governance.’  This results 
268
from a relationship between the two parties which at best is characterised by apathy and distrust and at 
worst is dominated by hostility and rejection.  This negative relationship exacerbates intolerance and 269
distrust and minimises opportunities for cooperation from which constructive political relationships 
can develop.  One problem caused by pernicious polarisation is political gridlock resulting from the 270
refusal of opposing sides to cooperate. While important in countries like the USA, the issue of 
gridlock is less problematic in countries like Antigua where the Westminster System grants full power 
to parties with a majority in the legislature.   271
A more significant consequence of pernicious polarisation, as Iyengar et al have highlighted, 
is that it undermines the legitimacy of government actions in the eyes of the opposition party.  This 272
heightens the potential for civil disobedience, breakdown in law and order, and the collapse of 
government. Extremism becomes acceptable in the eyes of partisans through the tendency for hostile 
rhetoric to present the opposing group as a ​threat, either to their own party’s survival or the future of 
the nation as a whole.  In such a climate, action which may otherwise be regarded as extreme 
273
becomes seen as necessary. Among the opposition, extremism can involve disobedience and 
anti-government activism, while the governing party may pursue unconstitutional and anti-democratic 
means of repressing the opposition.  274
To demonstrate that Antigua was perniciously polarised between 1971 and 1976, this chapter 
will examine three interrelated phenomena. It begins by discussing the accumulation of power by 
political elites within the PLM and ALP. This represented a power-grab which was made acceptable 
and deemed necessary by party members in light of their belief in the threat posed by the opposing 
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party. The chapter then addresses the heightened culture of authoritarianism and extremism that 
became apparent in this period. In particular, repressive legislation by the PLM government and a 
Labour-supporting terrorist campaign are powerful markers of pernicious polarisation. The final such 
marker is the methods used by political parties to entrench support and loyalty among their members. 
This is demonstrated through an analysis of language used in printed partisan media and a 
consideration of efforts to expand party loyalty among children. The chapter closes with a brief 
analysis of the 1976 election result and a reflection on what that result shows about the state of 
Antiguan polarisation in 1976.  
 
Accumulation of Political Power 
 
The first phenomenon which points to a culture of pernicious polarisation is the accumulation of 
power by political elites, both in the governing PLM and the opposition ALP. The accumulation of 
political power in itself is not a marker of pernicious polarisation and nor is it unique to this moment 
in Antigua’s history. However, the manner and rapidity of this accumulation after 1971 is striking and 
represents a pernicious development in Antiguan political culture. Moreover, the methods of 
accumulation pursued by the PLM and ALP were motivated by and made permissible by a culture of 
pernicious polarisation.  
As the party of government, power accumulation was most visible in the PLM and took three 
forms: securing Walter’s personal control of the PLM; entrenching PLM control of government and 
public agencies; and reducing the AWU’s influence over the PLM. Chapter Three has already 
demonstrated how Walter secured leadership within the PLM. After becoming Premier in 1971, 
Walter replicated this process at the level of national government and public sector. The most 
important resource available to Walter as Premier was the power of high-level appointments, which 
he used to secure loyalty at strategically important nodes of influence in government and the public 
sector. Looking at Latin America, Levitsky et al have shown that ‘significant long-term patronage’ 
networks are crucial to the survival of young political parties, particularly when they lack a strong 
unifying ideology. ​ This was the case for the PLM, where Walter used powers of patronage to 
275
strengthen the cohesion of his party and to consolidate his personalised control over it. In doing so, he 
contributed to a long tradition of political patronage across the Caribbean. The most obvious example 
of Walter’s use of patronage was his expansion of Government from five ministers to eight, plus 
inviting three additional Permanent Secretaries to attend Cabinet. Walter was able to do this because 
the 1967 Constitution placed no restrictions on the size of the government. Walter used every 
Constitutional means available to him to secure personal loyalty within the government. The 
expansion of the government was noted by the British Representative who described an 
eleven-member Cabinet in an island of that size as ‘unwieldy’ and suggested it was done to 
accommodate factions within the PLM.   
276
While factional accommodation may have been a consideration, there were two further and 
more important motives for Walter’s expansion of Government. First, more appointments gave Walter 
patronage over a greater number of Antigua’s most important politicians who would now offer greater 
loyalty to Walter personally rather than to the party generally or to their constituents. Secondly, by 
increasing the number of ministers Walter reduced their relative power by diluting Cabinet collective 
275 Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyke, ​Challenges of Party Building in Latin America, ​12. 




responsibility among a greater number. In an essay on Indonesian coalition politics, Dan Slater 
highlighted how spreading a discrete quantity of resources (government positions and power) among 
more claimants (coalition partner parties) reduces the ability of single partners to amass power and 
become potential rivals.  This can be applied to Westminster Systems where the claimants on 
277
government power are members of the Cabinet. Ergo, by increasing the size of the government, 
Walter reduced, in relative terms, the independent authority of and threat from individual Ministers. 
By implication this heightened the relative power of the Premier who retained the same prerogative 
powers as ​primus inter pares​ in a Westminster-style government. The exploitation of the 
Premier/Prime Minister’s prerogative powers is a common problem with the Westminster System, 
particularly in small and developing states as in the Eastern Caribbean. In a paper on Commonwealth 
constitutional development, Cynthia Barrow-Giles (University of the West Indies) has pointed directly 
to ‘excessive powers of the Prime Minister and their implications for autocratic government’ as an 
issue requiring urgent reform.   
278
Barrow-Giles has raised a second point of concern about the Westmister system in small 
Eastern Caribbean states: the lack of separation of personnel between the legislative and executive. 
Again, this was exaggerated under Walter because from 1971 members of his government constituted 
a super -majority (ten out of thirteen) of PLM MPs, as well as a simple majority of all MPs (ten out of 
seventeen.) Consequently, Walter's actions served to heighten the overlap between the legislature and 
the executive, further diminishing the separation of powers. The legislature was thus weakened as a 
check of government action, being reduced to ‘little more than a rubber stamp.’  This made it easier 
279
for Walter to pass repressive legislation such as the Newspaper Laws discussed below.  
A further mechanism of power accumulation used by Walter was the exploitation of factions 
within his own party. Drawing on Michels, Paget Henry has shown that ‘factional exploitation’ is an 
effective method of power accumulation, particularly common in the Anglophone Caribbean. In his 
1991 treatise, Henry predominantly focuses on the use of purges by Bird to consolidate control of the 
ALP between 1943 and 1967.  However a more subtle type of factional competition is the careful 280
manipulation of senior individuals' positions within one's party. These may be adjusted so as to reduce 
the potential of a threat from colleagues whilst keeping them within the party and avoiding the scandal 
and backlash of a purge.  
The position of Donald Halstead's within the PLM demonstrates this careful manipulation. 
Halstead was a close ally of Walter, having also been dismissed from the ATLU in 1967. Halstead 
was extremely popular with AWU members and had a reputation for being even more militaristic and 
pro-worker than Walter. This meant that Halstead posed a potential threat to Walter's leadership in the 
same way that Walter had challenged Bird's. It was therefore prudent for Walter to subtly reduce the 
authority of Halstead whilst keeping him in the PLM and not offending his supporters. Walter did this 
in a variety of ways which collectively worked to reduce the threat of Halstead as a potential rival. For 
example, Walter refused Halstead the position of Deputy Premier, giving it instead to Robert Hall. 
This avoided giving Halstead too much power and simultaneously strengthened the loyalty of Hall 
and his supporters. The BGR specifically noted this appointment as an example of Walter trying to 
'clip [Halstead's] wings.'  In this way Walter exploited factions within his own party to reduce the 
281
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power of potential rivals and strengthen his own position as party leader and as Premier. With full 
internal domination of the party and Cabinet, Walter could pursue extremist and radical measures 
designed to suppress the ALP and ensure the continued empowerment of the PLM.  
After Walter had secured loyalty within government, he extended his government’s control 
over state-run public institutions, including the police and civil service. By 1971, Bird and Labour had 
been the dominant force in Antiguan politics for over 20 years. It was therefore assumed by many in 
the Opposition that public institutions would be dominated by Bird-loyalists inclined to sabotage the 
work of the new government. For example, Walter immediately expelled non-Antiguan members 
(mainly from St Kitts and Dominica) of the ADF which was regarded by the PLM as a private 
pro-Bird paramilitary group, rather than a peace-keeping nonpolitical organisation.  This perception 
282
was rooted in the fact that all ADF personnel were Bird appointees and the ADF had been 
over-zealous in their disbanding of AWU and PLM demonstrations.   283
Similar changes of personnel took place in the police, civil service, and among public sector 
employees in nationalised and state-run enterprises.  Some of these alterations were constitutional, 
284
relying on the powers granted to the Premier, but others relied on extra-constitutional pressure and 
intimidation. In late February 1971, British Representative Reiss reported that Walter was planning a 
‘re-organisation of the Civil Service’ that would lead to ‘victimisation’ of Labour supporters.  Reiss 
285
also claimed that the new government had a ‘list of opponents’ whom they planned to remove through 
any means possible from the denial of work permits to arbitrary dismissal. High on the list was the 
prominent lawyer Cosmos Phillips who was pressured to resign his chairmanship of the Public 
Services Commission (PSC).  Under section 83 of the 1967 Constitution, the PSC was established as 
286
an independent non-political body with power to appoint civil servants, including the Director of 
Public Prosecutions.  A neutral Civil Service is a hallmark of the Westminster System and was 
287
enshrined in the 1967 Constitution. The intrusion of party-politics into the Civil Service is a marker of 
pernicious polarisation as it subverts constitutional rules and conventions. It also damages good 
governance by replacing experienced civil servants with party loyalists, prioritising party politics 
above meritocracy. Removing scrutiny by intermediary institutions like the Civil Service enabled the 
PLM government to more easily pass and enforce reactionary measures like the Newspaper Acts. 
These in turn furthered polarisation by contributing to the opposition's sense of fear and 
powerlessness, driving extremism by Labour supporters. This illustrates how pernicious polarisation 
has a self-entrenching effect.  
The final mechanism of power accumulation by the governing PLM was the reduction in the 
autonomy of the AWU. This echoed Bird's efforts in the late 1960s to restrict the power and 
independence of all unions, including his own ATLU. In both cases, reducing union activity is an 
example of partyism because it shows politicians taking repressive action, even against their own 
base, in order to preserve and empower their party at any cost. Just as Bird tried to eliminate both the 
ATLU and AWU as threats to the ALP, Walter tried to reduce the capability of the AWU to threaten 
PLM authority and stability. Walter's own experience in establishing the AWU taught him that an 
autonomous and energised union could cripple a government. He therefore set out to reduce the 
autonomy and power of his own AWU in order to strengthen his party. This was done primarily by a 
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purposeful abandonment of the principle of union-party separatism whereby the Two Hats Problem 
was converted into the Two Hats Asset.  
A notable example of a purposeful overlap of personnel was Donald Halstead who served as 
Minister for Home and Labour Affairs whilst retaining his position on the AWU Executive 
Committee. This gave the PLM Government a vocal and highly popular voice within the AWU 
leadership.  This was possible because neither the AWU or PLM constitutions forbade overlapping 
288
personnel - this was just convention which was broadly accepted as mandatory until 1971. From 1971 
partyism eroded this convention, making any action designed to strengthen the party acceptable and 
necessary in the eyes of supporters. 
Further party-union overlap was orchestrated through the Senate. As Premier, Walter 
appointed AWU vice-President Malcom Daniel and AWU Executive Committee member Prince 
Hurst to be PLM Senators.  These appointments closely tied the AWU leadership to the interests of 
289
the PLM and further diminished the autonomy of the AWU executive. Appointing these senators also 
brought Walter the personal loyalty of two powerful AWU leaders. Walter’s aim was to make the 
demands of the AWU subservient to the interests of the governing PLM and thereby forestall any 
union-based threat to the government and party. By bringing the most popular leading unionists under 
the PLM umbrella, Walter prevented a repetition of his own 1967 stand against the ATLU/ALP 
leadership. Again, this is an example of party survival eclipsing all other principles, in this case trade 
union independence and activism.  
The success of this tactic may be seen in the de-escalation of AWU activism in the 1971-76 
period. A notable example at the time was the Cable and Wireless strikes organised by the AWU. 
After the PLM gained power, Halstead used his position of authority within the AWU to end these 
'disruptive tactics' even though no industrial settlement had been brought about.  This is an example 
290
of workers' and union interests being made subservient to party success and stability.  
The abandonment of party-union separatism was recognised and criticised by some 
contemporaries, such as calypsonian King Short Shirt. In 1975 Short Shirt sang that “​With 
government, union, and employers now all combined...Brothers, they go rob we blind.”  Here Short 
291
Shirt recognised that by restricting and regulating union activity through its leadership, the PLM 
hindered the AWU’s ability to operate as an advocate for workers’ rights.​ ​Moreover, the sense of 
hopelessness conveyed in Short Shirt’s lyrics reflects a feeling of powerlessness on the part of some 
government critics as the union-party overlap also restricted the AWU’s ability to function as a check 
on government. Subtly curtailing the ability of civil society institutions to hold government to account 
is a particularly perfidious effect of pernicious polarisation. This was also recognised by union purists 
such as the AWU General Secretary, Keithlyn Smith who was one of the few AWU-PLM leaders 
maintaining support for union-party separation. Early on in the PLM government, Smith warned the 
AWU Convention that the PLM must respect the AWU’s autonomy or “risk losing union support.”  
292
This was an empty threat as withdrawing support from the PLM would risk handing power to Labour. 
Moreover, Smith himself somewhat sacrificed union-party separation by becoming a PLM senator in 
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1976 whilst retaining his position as AWU General Secretary.  Therefore, by 1976, even the most 
293
principled purists like Smith succumbed to the overwhelming influence of partyism. 
The accumulation of political power by the PLM leadership was both a symptom and a cause 
of pernicious polarisation. Accumulation of this kind reveals the presence of pernicious polarisation 
because activity which would otherwise have been unacceptable - in this case reintroducing the Two 
Hats Problem - was now deemed necessary for the survival of the party. At the same time, this 
accumulation exacerbated polarisation because reducing diversity of opinion in Cabinet and 
restricting the independence of the AWU focussed the PLM’s activity behind the single purpose of 
party survival at any cost. The next section will show how this directly facilitated the kind of 
unconstitutional and authoritarian government action typical of perniciously polarised societies and 
only widened the gulf between supporters of the ALP and PLM.  
The accumulation of political power was also pursued by leaders of the ALP. Though Bird 
and Labour were out of government for the first time in twenty years, this was not, as Douglas Midget 
has pointed out, ‘an exile without renewal.’  The 1971 defeat instigated a two-part reorganisation 
294
within the party at both the grass-roots and leadership levels. This was designed to increase the party’s 
appeal to a younger generation of voters whilst simultaneously tightening direct control of the party 
by the ‘Bird clique.’ I use this latter term to refer to the small circle of veteran Labour leaders who 
had controlled the ALP since its establishment. These men were ardent Bird-loyalists and included 
John St Luce, Lionel Hurst, Ernest Williams, and others. Within the Bird clique was an emergent Bird 
Dynasty, focussing around the political and legal careers of his sons Lester and Vere Jr.  
One way the Bird clique accumulated power was to appoint Labour grandees who had failed 
to be elected in 1971 to the Senate, including Lester Bird and John St Luce.  The 1967 Constitution 295
required the Governor to appoint three Senators at his own ‘discretion’ after ‘consultation’ with the 
Premier.  After the formalisation of the Official Opposition in 1968, appointees for these seats were 
296
nominated by the Opposition. Labour used this power to ensure that its leading figures secured a seat 
in Parliament, even if they had been rejected by the electorate. This disregard for voter opinion is an 
example of the elite’s withdrawal from mass control, a second strategy of power accumulation 
identified by Paget Henry.  At the same time, Lester Bird was elected Chairman of the ALP. This 
297
meant that Lester Bird had ultimate authority over the internal management of the Labour party as 
well as a platform to challenge the government in the Senate.  
Meanwhile, Vere Bird Sr was appointed Labour’s ‘Political Leader’, despite also being 
defeated in the election.  Political Leader was a new title seemingly invented to grant Bird supreme 
298
authority within the party, regardless of electoral outcomes. This was tantamount to declaring Bird 
‘Labour leader for life’, and is comparable to Bustamante’s ‘proprietary’ leadership of the Jamaican 
Labour Party.  Meanwhile Ernest Williams became Leader of the Opposition in Parliament.  
299 300
Williams was another stalwart Bird-loyalist and had first been elected alongside Bird in 1951. ​ After 
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1971 the Bird clique thus secured tight control over the party at all levels - in the Senate, in the House, 
and among the Party Executive. Thus, while they had lost the election, the Bird-clique had no 
intention of relinquishing power over the party but instead chose to strengthen their internal positions 
of dominance. This reinforcement of the Bird-clique in unassailable positions of leadership 
exemplifies what LeBas and Munemo referring to Zimbabwean authoritarianism have called a ‘more 
closed political regime’  Just as the PLM became focussed on Walter-led partyism, the ALP became 
302
a closed political regime built entirely around the Bird-clique and their own partyism.  
A simultaneous process of opposition-era rejuvenation within the ALP was an expanded 
appeal to young voters. Reflecting the personality-centric nature of political rhetoric in this period, 
this appeal was accomplished through personnel changes not policy reform. For the 1976 election, 
Labour presented a slate of ‘second generation’ Antiguan Labour politicians, including Bird’s sons 
Lester and Vere Jr, Bill Abbot, Hugh Marshall, and Robin Bascus. These replaced the ‘first 
generation’ of veteran Labour politicians: candidates like Danefield Hurst, Joseph Lawrence, Bradley 
Carrott, and Donald Sheppard who had stood in most or all elections prior to 1976 but never 
campaigned again after 1971.  Instead, they were replaced in 1976 by nine first-time Labour 
303
candidates.  One of these was St Phillip’s (North) candidate, Robin Yearwood, who was first elected 
304
in 1976 and has retained the seat ever since. The second generation campaigned on more or less the 
same policy platform as their predecessors in 1971, with little change between the two manifestos. 
This fits the narrative of partyism making politics more about the people in the party than the 
principles and policy the party stands for. Welcoming a new generation of candidates while 
strengthening their hold of central party power enabled the Bird-clique to enhance the external appeal 
of their party whilst maintaining their internal dominance.  
The second way in which ALP accumulated political power after the 1971 elections was 
through a reduction in the autonomy of the ATLU. The ATLU-ALP relationship was more complex 
than that of the AWU-PLM but the motivation for reformulation was the same: party strength and 
survival. As mentioned, the ALP and ATLU had been formally separated on 24 November 1968, 
though non-executive level leadership and organisational structures remained the same. After 1971 
the ALP established constituency branches that were independent of local ATLU sections.  These 
305
new branches were led and staffed by a younger generation of activists recruited specifically to 
heighten the party’s appeal to younger voters. However, behind the scenes the ALP leadership moved 
to ensure they retained control over the affiliated Union. Two long-term Bird allies took the leading 
positions in the ATLU; Lionel Hurst became President while Adolphus Freeland became General 
Secretary. As with the Birds and St Luce, Hurst and Freeland had failed to win election in 1971. This 
is another example of Labour inserting its grandees into powerful positions, despite electoral opinion. 
Having staunch Bird-allies as President and General Secretary of the ATLU bound the union to the 
interests of the party in the same way the PLM had tied its own success to the AWU’s interests.  
Control of the ATLU was important to Labour for two reasons. First, union activism could be 
used as a tool by Labour to challenge the strength and upset the politics of the governing PLM. 
Secondly, it lessened the risk of a second challenge to the ALP’s authority by the union and reduced 
the risk of another party-damaging schism. As with the PLM and the AWU, the autonomy and 
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authority of the ATLU was being worn away in pursuit of party unity and strength. Writing in 1975, 
contemporary observer Professor Kunteng (Vanier College, Quebec) concluded that despite formal 
separation between union and party, Bird ‘maintained a firm grip on both, and was accepted as the 
undisputed leader.’  
306
Therefore, both the ALP and PLM abandoned the principle of union-party separation in 
favour of an amalgamation of the organisations’ leaderships. The phenomenon of union 
disempowerment, while acute in Antigua, was exhibited in multiple instances throughout the 
Anglophone Caribbean. Paul Sutton has shown how the power of organised labour was diminished 
through co-opting trade union leaders into government and making the union dependent on ‘favour by 
government for the privileges and opportunities that come their way.’  This perfectly describes the 
307
reorganised party-union relationships in Antiguan between 1971 and 1976.  
The reformulation of the ALP-ATLU and PLM-AWU relationships is one of the clearest 
examples of partyism in this period. Each party restructured its relationship with its supporting union 
in order to secure party unity and strength to win the next election. This meant abandoning the 
principle of party-union separation which previously had been the founding policy of the AWU. 
Moreover, the maneuvering of political elites at the top of both party and union was deemed 
acceptable to most supporters because it was done for the greater good of party survival. While some 
like Keithlyn Smith and King Short Shirt criticised the ongoing Two Hats Movement, it is notable that 
most Antiguans did not. This more than anything shows the rapidity and strength with which partyism 
came to dominate Antiugan political culture in this period.  
The political take-over of the unions is also one of the best examples of pernicious 
polarisation. This is because independent civil society organisations like unions, able to hold 
government to account, are a key feature of democracy. The partyist takeover eroded this ability by 
making the autonomy of the unions subservient to the interests of their respective parties. This 
weakened Antiguan democracy - the very definition of pernicious polarisation.  
The accumulation of political power that took place in Antigua after the 1971 election is an 
example of what Olwyn Blouet (Virginia State University) has called the ‘Caribbeanisation’ of the 
Westminster System.  A key feature of Caribbeanisation is the expanded role of personal power and 
308
patronage, especially of the Premier/Prime Minister. The Westminster System grants the Prime 
Minister significant personal powers, such as the power of appointment, but this becomes exaggerated 
in a small place like Antigua. Duncan and Woods explained the highly personalised nature of 
island-state politics in terms of the ‘strong personal ties’ between politicians and the public.  
309
Recently, Veenendal and Corbett have emphasised the ‘very personal ‘face-to-face’ basis’ of 
clientelism in Caribbean and Pacific island-states where small constituencies inculcate close 
professional and personal relations between politicians and voters.  The smallness of island-states as 
310
communities and as polities means that a certain degree of personalisation is effectively built-in the 
practice of democracy. 
Caribbeanisation and its emphasis on patronage both fed off of and contributed to pernicious 
polarisation. As outlined in the previous chapter, employment was used as a tool to reward party 
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members and punish opposition supporters. This is blatant partyism as it prioritises party 
aggrandisement over rational employment reasoning and meritocracy. Party-preference in the 
workplace is particularly pernicious in the public sector as it constitutes a form of corruption whereby 
the government exploits its powers for its own partisan gains. Job offers in the public sector can be 
used to buy voters' support which undermines the principle of fairly contested elections. Moreover, 
the governing party can use powers of appointment to position party supporters in key nodes of 
non-party government or state institutions like the police or civil service. This undermines the 
impartiality of these institutions which is a key principle of the Westminster System and reduces 
checks on the governing party's actions. At the same time, excessive use of patronage by the 
governing party furthers polarisation. It does this by stoking resentment among the opposition party 
which further undermines opportunities for cooperation and compromise. Moreover, unchallenged 
corruption of this kind generates emotions of powerlessness among the opposition, encouraging them 
to pursue more extreme partisan action. Regarding the government as corrupt makes extreme action 
legitimate in the eyes of the opposition. This is a good example of the self-sustaining downward spiral 
generated by pernicious polarisation.  
 
Heightened Authoritarianism  
 
A notable feature of Antiguan political culture between 1971 and 1976 is authoritarianism. I shall 
follow Carl Stone's definition of authoritarianism in the Anglophone Caribbean context: 'a strong 
authority system which locates command positions of power and control over a political and social 
system in the hands of political actors or institutions that are controlled by and loyal to interests at the 
upper end of an old, new, or emergent social hierarchy.'  In the case of Antigua, this new social 311
hierarchy was the leadership of the two political parties.  
Authoritarianism was not unique to this period of Antigua's history and it was not uncommon 
in the Anglophone Caribbean. Rather, authoritarianism has been recognised by a number of Caribbean 
scholars, including Nigel O. Bolland and Carl Stone, as a well-established feature of Anglophone 
Caribbean politics. Some have explained this in terms of an antagonistic political culture borne of 
centuries of colonial experience, while others have pointed to the Westminster System's susceptibility 
to manipulation by ‘maximum leaders’ and cliques in small and developing nations.  Similarly, 
312
authoritarianism was not a new phenomenon in Antigua after 1971. Authoritarianism underscored the 
entirety of Antigua's colonial-era political culture; as Danns has pointed out: 'colonialism is 
synonymous with authoritarianism.'  But this authoritarian culture continued throughout 313
decolonisation and came to characterise Bird's leadership. For instance, the culture of purges and 
dismissals typical of Bird's Presidency of the ATLU fit Stone's definition of authoritarianism as they 
were designed to focus power in the hands of the new social hierarchy.  
Authoritarianism was therefore present in Antigua prior to 1971. What we see after the PLM 
gains power, however, is a noticeable spike in authoritarian tendencies. This was driven by partyism 
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and the PLM's desire to use any means available to maintain their hold on political power. This 
escalation in authoritarianism highlights the perniciousness of political polarisation because the 
government abused its powers to undermine democracy for their own benefit. This affirms McCoy et 
al’s proposition that pernicious polarisation can have a destructive effect on democracy itself.  
314
Immediately on gaining power the PLM introduced six bills which many Labour supporters 
still see as signalling ‘the repressive direction the [PLM] government was preparing to take.’  Of 
315
these, the two ‘Newspaper Acts’ are the most explicitly partisan. The 1971 Newspaper Registration 
(Amendment) Act required newspapers to obtain a licence to print and sell their publication. This 
licence cost EC$600 a year and required the approval of the appropriate government minister.  
316
Meanwhile, the Newspaper Surety (Amendment) Act required all newspapers to make an outright 
surety deposit with the treasury of EC$10,000 in cash, unless the appropriate minister was convinced 
of the publication’s ability to cover all potential costs.  The purpose of these laws was to shut down 
317
opposition newspapers the ​Worker’s Voice ​and the ​Antigua Times. ​They did this by effectively giving 
the government the ability to financially cripple opposition newspapers whilst allowing supportive 
publications to avoid the surety deposit. These laws constitute an unconstitutional power-grab by the 
government through which the media was prevented from scrutinising politicians’ actions. As free 
debate is a hallmark of democracy, these laws require special attention as a marker of pernicious 
polarisation.  
The newspaper laws were extreme by contemporary standards. Previously there had been no 
legal requirement for Antiguan newspapers to obtain a licence or pay an annual fee. A 1910 
Newspaper Surety Act did require newspapers to have surety but only of EC$960 and this could be in 
the form of a government bond. The 1971 Acts are also extreme by contemporary comparisons: 
Barbados legislation required a newspaper surety of $240; Trinidad mandated $1,000; and Jamaica 
required a licence fee equivalent to EC$60.  Yet attempts to regulate the press were a common 
318
feature of Caribbean politics in the 1970s. In 1972 John A Lent (later Professor Lent, Temple 
University, Philadelphia) completed a PhD on mass media in the Commonwealth Caribbean, followed 
by an investigation into press freedom in the region in 1973. Lent observed Caribbean leaders using 
two primary methods to ‘redefine’ press freedom.  First, some governments attempted to control 
319
press coverage through ownership of news outlets. Lent raised the examples of Trinidad where two 
thirds of the electronic media was owned by the government, and St Kitts where the Bradshaw 
government owned the broadcasting outlet and a newspaper.  The other way governments tried to 
320
control the press was through regulatory legislation supposedly aimed at protecting individuals against 
libel and the state against sedition. Lent demonstrates this in the case of Dominica’s 1968 Undesirable 
Publications Act and the 1971 St Kitts and Nevis Press and Publications Board Act.  The PLM’s 
321
Newspaper Acts thus fit into a Commonwealth Caribbean context where legislation was used to 
expand government powers over independent and opposition media outlets.  
Antigua Star Ltd ​initiated legal action against the government on the basis that the laws were 
unconstitutional.  Both laws were struck down as contraventions of the Antiguan Constitution which 
322
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guaranteed freedom of expression and opinion.  In particular, the Court of Appeal criticised the 
323
licence fee on grounds that ‘a person cannot be required to purchase that which the Constitution has 
freely granted’, meaning the right to free expression.  Though nullified for the duration of the PLM 
324
government, these Laws remained statute in Antigua pursuant to a Privy Council decision handed 
down in 1976 that these laws, though ‘not free from difficulty’, were not unconstitutional - the licence 
fee for instance could be regarded as a form of tax which the government was justified in levying.
325
On regaining power in 1976 - the same year the Appeal Court decision was overturned - the ALP 
began publishing a government-run and tax-payer funded newspaper, ​The Nation​, which was highly 
partisan in blatantly attacking opponents of Bird and Labour.   
326
That these laws were introduced in the first place speaks to the pernicious nature of Antiguan 
polarisation. By 1972 Antigua was so polarised along party lines that many were willing to see severe 
curtailment of their constitutional freedoms in the name of party security. This is demonstrated by the 
press coverage of the bills’ passage through Parliament. The PLM-supporting ​Antigua​ ​Star​ defended 
the laws as necessary to protect citizens against lies and slander. For months the ​Star ​ran articles 
preparing the ground for the bills’ introduction by asking ‘How long are some newspapers going to be 
allowed to print lies’ and asserting that ‘Freedom of the press does not extend that far’.  The ​Star​’s 
327
rhetoric and style of argument in these pieces perfectly illustrates the echo-chamber effect of polarised 
opinion where readers of the same newspaper adhere to shared points of view which otherwise would 
have been regarded as extreme. This type of press coverage contributed to a political culture in which 
the ALP was seen as a threat not just to the success of the PLM but to the survival of Antigua as well. 
This is a hallmark of pernicious polarisation.  The idea of a threat to national survival effectively 
328
places a society on a war-footing which permits and even demands extreme action by the government 
in order to defend the country. This rationale explains why the PLM were able to pass such 
unconstitutional and authoritarian legislation.  
The Newspaper Laws were one example of Antiguan governmental interference in the media. 
Supplementary examples include the deportation of staunch PLM critic and ​Workers' Voice ​editor 
Dorcas White, originally from Montserrat.  The official reason for White’s deportation order was 329
that she lacked a work permit, though many including the British Representative saw her deportation 
as a politically motivated exploitation of government powers to quash popular opposition voices.  
330
The same tactic was used in St Lucia to deport Barbadian-born editor of ​Voice of St Lucia ​Denzil 
Agard after he criticised a minister’s speech in 1970.  Such deportations are an example of the ways 331
societal and pernicious polarisation cause politics to spill-over into areas of daily life and provoke 
problems, such as workplace discrimination.  
As well as newspapers and their editors, the PLM attacked the radio. Strict licences meant 
that Labour-supporting radio stations ZAL-TV and ZDK were banned from making political 
announcements of any kind.  At the same time, Labour were denied airtime on the government-run 
332
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Antigua Broadcasting System which did allow political broadcasts.  Again this regard, Antigua did 
333
not stand out; politically-motivated radio regulation was found throughout the Caribbean. For 
example, St Kitts-Nevis’s state-owned ZIZ station allowed Premier Bradshaw to make a politically 
motivated attack on the PAM in 1967 while denying the PAM any right to respond.  Efforts to 
334
regulate the flow of information for the purpose of winning votes is evidence of pernicious 
polarisation because it curtails rights expressly guaranteed in the Constitution. However, as with 
party-union separatism and the newspaper acts, these actions were regarded as legitimate by party 
supporters in order to guarantee the survival of the party.  
An authoritarian shift was also apparent within the Labour opposition. This is significant 
because by choosing to reciprocate the PLM's authoritarianism with heightened authoritarianism of 
their own, the ALP helped to worsen pernicious polarisation in Antigua. This aligns with recent work 
by McCoy and Somer which highlighted the fact that in perniciously polarised politics, the opposition 
may decide how to respond to polarising forces emanating from government (such as the PLM's 
Newspaper Acts or civil service reform). In such scenarios, the opposition can either capitulate and 
compromise or reciprocate the polarisation through agitation and mobilisation.  In the case of 
335
Antigua, the ALP clearly chose to reciprocate polarising forces and thus contributed to making 
pernicious polarisation an entrenched feature of Antiguan political culture.  
The most extreme form of an authoritarian shift in Labour was the emergence of an 
anti-government terrorist organisation unofficially aligned with the ALP called the Antigua Freedom 
Fighters (AFF). It is appropriate to label the AFF a terrorist organisation because it existed solely to 
intimidate PLM supporters and create a climate of fear and tension, undermining the PLM's ability to 
govern. The AFF claimed responsibility for a series of non-fatal bombings and bomb-plots between 
1971 and 1973. Threats about bombings were made over the Bird family-owned ZDK Radio station 
and resulted in numerous evacuations of schools and public buildings. In 1973 police arrested leading 
Labour activist Clarence Pilgrim on a charge of possessing illegal printing machinery used to print 
literature for the AFF. Pilgrim was represented by the law firm Bird and Bird (established by Lester 
Bird and Vere Bird Junior) who ensured the trial dragged on until Labour were returned to power in 
1976 and the charges were dropped.  Following Pilgrim’s 1973 arrest the activity of the AFF 
336
stopped for a time.  It is difficult to gauge how popular or how large the AFF was. Their own claims, 
337
which are likely to be exaggerated, put the membership at 487 in June 1972. ​ But more important 
338
than the membership was the AFF’s links to people in powerful places who provided it with access to 
considerable funds and resources, not least those necessary to make broadcasts and build functioning 
explosives.  
Beyond their bombing campaign, the AFF also produced fliers similar in style to the ABDM 
White Papers but with more aggressive content. The aim of the AFF papers was twofold. First, they 
complemented bomb-scares with threats of violence such as ‘The PLM ministers should be dead, 
blown to hell up...they must die it is the only way.’ [sic]  Secondly, the pamphlets contributed to the 
339
personalisation of Antigua's political rhetoric by slandering leading PLM politicians and supporters. 
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For example, the AFF claimed that ‘The PLM ministers deal in dope, they love obia’.  The same 
340
pamphlet called the lawyer Louis Lockhart a marajuana addict and accused Halstead of deporting a 
woman because ‘she refuse to give him sex.’  A subsequent pamphlet called Robert Hall a ‘cocobay 
341
bitch’ and accused his wife of having children through extra-marital affairs.  This type of 
342
personalised rhetoric was especially powerful in a very socially conservative and Christian 
community like Antigua where drug use, promiscuity, and black magic were particularly serious 
taboos.  
The AFF pamphlets show that significant pernicious polarisation was caused by partyism in 
this period. With no competing ideology or policy to argue about, the AFF focused exclusively on 
slandering the character of political leaders and their supporters. Partyism's dogma of 'party power at 
any cost' had become so strong by the 1970s that the AFF felt no topics were off limits. They did this 
with a degree of hostility and threat that had not been seen in Antigua before. Compared to the 
ABDM pamphlets or partisan media, the content of the AFF pamphlets mark a significant escalation 
in the hostility and aggressiveness of political rhetoric. Though the AFF was a small and niche group, 
their willingness and ability to print such explicit material testifies to a highly emotive and 




The accumulation of political power and heightened authoritarianism both indicate a perniciously 
polarised society between 1971 and 1976. A final factor demonstrating Antigua's pernicious 
polarisation in this period was expanded mechanisms for entrenching party loyalty. As with 
authoritarianism, efforts to spread and sustain party support are not unique to Antigua or to this 
period. But it is the sudden and extreme escalation of old and new methods used by the parties in this 
period which point to pernicious polarisation.  
Newspapers are and always have been highly partisan organisations, particularly when they 
were established to advocate the interests of a particular social group. The ​Workers' Voice ​and 
Antigua Star ​always strongly supported the ATLU and AWU respectively. After 1971 however, there 
was a pronounced escalation in the aggressive, emotive, and personalistic language used by these 
papers with regards to politics and politicians. The relationship between these newspapers and the 
respective party leaders cannot be overstated: the ​Antigua Star​’s principal owners were Donald 
Halstead and Gerald Watt - PLM ministers for Home Affairs and Public Utilities.  ​Worker’s Voice​, 
343
meanwhile,​ ​was printed directly out of the ATLU offices.  We may therefore assume synchronicity 
344
between the content of these two papers and the opinions of party leaders.  
Consequently, these newspapers acted as echo-chambers where the beliefs of the two party 
groups were reinforced daily through selective exposure to affirming evidence. Readership numbers 
are difficult to determine for Antiguan newspapers and there was extensive sharing and group-reading 
of the ​Voice ​and ​Star​. This communal aspect of media exposure further reinforced the echo-chamber 
effect. Furthermore, both the ​Voice ​and the ​Star ​contained non-news features such as articles on 
culture or community competitions. These reinforced the role of political parties as social identities by 
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providing a cultural and communal basis to the group that went beyond simple party membership. 
This is a clear example of societal polarisation and it made the divide between PLM and ALP 
supporters both more profound and more durable as it was predicated on more than just the fact of 
party membership. The highly personalised attacks and extremist language contained in the media 
pushed this press coverage from conventional political polarisation towards pernicious polarisation 
because it contributed towards the culture of distrust and intimidation which led to a breakdown in 
good democratic government in the 1971-76 period.  
Following the 1971 election, the ​Antigua Star ​made no attempt to bring supporters of the ALP 
and PLM together or to appeal to ALP voters as potential readers. Instead, the paper accused Labour 
of being ‘still on the campaign’ and likened them to ‘children playing with matches and gasoline.’  
345
This rhetoric reflects the antipathy and distrust that characterised the relationship between opposing 
sides in a polarised society.  Specifically, talk of ‘matches and gasoline’ reflects the propensity for 
346
perniciously polarised societies to see the political ‘other’ as a threat to the nation itself.  Moreover, 
347
explicitly likening Labour to ‘children’ implies that the ALP were in some way immature, ignorant, or 
irrational and thus incapable of good governance. Again, such subjective assertions about the 
personalities of politicians is a hallmark of pernicious polarisation. Accusations that the ALP were 
dangerous and immature were mutually reinforcing as poor government decisions often result from 
ignorance or poor thinking. The manner in which this single ​Star ​article bolsters the message that 
Labour was not fit to govern is indicative of the consistently personalistic and aggressive news 
coverage exhibited by these papers on a daily basis.  
The presentation of Labour as incompetent recurred throughout the ​Star​’s political coverage. 
In a notable example, an editorial claimed the new PLM government would be more tolerant of an 
Opposition because of the party’s ‘higher intelligence level among the members and their superior 
breeding’.  While it is a fact that Walter’s Cabinet contained more graduates, the language around 
348
‘higher breeding’ reflects an insidious rhetoric of difference and judgement. Nothing as explicit and 
offensive as this had been published in the ​Star​ or ​Voice ​prior to this period and this indicates the 
presence of pernicious polarisation. Firstly, this terminology is an unprecedentedly offensive smear on 
the character of Labour leaders and by extension their supporters. This is particularly noticeable in a 
society experiencing the horrendous effects of racism which is often predicated on pseudoscientific 
ideas about a link between ethnicity and intelligence. Secondly, the language of ‘higher breeding’ 
attempts to establish material differences between Labour and the PLM. To do so would make the 
gulf between the parties permanent and unbridgeable. This is an extreme example of the routine 
methods of group identity entrenchment where differences between groups are emphasised beyond 
reason, especially at times when such identities are most salient such as the aftermath of an election.  
349
The language used by the ​Star, ​not to mention the confidence with which even the editor invoked 
offensive and discriminatory language, shows the great extent to which pernicious polarisation had 
become an embedded and insidious component of Antiguan political culture. 
The incompetence rhetoric continued right up to the 1976 election and was parroted by party 
publications as well as the media. The PLM’s 1976 Election Manifesto opens with a foreword by 
Walter in which he refers to the pre-1971 period as ‘a barren political landscape’.  He goes on to 
350
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claim that Labour were ‘incapable, intellectually and pragmatically, of leading the people.’  This 
351
echoes the rhetoric of intelligence and aptitude discussed earlier and again reflects a highly 
personalised form of political antagonism. Again, while earlier party political publications had 
slandered the character of opposition politicians, the focus on qualities like intelligence was 
unprecedented and indicates a serious upsurge in polarisation.  
Beyond the partisan media, pernicious polarisation may be seen in the dramatic escalation of 
methods of party recruitment and support in the post-1971 period. A notable new mechanism of 
entrenching party support within communities was to turn attention to children and mobilise party 
support early in life. Efforts to bring children into the 'political party family' were seen throughout the 
Caribbean in this period. In Jamaica in 1968 the People’s National Party set up the PNP Youth 
Organisation while in 1970 Bruce Golding co-founded Jamaica Youth as an arm of the Jamaica 
Labour Party.  Guyana saw the establishment of two youth movements, each aligned to one of the 352
political parties: the Progressive Youth Organisation supporting the PPP and the Young Soialist 
Movement supporting the PNC.  In Dominica, the Dominica Freedom Movement established the 353
Young Freedom Movement which mobilised young people to support and join the party throughout 
the 1970s.   
354
In Antigua, the most effective political youth movements were established by the Labour 
party as part of their opposition-era renewal. Labour established two island-wide youth organisations 
with local bodies that mirrored the structure of the ALP and the ATLU. The ALP Youth Movement 
(ALPYM) was led by ‘dynamic and forceful young men and women’ with the aim of securing party 
loyalty among children while the ATLU Junior Executive recreated the Union’s structure for young 
would-be activists.  From the start, convention dictated that Labour-supporting parents would send 
355
their children to join Labour youth organisations - one political activist told me that in this respect 
youth groups reflected religious youth groups, with children’s participation depending on the 
affiliation of the parents.  Youth movements were therefore less about widening the party’s appeal 356
and more about solidifying support among existing members and actively trying to make the societal 
polarisation of Antigua permanent. Seeing to entrench the division of a society is a sign of pernicious 
polarisation as it shows politicians seeking to secure their own positions at the expense of social unity 
and harmony.  
Being in the ALPYM was akin to membership of a club, with the party colour (red) and logo 
(flaming torch) becoming symbols of group and individual identity. The wide dissemination of 
symbols among children is an example of what Levitsky et al call efforts to ‘cultivate strong partisan 
identities’ - the first mechanism crucial to party survival.  The application of this mechanism to 
357
children, who could not vote, had several perceived benefits for the ALP. First, children were told to 
encourage their Labour-supporting parents to vote in elections. This constituted an ongoing ‘get out 
the vote’ campaign designed to overcome the problem of low voter turnout. It is interesting that this 
implies that by 1976 Labour did not attempt to convert PLM supporters, but relied heavily on 
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maximising turnout among their own supporters to win the election. The 95 percent turnout in 1976 
implies this tactic was at least helpful in boosting turnout and contributing to the Labour victory. 
Secondly, cultivating partisan identities among children laid a foundation for reliable future party 
support. Crucially, voters who had already been groomed to develop partisan loyalties would be more 
susceptible to conventional forms of voter manipulation such as the printed media echo-chamber, 
slander of the opposition, and bribery or encouragement through job offers. This was particularly 
important following the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 in 1975.  Thirdly, Labour’s youth 
358
groups served as training grounds for new recruits into the party leadership structure - recruits which 
from an early age were drilled in strict adherence to the party line, veneration of its leaders, and 
clear-cut antipathy towards members of other parties. Simultaneously, the Junior Executive of the 
ATLU performed a similar function with regards to industrial relations and trade union affairs.  
359
Lester Bird directly credited this youth mobilisation by the ALP with their ‘razor-thin margin of 
victory’ in 1976.   
360
The targeting of children by political parties continues today, with parties giving book-bags 
and lunchboxes to school children for the purposes of inculcating party identity through the 
dissemination of party logos and symbols.  Such donations also bribe or gain the gratitude of parents 
361
whilst serving as free advertising for the party. Expanding the 'party family' to include children helps 
to explain the longevity of political loyalty, particularly the devout veneration of Bird which continues 
among many, even 21 years after his death.  Targeting children in this way reveals pernicious 
362
polarisation as it actively undermines social cohesion for party political purposes. Placing the 
long-term strength of a party above national unity epitomises partyism as it implies that the unity of 
the party is more important than the unity of the nation.  
 
The Election Result  
 
The effect of five years of pernicious polarisation were clearly noticeable in the 1976 General 
Election. Firstly, the turnout of 95 percent remains the highest ever in Antiguan history.  This 
363
turnout resulted from five years of highly partisan media, the politicisation of children, tightening of 
party control and use of victimisation or supporter-reward, and the experience of a more extreme and 
authoritarian political culture. These phenomena eroded the middle ground in Antiguan politics and 
pushed almost everyone into one of two party groups. In such a perniciously polarised community, 
one simply could not avoid becoming political and engaging in elections. The tendency for pernicious 
polarisation to couch political discourse in terms of group and national survival gave urgency to 
political participation - creating a sense that one must act and vote or risk imperilling one’s 
community.  
A second notable feature of this election is the near-unprecedented absence of minor and third 
parties. In the four general elections since 1951 there had always been a handful of candidates 
representing an issue-party or a minority group voter-targeting party. These included the middle-class 
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Antigua National Party in 1956, the pro-democracy Antigua Democratic Labour Party in 1960, and 
the Antigua Progressive Party in 1971.  Though these parties never won a seat, their campaigns were 
364
an effort to introduce debate into the political arena, challenge the status quo, and represent particular 
interests such as middle-class and professional concerns in contrast with the working-class block 
control of Parliament. In 1976, there were no other choices than the two parties except for Barbuda 
where the independent and wildly popular Barbudan nationalist Claude Earl Francis was elected. 
While the Westminster System and First Past the Post voting system create major challenges for small 
parties, as various scholars have pointed out, the total absence of third parties in Antigua in 1976 
illustrates just what proportions polarisation had reached.  
Firstly, societal polarisation made it nearly impossible for new parties to establish themselves 
because society was already so divided between two opposing groups. By 1976, ‘party’ was such a 
powerful part of social identity that those who did not belong to one’s own party were deemed to be 
‘the other’ and treated as a threat. There was effectively no mental bandwidth available in the 
Antiguan electorate for a new party to emerge. Secondly, the nature of political debate in Antigua had 
shifted so as to make ideology or issue-driven parties irrelevant. As has been shown, by 1976 
party-political polarisation had moved the terms of political debate away from policy or ideology and 
focused it entirely on personality and party. This shift ruled out the development of issue-based or 
pressure group parties in the 1976 election. Finally and relatedly, the collapse of third parties was 
facilitated by polarisation because the removal of ideology, class, and other political and social issues 
from the political arena meant that middle-class groups could easily be co-opted into one of the two 
larger parties. This happened when Rowan Henry’s middle-class Antigua People’s Party merged with 
the ALP in 1974. This contraction of Antigua’s political space further demonstrates the demise of 
traditional bases of political thought such as ideology and the indomitable rise of partyism as the only 
axis in Antiguan political culture.  
As well as high turnout and the absence of small parties, the 1976 election was marked by a 
near-perfect split of the electorate between the PLM and the ALP. In 1976, 24,879 votes were cast, of 
which 245 were cast for three independent candidates in Barbuda. The remaining 24,634 Antiguan 
votes were all cast for either PLM or ALP candidates.  The ALP got 12,056 votes to the PLM’s 
365
12,268, meaning there was a difference of 212 votes or 0.87 percent between the two parties.  The 
366
unrepresentative nature of the first-past-the-post constituency voting system meant that the ALP's 
49.01 percent vote share translated into 65 percent of seats. The near-perfect dissection of voters 
between the PLM and ALP typifies the polarisation of Antigua around 1976; by this time the 
polarisation of Antigua was so complete that almost no Antiguans could avoid being supporters of 




The foregoing discussion shows that between 1971 and 1976 Antiguan political culture became 
perniciously polarised. Political and societal polarisation prior to the 1971 General Election had 
divided Antiguan society between supporters of Labour and the PLM. Party membership eclipsed 
other markers of identity and became the overriding categorisation by which Antiguan identified 
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themselves. The ascension of the PLM to government and the relegation of Labour to opposition 
ushered in a reformatory period whereby the leadership of both parties took action to secure their 
positions of control and internal dominance. At the same time, both sides underwent an authoritarian 
shift whereby more extreme action was regarded as not only acceptable but necessary to ensure party 
survival. In the five years of PLM government fundamental principles of party and union separation, 
constitutionalism, and law and order were sacrificed in pursuit of party survival at any cost. The 
consequence of this partyism was a deepening of the ‘us versus them’ cleavage in Antiguan society 
which is shown by the high turnout and perfect split of voters in the 1976 election. Antagonism, 
antipathy, and distrust were established as defining features of Antiguan political culture. Reflecting 
on this, King Short Shirt echoed the sentiments of the quote with which this chapter opened, and 












This dissertation has traced the emergence of party politics in Antigua, and its polarising effect on 
Antiguan society. Party politics began in 1967 with a schism in the labour movement dividing 
working people between support of Bird’s old anti-colonial vanguard and Walter’s new rejuvenated 
workers' struggle. This cleavage quickly became emotionally charged, particularly with political 
rhetoric drawing on religious and nationalist tropes of bad-mindedness and treachery. Through such 
language, political debate in Antigua was articulated in terms of personality, with the character of 
individual leaders and their parties becoming the focus of attack or defence. This led to an ideology of 
partyism with the overriding objective of empowering the party at any cost. Soon political polarisation 
gave way to societal polarisation when almost all areas of daily life became infected by partyism, 
ranging from applying for jobs to children's clubs. Gradually, this societal polarisation, enhanced 
echo-chamber thinking in the partisan media, and heightened efforts to inculcate party identity among 
members helped to bring about a state of pernicious polarisation. Firmly in place after the 1971 
election, pernicious polarisation closed off any remaining opportunities for political compromise and 
partyism began to have serious and long term detrimental effects on Antiguan governance and society. 
This is demonstrated by the enactment of unconstitutional laws, a marked shift towards 
authoritarianism within both parties, and the escalation of political intimidation to the level of 
terrorism by the Antigua Freedom Fighters by 1976.  
Understanding the development of polarisation in the 1960s and 1970s is of great importance 
because its long-term effects are still being felt. Most importantly, pernicious polarisation and the 
demise of cooperation and debate has led to a high degree of political sterility in Antigua. Throughout 
the 1970s no creative political solutions were generated to deal with the social and economic 
challenges Antigua faced. The issue of foreign-ownership in the tourism industry was never resolved 
and to this day remains the dominant feature of Antigua’s economy. Just as noticeably, party-political 
polarisation remains the dominant feature of Antiguans’ sense of identity and contributes to profound 
and often moving instances of social discord ranging from childhood bullying to family feuds.  
But was it inevitable that Antigua’s political culture developed the way it did between 1967 
and 1976? The foregoing has shown that the rise of polarisation was to a high degree the product of 
purposeful decisions taken by individual political leaders. The reactions of working people were 
largely engineered to have the specific effect of entrenching animosity between the membership of the 
two parties and thereby strengthening the internal position of party leaders. In practically every 
instance, Antigua’s political leaders took the “wrong” decision and acted to perpetuate polarisation, 
either on purpose or through accident. For example, in 1967 and 1968 Bird had many opportunities to 
heal the growing labour schism. He could, for instance, have publicly issued an immediate and full 
explanation of Walter’s dismissal and tried to carry union and public support rather than insisting on 
autocratic control of the ATLU. Similarly, he could have attempted reconciliation with Walter and his 
supporters rather than instigating a personalised media campaign against him and Halstead. Hindsight 
makes such things obvious and in 1967 Bird was operating in a truly unprecedented situation. 
Nonetheless, the failure or refusal of Bird to recognise the scale and emotional nature of Walter’s 
support may well be the greatest missed opportunity of Antigua’s modern history.  
Faced with a choice between escalation and deescalation, Walter and his supporters also 
routinely chose the former option. This is most apparent in their time in government. For example, 




discussion in the party leadership which in turn encouraged more extreme and closed-minded thinking 
at government level. The opposite would have been beneficial - to maximise diversity of opinion in 
Cabinet and generate policies built in the spirit of compromise and conciliation which could have 
attempted to bring the Antiguan people together. Though initially motivated by good intentions, both 
Bird and Walter, and their successors, have continued a long legacy of authoritarian island-rulers 
which has its roots in the colonial planters and Governors. 
Ultimately, the reason these opportunities were lost was the propensity for Antiguan political 
culture to conceive of politics as a winner-takes-all game where there is no room for opposing or 
dissenting voices. This winner-takes-all culture was derived from the Westminster System which 
prioritises securing a simple majority of seats in the elected legislature to form a functioning and 
powerful government. Manfred Schmidt is not alone in pointing out that while majoritarian rule can 
generate innovative, decisive politics, it can also cause confrontation, hostility, and destabilisation.  368
Another flaw of the Westminster System that is exposed in small places is the weak separation of 
powers between the legislature and the executive. Where the Cabinet is not completely outnumbered 
by the legislative chambers (as it is in the UK), there is no meaningful check on executive power. This 
facilitates the passage of legislation like the 1972 Newspaper Acts which otherwise would be regarded 
as extreme. The presence of these innate flaws in the political system means that Antigua was acutely 
vulnerable to absolutist, extremist, and authoritarian politics from the start. When party politics 
emerged in 1968, polarisation was very ​likely​ and when political leaders then actively pursued partyist 
policies, polarisation became ​inevitable​. It can be argued, then, that polarisation in Antigua resulted 
from both a poorly suited political system for a small island ​and​ a political class intent on pursuing a 
policy of partyism over and above any ideology or principle.  
This dissertation has also pointed to the need to consider how polarisation continued after 
1976 and in what ways it has shaped Antiguan political culture into the present day. Most importantly, 
it is essential to assess how a partyism and pernicious polarisation influenced public debate and 
official negotiations in the run up to independence in 1981. The settlement agreed upon in 1981 was 
and remains controversial, particularly in its handling of Barbuda. It is important to know if partyism 
impacted how Barbuda was treated in negotiations between Antigua and Britain and if pernicious 
polarisation shaped the Antiguan side of those negotiations. Such questions have modern day 
implications because the rights of Barbudans and the relationship between Barbuda and Antigua are a 
major topic of debate today. Within this must be engagement with the fact that only the ALP has been 
a constant of Antiguan politics - every election has seen the opposition party collapse and reform itself 
into a new organisation. This distinguishes Antigua from the rest of the Anglophone Caribbean and 
likely had an impact on Independence negotiations.  
As well as potentially influencing independence, partyism has posed a number of long-term 
challenges for Antigua in the postcolonial period. Partyism and pernicious polarisation are threads that 
link together ongoing issues such as corruption, economic inequality, colourism, and social disunity. 
Understanding political culture and its relationship with other forms of culture and identity in Antigua 
are essential to provide possible solutions to these challenges and forge a new and more optimistic 
path forward. The opportunity for further research in these and other topics is therefore extensive. It is 
hoped that this dissertation serves as motivation for further investigation, fundamentally prompting 
more questions than it answers.  
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Appendix i: Timeline of Relevant Events  
1939 - Moyne Commission arrives in Antigua, ​ATLU established  
1943 - Bird becomes ATLU President, ​Workers' Voice ​begins printing  
1945 - Bird elected to the Legislative Assembly for the first time  
1946 - Bird nominated to the Executive Council 
1951 - ​Universal Suffrage Introduced  
1956 - ‘Committee Government’ introduced; Bird as Chairman for Trade and Production  
1960 - Ministerial Government introduced; ​Bird appointed Chief Minister  
1967 - ​Associated Statehood ​(27 Feb), Walter dismissed as General Secretary of the ATLU (May) 
1968 - Civil Unrest & State of Emergency (March), ​PLM established​ & wins 4 by-elections (Aug) 
1971 - ​PLM win general election  
1972 - Newspaper Acts and Public Order Act passed, Sugar Industry closed down  
1976 - ​ALP win election  
1978 - ALP signal to UK they will campaign for independence  
1980 - Parties campaign for independence, ALP win election, Constitutional Conference in London  
1981 - ​Independence  











Element  1956 Constitution  1960/61 Reforms  Notes 
Administrator Representative of the Monarch; 
Head of State.  
 Alec Lovelace (1954-58), 
Ian Turbott (1958-64), 
David Rose (1964-66) 
Chief Minister  Position nonexistent. The 
Colonial Administrator was head 
of the Executive and had direct 
governmental powers.  
Position of Chief Minister 
created. Chief Minister appointed 
by virtue of majority support in 
the Legislative Assembly. 
 
Governmental powers transferred 
from Administrator to Chief 
Minister.  
V C Bird was Chief 
Minister from 1960 
Executive  
Council (EC) 
‘Committee’ government  
 
Specialised ‘committees’ or 
departments were overseen by 
Chairmen appointed by the 
Administrator. Three of these 
had to be from elected members 
of the Legislative Assembly.  
 Ministerial Government is fully 
established. 
 
All ministers are now chosen by 
the Chief Minister.  
 
Ministers for Labour and Finance 
to be chosen from among elected 
members of LA.  
Bird was chairman for 
Trade and Production in 
the Committee System 
 
Bird became Chief 
MInister from 1960 
Legislative  
Assembly (LA) 
13 members: 8 elected and 4 
appointed by the Governor.  
Elected seats increased from 8 to 
10.  
Nominated reduced to 2.  
ATLU won all elected 
seats.  
 
The Electorate  Voting restrictions abolished in 
1951. All Antiguans 21 years and 
older allowed to vote.  
All Antiguans 21 years and older 
allowed to vote.  
 
 
Appendix iii: Antigua’s political structure established by the 1967 Constitution 
(Associated Statehood) 
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Element  Function  Notes 
Governor Representative of the Monarch; Head of State.  Wilfred Jacobs was made the first 
Governor and the first black ‘chief 






The Governor is obliged to appoint as Premier the member of 
the House of Representatives most able to command the 
confidence of that House. (62.2) The Premier is invited to 
form a Government by advising the Governor on appointing 
members of the Senate and House to a Cabinet. (62.3) 
Vere Cornwall Bird, 1967-1971 
George Walter, 1971-1976 
Vere Cornwall Bird, 1976-1981 
Cabinet  “Other ministers” to be appointed by Governor on advice of 
Premier for responsibilities at the discretion of the Premier 
(61.1) Ministers may be from the Senate or the House. The 
Cabinet forms the government, responsible for the 
management of the state.  
The Premier could also appoint 
Permanent Parliamentary Secretaries 
from the House to support the work of 
Ministers. PPSs were entitled to attend 
Cabinet.  
Senate  The “Upper House”, approval required for all bills except 
‘money bills’. The Senate may not refuse a bill twice in 
consecutive Parliaments.  
10 members, serving for the duration of the Parliament, 
appointed by the Governor; 7 on the advice of the Premier, 3 
at the discretion of the Governor (in practice, this meant after 
consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.)  
Presided over by a non-government President elected by and 
from Senators.  
The Senate was dissolved and 
re-appointed at each election. There 
were no ‘crossbenchers’ and all 
positions were party political.  
 




The “Lower House”, responsible for introducing and 
approving all legislation. 
 
MPs elected by single-member constituencies by FPTP, 
serving for the duration of the Parliament.  
 
Presided over by a non-government Speaker elected by and 
from MPs.  
Single-member constituencies 
determined by a Constituencies 
Commission. At the time of 
introduction in 1967 there were 10 
constituencies, 13 in 1968, and 17 
from 1971 onwards. 
 
Simple majority voting. 




ABDM - Antigua Barbuda Democratic Movement  
ADF - Antigua Defence Force  
AFF - Antigua Freedom Fighters  
ALP - Antigua Labour Party 
ALPYM - Antigua Labour Party Youth Movement  
ANA - Antigua National Archive  
ANP - Antigua National Party  
ATLU - Antigua Trades and Labour Union  
AWU - Antigua Workers Union  
BGR - British Government Representative (to the West Indian Associated States) 
CCL - Caribbean Congress of Labour  
PLM - Progressive Labour Movement  
TNA - The National Archives (UK) 
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